Stalin paid little attention to Zhukov’s objection and replied, before hanging up: “Let Vatutin personally supervise the operations of the 13th and 60th Armies in the area of Rovno–Lutsk–Dubno, while you assume responsibility for preventing a breakthrough by the enemy striking force from the Lisyanka area.” A few hours later this was confirmed in the form of a written directive, which also included the order to transfer the 27th Army, with the 180th, 202nd, and 337th Rifle Divisions, plus the 54th and 159th Fortified Regions, to Konev’s 2nd Ukrainian Front. To what extent Stalin’s order affected the operations is of course difficult to tell, but compared to force ratios, weather, logistics, and other factors it probably had relatively little effect. The order did mean that Vatutin’s front would not be honored with the expected victory over the encircled Germans.547
General Konev gives a slightly different description of events in his memoirs. According to Konev it was Stalin who proposed to transfer 27th Army to 2nd Ukrainian Front, but Konev claims to have advised against the idea. He valued Trofimenko as a commander, but Konev believed it would be difficult for him to lead and assist an army on the other side of the cauldron. However, Stalin remained firm and 27th Army was transferred.548
Following the directive to place 27th Army under the command of 2nd Ukrainian Front, Konev decided to establish a forward command post where 4th Guards Army had located its staff. He was told that the ground was too soft for a Po-2 aircraft to land, but as it would take too much time to travel by car in the mud, Konev ordered that a temporary landing strip should be created. Finally, two Po-2s left the 2nd Ukrainian Staff headquarters, one of them with Konev as a passenger and the other with his adjutant. The latter aircraft was attacked by German fighter aircraft and did not reach its destination, but Konev arrived at his forward command post to lead his units.549
It was of course very important that the Germans should capitalize on their possession of the bridgehead at Frankovka as quickly as possible. Late in the evening, Bäke was ordered to conduct a night attack from the bridgehead toward the Luka–Lisyanka road. However, due to resupply difficulties the attack could not be launched until after dawn. Using 10 Panthers from the II./Pz.Rgt. 23 and elements of the reconnaissance battalion of 16th Panzer Division, the attack was to unfold south of Dadushkovka and Chesnovka. However, south of Dadushkovka, fire from Soviet antitank guns in ambush positions, assisted by poor visibility due to fog, knocked out several Panthers. Four of them seem to have been permanently lost, and the attack was halted.550
The dearth of supplies continued to be a restraining factor for Kampfgruppe Bäke, which remained fairly inactive during 12 February. Kampfgruppe Blömeke also saw little action. An attempt was made to advance toward Kamenyy Brod, but after some initial success the German troops returned to the positions held during the morning. Neither did the 17th Panzer Division see much action. It moved its elements forward, to be in a better position to cover the flank of the 16th Panzer Division, as the latter would continue to drive northeast as soon as possible.551
The other three divisions of III Panzer Corps were involved in more difficult fighting during 12 February. At Vinograd, the Soviet 3rd Guards Airborne Division launched several battalion-sized attacks, which penetrated into Vinograd and continued to the center of the village. As the German defenders only consisted of 35 riflemen, four machine guns and an antiaircraft platoon from the 198th Division, they could not withstand the attack. The Germans were forced to withdraw to the southern part of Vinograd. To restore the situation, the 326th Infantry Regiment, the Füsilier battalion, and one artillery battalion from the 198th Division were directed toward Vinograd. Also Breith sent two batteries from the 202nd Assault Gun Battalion, which had just been transferred from VII Corps, to reinforce the 198th Division at Vinograd. Finally, a Kampfgruppe from SS-Leibstandarte was ordered to counterattack along the road from Votylevka toward Vinograd. The latter only consisted of one Panther and 12 riflemen. By twilight it was still to early to tell what effect Breith’s countermeasures would have.552
The Soviet 58th Division put pressure on the SS-Leibstandarte, especially at Repki, which was attacked early in the morning. The reconnaissance battalion of the 1st SS was soon forced out of Repki. Otherwise, Leibstandarte was beset with supply problems, just like virtually every other unit. Due to the poor condition of the roads, its field kitchens had still not arrived. The soldiers had been given cans of meat, to heat by themselves, but the unbalanced diet gave the division doctor cause for concern about the health of the men. Ammunition also remained scarce. Lieutenant-Colonel Stoltz looked for a means to alleviate the transportation difficulties. As so often in this war, the local population and its assets were used. About 150 horse-drawn vehicles were commandeered and sent to the front, each loaded with 200 liters of fuel. A stretch of narrow-gauge railroad had been found, leading to a brickyard, and it was decided that it too could be used. Work was begun on connecting it to the front so that rail hoppers could be drawn by horses on the tracks. For the moment these measures had not yet proved useful, but at least they presented some hope for improvement.553
The 1st Panzer Division, on the other side of the protruding salient that the III Panzer Corps had driven into the Soviet lines, also spent much of 12 February worrying about supplies. Kampfgruppe Frank at Lisyanka was very low on fuel and ammunition. As we have seen, one Panther company and some infantry, under the command of Lieutenant Wall, had been left at Bushanka. It was decided to move them to Lisyanka, which would provide Frank with some fresh forces that were also better furnished with ammunition and fuel. When the Panther company began to move it met very little resistance.
The distance between Bushanka and Lisyanka was only six kilometers. In good conditions it would take less than a quarter of an hour for Wall’s Panthers, but when he set out in the morning he could not count on perfect conditions and he probably expected the journey to take more time. It seemed likely that there would be little opposition from the Red Army, and Lieutenant Wall’s force proceeded unmolested until Lisyanka was within sight. However within 300 meters of Lisyanka, a shot from a Soviet antitank gun hit his tank, killing or wounding the infantry who rode on top of the Panther. Sergeant Strippel, who commanded the tank following behind Wall, saw what happened and radioed to the other tanks to halt before reaching the field of fire of the Soviet guns.
Covered by fire from Lieutenant Wall’s Panther, Strippel ordered his driver to run the tank over the open field at full speed to Lisyanka. It was a daring maneuver, but Strippel was a very experienced tanker, who had clocked up an impressive score of knocked out enemy tanks. Strippel’s Panther made it to Lisyanka without being hit, and he took cover. It was difficult to locate the Soviet antitank guns, so Strippel found it prudent to climb out from the tank while it remained in cover, and proceed on foot to locate the guns. Having successfully done that, he went back to his Panther and rolled forward to open fire on the antitank guns, which were silenced. Subsequently the remainder of Wall’s company proceeded safely to Lisyanka.554
Otherwise, Lieutenant-Colonel Frank had little for which to be thankful. During 12 February, 40 aircraft flew supplies to the III Panzer Corps. All of it had to be dropped in canisters, and Frank did not get much, as only two of the aircraft dropped their loads in the area held by his Kampfgruppe. In frustration he saw that many other canisters fell in a forest south of Lisyanka, which was held by Soviet troops. Also, the link between his Kampfgruppe and other parts of Koll’s Division was very weak, as the roads running west and southwest from Lisyanka were harassed by Soviet forces. Already during the night of 11 February, a column of German vehicles loaded with supplies became painfully aware of the threat. When it reached the area between Yablonovka and Tikhonovka, it was shot up by Soviet antitank guns and assault guns. This boded ill for the urgent need to get supplies to Frank. Furthermore, unless a corridor could be held open, through which Stemmermann’s beleaguered soldiers could move, there was no point in the German armored spearheads reaching the pocket.555