When he reached the outpost Fiebelkorn was completely exhausted and lost consciousness. He did not reawaken until he was on an aircraft. Then he found that in addition to the wound received before the breakout, both hands, both feet, and one knee was frost-bitten. Still, he lived and would get a chance to see his family again, including his wife who was carrying their second child.739
Soldiers arrived in various conditions over a period of some days after the breakout began, so it was difficult for III Panzer Corps to establish how many managed to escape. Lieutenant-General Mattenklott, the commander of XXXXII Corps who had been on leave when the Soviet pincers closed at Zvenigorodka three weeks earlier, was given the task of collecting and counting the survivors of Gruppe Stemmermann before sending them by rail or air toward facilities in the rear. It took almost two weeks for Mattenklott and his staff to count the survivors. Their final count showed that 27,703 German soldiers and 1,063 HiWis had broken out unscathed. In addition 7,496 wounded and injured had managed to reach III Panzer Corps. These were soldiers who had either been wounded during the breakout or who had been wounded beforehand but nevertheless been brought out. Hence, 36,262 had managed to escape the pocket. Also, 4,161 wounded and sick had been evacuated prior to the breakout aboard aircraft. Thus a total of 40,423 men had survived the encirclement without becoming prisoners.740
Since an estimated 59,000 men were trapped inside the encirclement on 28 January, about 19,000 men seem to have been killed or taken prisoner. About 11,000 were wounded, giving an overall casualty figure of about 30,000. This was of course a serious loss, but at least it was far from the disaster at Stalingrad, which appears to have loomed as a specter for many of the Germans who took part in the Korsun battle, whether on the ground or within the higher commands.741
The German soldiers’ fear of a new Stalingrad is also evident in Soviet archival records. For example, a German soldier who was taken prisoner and interrogated by 4th Guards Army said that the encirclement was regarded as a “second Stalingrad” by the German soldiers. They did not want to surrender due to fear of Siberia.742
Equipment losses were of course extensive. According to estimates by Mattenklott’s staff, there were 141 10.5cm howitzers, 33 15cm howitzers, eight 10cm guns, three 17cm guns, 41 7.62cm field guns, 51 7.5cm antitank guns and 13 other towed antitank guns inside the pocket when it was formed. There were also 12 Wespes, four Hummels and seven SP antitank guns inside the pocket. Thus 313 guns and howitzers had been encircled and virtually none came out.743
Soviet sources give grossly exaggerated figures on the German losses. First of all they inflate the strength of Gruppe Stemmermann; secondly they play down the number of soldiers who got out. Soviet sources claim that 75,000 Germans were surrounded, with 270 tanks and assault guns and 1,100 guns. Of these it is said that 52,000 soldiers were killed and 11,000 taken prisoner, while all equipment was lost. The only one of these figures that seems reasonable is the number of prisoners. All other are grossly inflated. It should be noted that these Soviet figures were released as soon as the battle ended, in an official bulletin. It seems wholly unreasonable that the full picture of the German losses could have been clear by then. It can only have been a figure deemed suitable for propaganda purposes, but was not changed in subsequent Soviet historiography.744
In his memoirs, Konev claims that the surrounded German force comprised the 57th, 72nd, 82nd, 88th, 167th, 168th, and 332nd infantry divisions, plus the SS-Panzer Division Wiking and the 213th Security Division. Also, he clams that the SS-Brigade Wallonien, an independent cavalry regiment, and a regiment each from the 389th and 198th Divisions, as well as a regiment from 14th Panzer Division and a number of supporting units were in the pocket. Compared to the German units that actually were in the pocket, Konev’s claims contain a number of errors, and some of the divisions given by Konev no longer existed.745
The dubious Red Army information on the German divisions is perhaps not surprising. After the Allies landed in Normandy, an exchange of intelligence took place between the Western Allies and the Soviet Union. The Western Allies were clearly disappointed with the information provided by their comrades at arms in the East. It revealed that the Red Army had poor knowledge about which German divisions were actually present on the Eastern Front.
A lesser controversy is that regarding the possession of hill 239.0 northeast of Lisyanka. The III Panzer Corps reported that the position had been taken, but many officers who broke out of the pocket maintained that the hill was occupied by Soviet forces. The fire from these forces contributed considerably to the fact that many Germans veered off toward the Gniloi Tikich River. One important factor behind the diverging opinions is that hill 239.0 is, in fact, not much of a hill. Rather it is just a point on a gently rolling area. It was difficult to identify the point, which may be the reason for the different opinions expressed in the reports.746
According to Konev’s memoirs, he ordered the commander of 27th Army to defend hill 239.0 with an antitank regiment, to prevent German tanks from breaking into the pocket. The order was issued on 14 February. Thus it seems possible that the defense of hill 239.0 was mainly designed to prevent attacks from the west, not east.747
The Soviet resistance in the area around hill 239.0 area was not typical of the German impression of the Soviet opposition. German reports often explicitly or implicitly express surprise at the weakness of the Soviets’ resistance to the breakout. One reason may have been that Konev concentrated his efforts on the southeast and northwest flanks of the pocket, and for example, only on 17 February, when the German breakout was already in full swing, did 5th Guards Cavalry Corps shift to the proper area.748
The true reason for the weak Soviet resistance may perhaps be found with more extensive research in Soviet archives. Soviet secondary sources maintain that virtually no German soldiers broke out of the encirclement, but this is patently wrong and seems mainly to be a cover-up for the failure to completely destroy Gruppe Stemmermann.
One possible explanation for the lack of opposition the Germans faced is that snow storms reduced visibility. The 4th Guards Army noted that the intense thaw in the first half of February ended on 14 February, when temperatures fell and snow began to fall. On 16 February, as the wind increased the snowfall gradually turned into a storm, which became especially intense during the evening of 18 February. The roads, which had been very bad previously, deteriorated even further as drifting snow closed them in many places. Soviet movements to block the German breakout were seriously hampered.749
Although the two Soviet fronts failed to deliver the coup de grace to Gruppe Stemmermann, the fact that the two German corps had suffered a major defeat should not be disregarded. Virtually all equipment had been lost, and almost one third of their men were dead or prisoners. Furthermore, many of those who broke out were in very poor condition. Already before the breakout the soldiers were exhausted by continuous fighting, regrouping, creating field works, and other activities that left little time for rest. The harsh weather imposed further strains, as did the knowledge of being cut off from friendly units for weeks, with the accompanying dread of capture and the uncertainty of what would happen if wounded. Finally, the breakout with its horrors and drama drained the last ounce of strength from many soldiers. Walther Wenck judged that the soldiers had indeed performed remarkably, but only a few men, by their nature hardened, would be able to stand up to such trials again.750