Breith’s Panzer corps had not fired its last shot. During the night a supply column reached Kampfgruppe Bäke, bringing precious ammunition and fuel to the Panthers and Tigers, thereby making it possible to resume offensive actions. Breith gave clear orders to his units for 13 February to continue the offensive. The 16th Panzer Division, with Bäke’s regiment, was to break through the Soviet defenses near Dadushkovka and reach Khizhintsy, to link up with Gruppe Stemmermann, no matter what it took to do so. Kamfpgruppe Frank should ford the Gniloi Tikich River at Lisyanka, and if necessary give up the southern part of the town. Breith’s orders carried the suggestion that the attempt would succeed here or fail completely, because he was aware that Gruppe Stemmermann could not hold out for more than a few days.556
One reason for the sense of extreme urgency was the situation at Korsun airfield, which was very close to the front line. Gruppe Stemmermann had about 2,000 wounded who had not been evacuated by air, most of whom were located near the Korsun airfield. Since the air evacuation operation was now at an end, they were to be moved to Steblev. From now on, the only remaining hope of getting out of the pocket was to move to the southwest. Lieb visited Khilki, which had just been taken. It was an important step toward linking up with the III Panzer Corps, but Lieb could not avoid noting how exhausted the soldiers were. Seeing that it was uncertain if they had the strength to accomplish a breakout, Lieb sent a message on the radio, saying that it was “urgently necessary that Breith as soon as possible reached Petrovskoye.” The latter village was located three kilometers west of Khilki, and if the III Panzer Corps got that close, a breakout stood a good chance of succeeding. Lieb asked his orderly to burn his papers and to distribute clothes and other items to his staff. Perhaps they would have more use for them during a breakout.557
The possibility of a breakout depended on whether III Panzer Corps could advance further, but still von Vormann’s corps had to continue attacking. If he did not, Konev would be able to release units from 2nd Ukrainian Front and place them between Gruppe Stemmermann and Breith’s Panzer corps. According to the plans previously prepared, the bridgehead at Iskrennoe was evacuated before sunrise. The remaining elements of the 13th Panzer Division were finally relieved by the 14th Panzer Division and were sent west, to join von Wietersheim’s attack.558
Before noon, the 11th Panzer Division mopped up Skalevatka, which had been captured the day before. From Skalevatka, Kampfgruppe von Sievers would attack toward Zvenigorodka, although the aim was to take hill 204.8, which was located about 4 kilometers north-northwest of Skalevatka, halfway to Zvenigorodka. Panthers from the 15th Panzer Regiment and I./Pz.Rgt. 26, with infantry riding on the tanks, would conduct the attack, which was scheduled to begin at 12.15hrs. Just before beginning the attack it was decided to proceed without infantry riding on the tanks, a decision that proved fortunate since Soviet mortars shelled the Panthers as soon as they rolled north. The infantry would most likely have suffered serious losses if they had sat on the tanks while shells exploded around them.559
The tanks proceeded unmolested to bypass hill 204.8 to the west, but soon Soviet antitank guns joined the mortars. The Germans found themselves in a crossfire, and Lieutenant Wartmann, who commanded the I./Pz.Rgt. 26 with its 10 operational Panthers, directed Sergeant Fangerow, with some of the Panthers, to engage the enemy to the east, while Lieutenant Weidinger with some of the other tanks attacked the Soviet forces to the west. Wartmann placed himself at the tip of the attack, to bypass hill 204.8 and attack it from the north.560
As was customary in the German Panzer troops, Wartmann commanded with his head up through the cupola on the roof of the Panther turret. This gave him better visibility compared to that from the vision aids within the tank, but of course also meant that he took a greater risk. While proceeding toward the hill, which he carefully studied through his binoculars to see if it was free of enemy troops, Soviet shells suddenly exploded near the German tanks. A splinter hit Wartmann in the wrist, making him unable to command the battalion.561
Lt. Weidinger assumed command and continued the attack, which succeeded in capturing hill 204.8 at about 14.30hrs. The Panthers had reached the objective, but had also suffered some losses. One tank was rendered unsalvageable, although the crew bailed out unharmed. Another tank was hit, but did not suffer extensive damage. Its crew was less fortunate, although there were no fatalities. Furthermore, the fuel tanks of the Panthers were almost empty at the end of the day. No fuel reached the forward tanks, and even a few tanks that drove back to Yerki for fuel found nothing. Weidinger’s tanks had to sit out the night almost immobile while waiting for fuel to arrive on the following day.562
On the morning of 12 February, Wöhler had set out to visit 11th Panzer Division and Kampfgruppe Haack, but only reached a point two kilometers north of Yampol, when he had to turn back because the roads were impassable. Thus he did not even get within 25 kilometers of von Wietersheim’s spearheads.563
Further north, the 13th Panzer Division attempted to gain a crossing over the Shpolka River at Yurkovka. On 11 February, the elements of the division that were subordinated to the 11th Panzer Division had occupied the high ground south of Yurkovka. At 13.00hrs that group, supported by the 911th Assault Gun Battalion, resumed the attack toward Yurkovka, and one and a half hours later penetrated into the village. A Soviet counterattack pushed the Germans back, but they still retained a small bridgehead when darkness fell. Hope remained that, when more troops from the 13th Panzer Division reached the area, the bridgehead could be expanded.564
Anton Meiser had been sent to take part in the defense of Korsun, and was given command of 20 men and subordinated to a lieutenant-colonel from the infantry. He took part in the vital defense of a hill behind which the airfield was located. Many wounded men were treated in Korsun, and during a lull in the fighting Meiser went to see some of them. The wounded men, often suffering severely from pain, were crammed on the floor of a house. Many of them seemed to be apathetic, others were in despair. The medical staff had much to do, but their resources were very limited.
Walking further in, Meiser found the cadet Damen, who had been shot through his hand and now also suffered from a high fever. Next to him lay another man from his old battery, a corporal who had been shot through the neck. Fortunately the bullet had passed straight through, without wobbling or hitting the trachea, arteries, or any other vital parts. Both Meiser’s comrades had “flight tickets,” a certificate written by a doctor that allowed them to be evacuated by air. After a while Meiser became aware that many of the soldiers held firmly to their “flight ticket.” He asked why and received the answer that there were people who walked around and tried to steal the certificates from the seriously wounded. Neither the wounded nor the thieves knew that by this time the evacuation by air had ceased.565