Stelzner angrily hung up without saying anything further. Meiser was put on the sick-list, but did not remain long at the cottage hospital. Without letting Stelzner know, Meiser declared himself fit. The doctor said that Meiser was crazy, but let him go after providing him with some painkillers. Meiser joined a hastily cobbled-together infantry troop. Like many other similar formations it was not a success in battle and Meiser soon found himself searching for his parent division again.482
There were also some favorable developments for Gruppe Stemmermann. Most important was the fact that the air supply was quite successful on 8 February. During the day, the initial reports showed that 20 tons of ammunition and 14 cubic meters of fuel were landed at Korsun, in addition to 127 canisters with various contents that were dropped in the pocket. Furthermore, during the night of 8 February, another 100 tons of ammunition and 32 cubic meters of fuel were landed, and 566 wounded were brought out with the aircraft. In fact, it later transpired that these initial reports gave a conservative estimate, because it was reported that between the morning of 8 February and the morning of 9 February, 150 tons of ammunition and 60 cubic meters of fuel were flown in to Gruppe Stemmermann. This was the largest amount so far to be flown in during any 24-hour period.483
The arrival of the much needed supplies, in particular ammunition, gave Gruppe Stemmermann some respite. It was indeed in the nick of time, as the quartermaster of 8th Army had predicted that the ammunition on hand would be exhausted on 9 February. Still, when Speidel and Busse discussed the situation on the morning of 9 February, they concluded unanimously that Gruppe Stemmermann would have to break out no later than 11 February.484
Even though a significant number of wounded men had been flown out, many remained. Late in the evening of 8 February it was reported that approximately 1,400 wounded were in Korsun. Some of these were among those evacuated by air during the following night, but still about 1,000 must have remained.
Casualties had not been slight during the two weeks that had elapsed since the two Soviet fronts began their offensive. The 389th Infantry Division had been weak already before the beginning of the battle, and by now it was so depleted that its combat elements were distributed to other formations and the division staff was used to control traffic within the pocket. To the soldiers in the pocket there was probably nothing remarkable in this. Almost from the very beginning, units had been shuffled back and forth. Even though sectors had been allotted to divisions, elements of various divisions were intermingled to a considerable extent.485
It was not only the movements ordered by the senior commanders that caused units to be intermingled. In many cases soldiers were cut off from their units and wandered around in the pocket, some searching for their unit, some trying to hide from the fighting. Together with four other soldiers, Anton Meiser had reached Gorodishche, where they searched for their division after finding some food and rest. Two of the soldiers had little inclination to be “sacrificed,” as they called it. Meiser attempted to convince them that if everyone thought like that, nobody would get out of the pocket. It was to no avail and Meiser tried to argue that one day or another, deserters would get into difficulties, but failed to make any impression on the two soldiers. Meiser left them, but the other two soldiers followed him and continued to search for their division. After a while they met a sergeant, who told them he had seen vehicles with the 389th Division insignia north of Gorodishche. Meiser was skeptical about this, but did not rule out the prospect that the sergeant was correct. After all, they had been pushed northward.486
By now the ground had frozen and it was much easier to walk, compared to the days before when the deep mud had made every step a challenge. After a long walk Meiser and his two comrades reached the Wallonien Brigade. To turn back was out of the question; neither Meiser nor the other two soldiers wanted to walk back and forth unnecessarily, so instead they decided to report themselves at one of the Wallonien companies, where they were also given food. Meiser and his comrades were included in the Wallonien ranks without much formality. Meiser could not avoid reflecting on his appearance and that of the other two soldiers. None of them had shaved for several days, and their clothes were more akin to rags than uniforms. The well dressed Wallonians seemed amazed when they saw the three ragged veterans from the 389th Division. Still, the newcomers were given ammunitions for their small arms, two hand grenades each, and rations. The commanding officer said that he would send them to 389th Division as soon as he received information about its location. In the meantime, Meiser and the two soldiers stayed with the Wallonien Brigade, where they were treated very well.487
As the advance in the Valieva area had progressed far less rapidly than Konev had hoped, he ordered Selivanov to use the 63rd Cavalry Division to cover the sector from Valiava to Klichkovo, and to use the rest of his forces to attack towards Zavadovka. Simultaneously, 52nd Army was to attack towards Zavadovka, from the northeast, thereby cutting off the German salient around Gorodishche.488
Stemmermann also had plans for the forthcoming days, which he outlined in a radio message to 8th Army at 04.45hrs on 9 February. Until the night of 9 February the present line was to be held, even though elements had been pulled out from the Gorodischche area. Under cover of darkness the southeastern front should be withdrawn to the line of Glushki–Derenkovets. On 10 February the 72nd Division and elements of SS-Wiking should be shifted to the Shenderovka area, in order to be ready to attack on 11 February, with the aim of advancing along the road from Shenderovka to Morentsy. Thus, Gruppe Stemmermann would attack toward III Panzer Corps.489
Stemmermann’s plans could not be carried out exactly to the letter. Soviet pressure and difficult roads conspired to upset the schedule. However, by the end of 9 February the situation was approximately as planned. Konev’s troops entered Gorodishche, which had been abandoned by the Germans. For the moment, German food reserves were sufficient for five days, but as a precaution Lieb ordered the bread rations to be cut back to 500 grams per day within his corps. The number of wounded remained high. On 8 February Gruppe Stemmermann had suffered 350 casualties, and approximately 1,100 wounded were in Korsun.490
As so often in war, where true information is scarce, rumors spread inside the Korsun pocket. Some of them at least had a trace of substance while other were wildly off the mark. For example, there was speculation about rifts between the German commanders. Such perceptions may have held a grain of truth, but the stories were exaggerated with each person who retold them. Another rumor was that the German generals had negotiated with the Soviet commanders. Exactly how this rumor originated is unclear, but a possible explanation is that some soldiers of Korps-Gruppe B may have observed that a high ranking Soviet officer came to the chief of staff. Assumptions of the outcome of that meeting may have spread quickly. Another strange rumor was that General Stemmermann had been arrested and General Gille had assumed command. The basis for such a rumor is even more difficult to guess at.491