CHAPTER 14
Breith Tries Again
The days that had passed between 4–10 February had taken their toll on the III Panzer Corps. Its tank losses due to enemy action were small, but many more tanks had been rendered inoperable due to technical problems and the very poor condition of the roads. However, it was hoped that these would soon be brought back into running order. For example, on 10 February heavy Panzer Regiment Bäke had 10 Tigers and 16 Panthers operational, but it was hoped that a total of 40 tanks would be available to the regiment on 11 February.
The situation was worse for the 17th Panzer Division, which only had one Panzer III and four Panzer IVs operational on 10 February. On the other hand, the 16th Panzer Division reported 16 Panthers, 16 Panzer IVs, and 10 StuG IIIs on the same day. Again it was supposed that more tanks would soon be operable again. The 16th Panzer Division was reinforced by a company with 10 PzKw IV tanks from SS-Leibstandarte. The 506th heavy Panzer Battalion had only two operational Tigers on 10 February, and the 249th Assault Gun Battalion was little better off, with four StuG IIIs.504
This meant that the units that had begun Operation Wanda now consisted of 79 tanks and assault guns, a reduction of 39% since the beginning of the operation. To supplement these units, more formations from the 1st Panzer Division had arrived, including 18 Panzer IVs and 48 Panther tanks. Thus, on the evening of 10 February the III Panzer Corps had, together with the tanks from SS-Leibstandarte, 155 tanks and assault guns available in the units that were to attack at dawn the following day. More than half were heavy Panthers and Tigers.505
Hube had previously claimed that his Panzers could roll over any Soviet defense consisting of infantry and antitank guns. For the attack on 11 February he had collected an impressive attacking force by German 1944 standards, and one that was much stronger than anything von Vormann could hope for. It remained to see if Hube’s confidence in his Panzer units was justified. After all, the ground remained very soft and muddy, and the opposing Soviet 6th Tank Army had been given several days to prepare its defensive positions.506
Breith had chosen to place the 16th Panzer Division, with heavy Panzer Regiment Bäke and the II./Art.Rgt. 67 Artillery Battalion, in the center, just west of Shubennyi Stav. The division was complete, except for one infantry battalion, which remained with the SS-Leibstandarte covering the western and northern flank of III Panzer Corps. The weak 17th Panzer Division was placed on the left flank. Elements from the 1st Panzer Division were still stuck in the mud further south, but the division was to attack alongside the 16th Panzer Division, with its elements available at dawn on 11 February.507
The plan was quite straightforward. The tanks, in particular heavy Tank Regiment Bäke and Kampfgruppe Frank, the latter consisting of the Panther battalion and SPW battalion of 1st Panzer Division, were to crush the enemy defenses between Ryshanovka and Shubennyi Stav. Two Nebelwerfer regiments were to support the 16th and 17th Panzer Divisions. After breaking through the Soviet defenses the tanks were to make a dash toward the Gniloi Tikich River to capture crossings between Kamenyy Brod and Lisyanka, thereby enabling III Panzer Corps to continue toward Gruppe Stemmermann.508
Hans-Valentin Hube spent most of 10 February—a Thursday characterized by fog, snow squalls, and thaw—visiting III Panzer Corps. The Leibstandarte, which had the task of holding the western part of the III Panzer Corps, had very little infantry. On the previous day it had only been able to muster 180 men in the trenches, a small number for a division that had to cover a front of approximately 15 kilometers. The II./Pz.Gren.Rgt. 79, a motorized infantry battalion from 16th Panzer Division, had to remain with the Leibstandarte, or else the division could not be expected to hold its positions.509
The mud caused Hube great concern. It had taken a heavy toll on the vehicles. For example, one of the artillery battalions of 1st Panzer Division had lost 11 of its 15 prime movers for the guns and was stuck in the mud further south. The staff of III Panzer Corps only had three vehicles in order and was unable even to organize itself according to the normal procedures. If the mud continued to be such a factor, the other arms might find it well nigh impossible to follow the tanks when the offensive began.510
Despite the mud, the battles that had raged since 4 February had been quite intense. The III Panzer Corps claimed to have knocked out 300 tanks since Operation Wanda began. These claims were said to be confirmed and were regarded as reliable. Hube was shown a tank graveyard near Pavlovka, where countless U.S. lend-lease tanks and Soviet T-34s could be seen. Furthermore, the 1st Ukrainian Front archival records show that Vatutin’s troops had lost 337 tanks and assault guns irretrievably during the first 10 days of February.511 As most of its armor was employed against III Panzer Corps during these days, and little action took place elsewhere, it seems that the German claims were not too far off the mark. Whatever the true number of destroyed Soviet tanks, it was certainly considerable, and ample testimony to the fierceness of the fighting. In exchange, German tank losses due to enemy fire were slight.512
It is likely that Hube was thoroughly confident in the combat skills of his Panzer units, but whether it was sufficient to save Gruppe Stemmermann was another matter. However, there was no alternative to trying, no matter what it might cost.
Franz Bäke had placed the 503rd Tiger Battalion in the center, the II./Pz.Rgt. 23 Panther Battalion on the left and the I./Pz.Rgt. 2 Panther Battalion (from the 16th Panzer Division) on the right, when his battle group moved up toward the front. Frost during the night did make it somewhat easier to move, but it was unlikely that the ground would remain frozen during the day. Bäke gave the forward signal at 07.00hrs, and at least 10 Tigers and 32 Panthers began to advance against the Soviet defenses facing the German tanks. Behind them followed the infantry of Kampfgruppe Blömeke from 16th Panzer Division, but Captain Blömeke chose to go with the tanks in the lead.513
Blömeke’s decision to go with the tanks in the lead proved to be a wise choice, as the tanks made very rapid progress. Within two hours hill 239.1 had been reached, which was about eight kilometers from the jump-off positions. Bäke’s tanks kept the attack going, and if anything even increased the pace. Under a clear sky the Tigers reached Bushanka at 10.00hrs, only to find that all bridges capable of taking tanks and other vehicles had been blown up. A small bridge, which allowed soldiers to pass, was undamaged, but that was all. However, the II./Pz.Rgt. 23 Panther Battalion was more fortunate. While the Tigers reached Bushanka the Panthers rushed into Frankovka, stormed over the bridge over the Gniloi Tikich River, which had demolition charges attached, and secured it before the Red Army had time to destroy it. The crew of the tank that first crossed was rewarded by an extra eight days’ leave.514
The Gniloi Tikich River was a major obstacle and with a river crossing secured, the chances of reaching Gruppe Stemmermann had improved considerably. At III Panzer Corps staff the news about the success at Frankovka caused elation, and the following radio message was sent to General Stemmermann: “We are coming. Bridgehead and bridge at Frankovka 11.00.”515
South of Kampfgruppe Bäke, the 1st Panzer Division attacked with Kampfgruppe Frank. At 06.30hrs, supported by one artillery battalion from 1st Panzer Division and the artillery of 198th Infantry Division, Frank sent his tanks forward. In the lead was a Panther company, commanded by Lieutenant Seemann. There were no Panzer grenadiers riding on his tanks, but the companies following behind did have Panzer grenadiers with them. As the divisions’ SPW-units had not yet arrived, there was no other possibility of bring the grenadiers along in the mud. Success was swiftly achieved. After two hours Chizkhovka was taken, and the tanks veered to the left and squeezed a Soviet rifle battalion between the 1st and 16th Panzer Divisions. The Soviet battalion was quickly defeated.516