The significant number of wounded men placed considerable strain on the medical facilities that were waiting for them. Professor Stoll served with a facility that received the wounded and gave them first aid and conducted emergency surgery. He recalled that it was located in a large factory building:751
We received about a thousand men each day. Often a surgical treatment was impossible, rather we could only bandage and delouse. Sometimes we could not even do that. I worked as a surgeon. We did surgery on three operating-tables in the factory hall, where we did surgery and bandaging. At each table a doctor and a medical orderly worked, often also a third man who assisted. There were also two men who brought the wounded to and from the operating table.
Crêpe paper rollers served as first aid bandages, which had excellent absorption capacity. The floor was soon covered by removed bandages and more and more piled up. The stench was terrible. We had covered the upper part of our boots with bandages drenched with lysol, to prevent lice from getting into the clothes, since the bandages of the wounded were full of lice. It must have itched enormously; at least there were many wounded who scratched under their bandages by using small sticks. The number of wounded we received was so great that we could not cope. Abscesses were opened, sometimes rifle bullets were removed, when the entry hole was clean and the bullet was located near the skin. Despite all the difficulties we stood eight hours at the operating-tables, spent another eight hours on visiting the wounded and caring for them and prepared the treated soldiers for evacuation. The remaining eight hours could be used for rest and sleep. We drank coffee immensely and smoked a lot. Alcohol was avoided.
We could not treat the head wounds. We strived to send these cases away by air. Cases with abdominal wounds were–I have to say: placed in a corner–and given morphine to die. This was the reality, as we could not perform surgery on men who had been hit in the stomach. Such an operation would have lasted two to three hours and soldiers who could quickly be helped would be lying unattended. We simply did not have the time.
With so many wounded and exhausted men among the survivors of Gruppe Stemmermann it would take months of rest, training, and rebuilding before the surviving troops were again ready for action. These troops would be sorely missed on the Eastern Front, but before other operations could be initiated, the soldiers of Gruppe Stemmermann would have to be brought to the rear. 1st Panzer Army had prepared to receive and quickly move the exhausted soldiers, but the weather still contributed to logistical difficulties.752
Those soldiers who could still walk usually had to make their own way from the exposed salient held by the III Panzer Corps spearheads. Transport was mainly reserved for the wounded, and time was scarce. The III Panzer Corps was dangerously extended, and on 19 February it began to pull back from the Lisyanka salient. By then it was assumed that no more soldiers from Gruppe Stemmermann would be rescued.753
CHAPTER 19
Aftermath
Both sides tried to portray the Korsun battle as a victory once it had ended. Obviously propaganda purposes played a prominent role in the spreading of such images. In any case, the Red Army had some reason to label the hard-fought battle a victory. The Germans had finally been driven away from the Dnepr in the Ukraine, and two enemy corps had been defeated; but the success was less than claimed. Soviet propagandists asserted that no German soldiers escaped from the cauldron. All in all it was claimed that Gruppe Stemmermann lost 52,000 men killed and 11,000 taken prisoner, a gross exaggeration, at least of the number of killed. Furthermore, it was claimed that the German relief forces—the III and XXXXVII Panzer Corps—lost 20,000 officers and men killed and more than 600 tanks, another gross exaggeration. The Soviet sources did not say anything about the losses incurred by their own forces, since to mention the losses suffered by the Red Army in individual battles was virtually a forbidden topic prior to 1990. According to Krivosheev, the Soviet casualties in the Korsun-Shevchenkovskii operation (24 January–17 February) amounted to 80,188, of which 24,286 were killed or missing.754
Reports from the two Soviet fronts support the level of losses given by Krivosheev. Vatutin’s 1st Ukrainian Front reported 16,545 killed, 46,410 wounded, and 14,997 missing between 20 January and 20 February. The Konev’s 2nd Ukrainian Front incurred 10,669 killed, 34,613 wounded, and 1,886 missing during the same period. Equipment losses included 1,711 guns and 512 mortars for the 1st Ukrainian Front and 221 guns and 154 mortars for the 2nd.755
Given the scope of the fighting on the Eastern Front, the Soviet casualties suffered in the Korsun battle were slight, and compared to the results achieved they were low by Red Army standards. However, tank losses could not be described as slight by any standards.
In Moscow a 20-shot salute was fired by 224 guns on 18 February, but the consequences of Stalin’s decision to assign the 2nd Ukrainian Front responsibility for the annihilation of the pocket became evident on this occasion too. In Stalin’s congratulation, the 1st Ukrainian Front was not mentioned at all. The council at Vatutin’s front listened to the broadcast of the salute and the congratulation. None of the members could conceal their disappointment. Krainjukov at the staff of the 1st Ukrainian Front later said that the members of the council thought someone had not informed Stalin correctly and objectively about the efforts of the front. When the indignance had settled somewhat, Vatutin said: “The most important thing to do is to defeat the enemy. Later, historians can try to find out who has done what.”756
As we have seen, the casualties suffered by Gruppe Stemmermann amounted to approximately 19,000 killed or missing and approximately 11,000 wounded. The forces outside the pocket of course also suffered losses, but compared to the two encircled corps they suffered far less. During its relief attempt, the 1st Panzer Army endured about 3,300 casualties, of which more than 70% were wounded. The elements of the Panzer army that did not take part in the relief attempt suffered less than 900 casualties during the first 20 days of February, ample testimony to the fact that relatively little action took place outside the areas where the III and VII Panzer Corps fought.757
It is perhaps somewhat surprising that the divisions fighting at the base of the salient created by the III Panzer Corps—the 34th and 198th Divisions plus the 1st SS-Panzer Division—suffered more casualties than the three Panzer divisions thrusting toward Gruppe Stemmermann. In fact, the 1st, 16th, and 17th Panzer Divisions suffered approximately half the casualties incurred by 34th Division, 198th Division, and 1st SS-Panzer Division, despite the former three being mainly on the offensive and the latter three on the defensive. There are a few likely explanations. First of all, we must question the notion that it is more costly to attack than to defend. Usually the attacker has some important advantages, such as superior firepower, surprise, numerical advantage, local air superiority, more ammunition available, or rested troops. These factors often overshadow the advantage of defensive posture.758
In the case of the III Panzer Corps’ attack toward Gruppe Stemmermann, it must also be emphasized that tanks bore the brunt of the fighting, while infantry probably carried the main weight at the base of the salient. Thus it could be expected that the units at the base of the salient suffered greater losses in men, though fewer losses in armor. Indeed, the German armored spearheads suffered much greater tank losses, but how the losses arise is perhaps not self-evident.