Walter Scherf commanded the Tigers and ordered that white flares should be fired as soon as the Stukas became visible. The tankers ensured that AP as well as high-explosive ammunition was easily accessible, as both tanks and antitank guns could be expected. Scherf had ordered that his tanks should move forward as soon as the first Stukas had released their bombs, but this did not work out as planned. When the Stukas attacked, the Soviet tanks moved forward, perhaps because they were located in a position that was suitable for ambushing advancing German tanks, but that did not provide cover from the air. Instead, the T-34s rolled straight toward the guns of the Tigers. At a distance of about 1,800 meters the Tigers opened fire and destroyed all the T-34s, save a few who turned back in time.577
Scherf ordered his Tigers forward when the Soviet tanks withdrew and soon became engaged in a life and death battle with Soviet tanks and antitank guns. Fortunately the flanking move by the Panthers now paid off, as they effectively engaged the Soviet tanks. However, the Soviet forces had further cards to play, when they threatened to outflank Scherf’s Tigers on the left; but again Scherf was lucky, as a Panther company from 16th Panzer Division arrived in time to stave off the threat. Meanwhile the Stukas continued attacking and proved especially effective at silencing the Soviet antitank guns. Finally the Germans got the upper hand, and when the battle was over they estimated they had knocked out about 70 tanks and 40 antitank guns. Five Tigers and four Panthers had been put out of action.578
When the strong Soviet position had been defeated, German troops from 16th Panzer Division occupied Dadushkovka at about 10.00hrs. There was no time to rest, as it was necessary to take advantage of this hard-fought success. In the mud the tanks and SPWs pushed on and took Chesnovka at 11.20hrs. One and a half hours later, Bäke’s regiment took up positions at hill 239.8, which was located about five kilometers north of Lisyanka, on the main road from Lisyanka to Baranye Pole. It was the very road Kravchenko’s tanks had used when they’d first headed for Zvenigorodka to encircle XI and XXXXII Corps.579
The Tigers kept blocking the road, while four Panthers, together with 12 SPWs from the reconnaissance battalion of 16th Panzer Division, continued toward Khizhintsy, which was taken in the afternoon. Thus the 16th Panzer Division and heavy Panzer Regiment Bäke had covered another 12 kilometers. Only 10 kilometers remained before they reached Gruppe Stemmermann. This was an impressive achievement, and von Manstein sent a radio message to III Panzer Corps and the 1st, 16th, and 17th Panzer Divisions, with the following content:580 “Bravo—despite mud and Russians, already much accomplished. Now it is about the last step. Teeth together and forward. Now or never. This step will succeed too.”581
Further south, at Lisyanka, Kampfgruppe Frank searched for a way to cross the Gniloi Tikich River. The thaw had caused the water to rise and the current was swift. The banks were steep and the condition of the river bed was unknown. That morning Soviet attacks had claimed the Kampfgruppe’s attention, but at noon Sergeant Strippel found a place where it might be possible to ford the river. Together with soldiers who volunteered for the task, he crossed the river further west of the bridge that had been blown up just in front of Lieutenant Ciliox’s Panther a day and a half earlier. Six more Panthers were collected, all with crews who volunteered, and, supported by Stukas, they managed to cross the river safely.582
With Strippel’s Panther in the lead, the Germans expanded the bridgehead. It was important to get infantry across too, and under cover from the guns of the Panthers that had already crossed, soldiers from the 6th Company of 113th Panzer Grenadier Regiment began crossing. In what amounted to a mixture of swimming and fording, the soldiers challenged the ice-cold water and swift current, but all made it to the other side. Once over they faced hard fighting, but by midnight the Germans had taken control of the western half of Lisyanka. Engineers began to repair the bridge, but it was too early to tell if it would be strong enough to carry Panthers. The muddy ground made it difficult to move forward essential repair equipment.583
Despite the uncertainty of the bridge at Lisyanka, the events of 13 February amounted to a major success for III Panzer Corps, which kindled hopes for the imminent rescue of Gruppe Stemmermann. The major concern was, as ever, the resupply of the spearheads. In the evening Frank had 22 Panthers fully operational and six that were not. In addition, most of Panzer Grenadier Regiment 113 and elements of Engineer Battalion 37 (both units belonging to First Panzer Division) were available to Frank at Lisyanka.584
This was all that 1st Panzer Division could make available for the advance toward Gruppe Stemmermann, since the rest of the division was either busy hauling supplies, covering the eastern flank, or had simply not yet arrived. In the Rizino area the divisional antiaircraft battalion was employed, but it was immobile. It had been stripped of its halftracks, which were employed in moving supplies forward. The supply route was under constant threat from roving Soviet forces, and to escort supply convoys from Tichonovka to Lisyanka, Koll had to use some of his PzKw IV tanks and Wespe and Hummel SP artillery pieces, in addition to one engineer company and elements of the SPW battalion. To cover the flank from Koblyaki to Tikhonovka, Koll disposed the reconnaissance battalion, the PzKw IV battalion, one antitank company, one infantry company, and three artillery batteries. The rest of his division was stuck in mud further south.585
Evidently Koll could only use a fraction of his division to push forward. Especially noteworthy is the relegation of the PzKw IV tanks to the role of securing supply lines to the Panthers, which led the attack. When the Germans had decided that each Panzer division should have one battalion of Panther tanks and one with PzKw IVs, several factors influenced the decision. One of the most important was that a complete shift to Panthers could not be done without seriously interrupting tank production, just at a time when it was critical that the rate of production should be increased. Thus the PzKw IV, which was old but not obsolete, was retained in the Panzer divisions. In fact production of the Panzers continued until the end of the war, which was sensible, considering that by February 1944 only seven Panther battalions had yet reached the front. Of these all but one were engaged in the battle to save Gruppe Stemmermann.
The idea to place Panthers at the tip of the attack, and use the older PzKw IVs to cover the flanks could usually not be carried through in practice, as most Panzer divisions had to rely on the PzKw IV and StuG III. At Korsun there was an usually high number of Panthers and Tigers available, and indeed almost all terrain gained by III Panzer Corps was taken with them in the lead. The lighter PzKw IV and StuG III were mainly used for flank protection. It had probably never been envisaged that the lighter vehicles should be employed as far back as Koll used them at this stage of the operation, but reality is a much stronger factor in determining dispositions than doctrine, and it is difficult to see what Koll could have done differently under the circumstances.