All in all, the tank units in Table 4 lost 138 tanks, but only 35 of these had been hit by enemy fire. Furthermore, not all of those tanks hit by enemy fire had suffered fatal damage, but lack of recovery means and poor weather prevented the Germans from salvaging them before they withdrew. Instead they had to be blown up. The recovery difficulties were also responsible for the losses due to mechanical failures given in the table. There were further tanks that suffered mechanical breakdowns, but were recovered.
The nine cases of spontaneous ignition included eight Panthers and one Tiger, which developed fires in their engine compartments, none of which could be extinguished in time to save the tanks from becoming complete write-offs. Thus self destruction constituted a significant share of the Panther tanks irrevocably lost. The main cause of loss, however, was the difficulty of recovering damaged tanks. At the onset of Operation Wanda the units of the III Panzer Corps only had about half their prescribed number of recovery vehicles operational, and breakdowns may very well have occurred in the deep mud that characterized much of the operation. The mud and snow caused further recovery difficulties, and the retreat from the exposed salient around Lisyanka was too quick to allow a significantly greater number of tanks to be recovered.759
In addition to the losses suffered by the units listed in Table 4, the 1st SS-Pz.Div. seems to have lost eight tanks and 10 assault guns, thus bringing the tank losses incurred by 1st Panzer Army to 156. But there were also many tanks in need of repairs. For example, of the 187 Panthers in the 1st Panzer Army on 29 February, no less than 171 were in workshops. It would take some time to bring them back to operational readiness, and if the units became embroiled in heavy combat it would be veritably impossible to bring all the tanks back to running order before new tanks needed repair.760
The men also needed time away from the frontline. On 24 February the III Panzer Corps reported that uninterrupted heavy fighting in mud and snow had exhausted the men to such an extent that they were at the end of their tether. Poor food had contributed to the grave situation, since the field kitchens had not been able to move forward to the frontline troops, who had to resort to cold emergency rations. The soldiers had not had any real sleep for weeks, which of course sapped them of their strength. Warm shelter had been lacking, and their clothes were worn out, especially their footgear. In the Leibstandarte and the 16th Panzer Divisions, there were units where up to 70% of the men suffered from various foot infections. Also many men suffered from trench foot or frostbite. For example, in a subunit of 1st Panzer Division there were 20 cases of frostbite in a single day, quite considerable considering that the unit had only 70 men. Finally, the poor weather conditions and supply difficulties conspired to cause hygiene to deteriorate. Almost all the men had lice, and the 16th Panzer Division reported that about 50–60% of its men suffered from scabies.761
Between 1 and 20 February the divisions of 1st Panzer Army received 8,505 replacements, more than twice as many replacements as casualties incurred. However, it must be remembered that casualties only refer to those soldiers who are killed, wounded, or missing due to enemy action. Soldiers absent due to exhaustion, frostbite, disease, injury, and other non-combat causes are not included. Hence, it may well be possible that the divisions of 1st Panzer Army had a much lower combat value after the relief of Gruppe Stemmermann compared to their condition at the beginning of February, especially as it seems that the divisions of III Panzer Corps received comparably less replacements.762
It is more difficult to pinpoint the casualties suffered by VII Corps during its defensive battles of 26–31 January. Some indication is given by the fact that the 34th and 198th Divisions lost 692 killed, 1,907 wounded and 316 missing during the entire month of January. Since the two divisions were involved in action for much of the month, it seems realistic to estimate that the defensive battles during the Soviet offensive caused losses amounting to about 1,000 men, of whom the majority were wounded. Tank losses must have been very low for the Germans during that phase, as no tanks and only a handful of assault guns participated. Thus it could be estimated that the forces of 1st Panzer Army that participated in the Korsun battle outside the pocket suffered casualties of about 4,000–4,500 men, of whom about two thirds were wounded, and about 160 tanks and assault guns that were irretrievably lost.763
The situation for the XXXXVII Panzer Corps was fairly similar to that which the III Panzer Corps experienced. Casualties seem to have been slight. For example, the 13th Panzer Division lost 559 men killed, wounded, and missing in February, while the 376th Division reported 399 casualties. This seems to be well in line with the losses reported for the entire 8th Army, which were very low in February.764
Except for the units inside the pocket, the losses for 8th Army in February were considerably smaller as compared to January, and especially when set against those of the Kirovograd battle. It is difficult to establish the losses for the Korsun operation, largely because it is not self-evident which units of the XXXXVII Panzer Corps participated. No doubt the 3rd, 11th, 13th, and 14th Panzer Divisions participated, but it is less clear which of the infantry divisions on the right flank to include. Neither is it entirely clear which units Krivosheev has included in his data on Soviet casualties, as shown above. However, as little combat activity took place on the right flank of the XXXXVII Panzer Corps, the effect on an estimate of the overall casualties is slight. If it is assumed that the elements that participated in the Korsun battle incurred half the casualties sustained by 8th Army during the period 20 January–20 February, about 4,500 casualties would have to be accounted for.
Even though the casualties sustained were not particularly high, the units were badly worn from prolonged fighting in very poor weather conditions. The 11th Panzer Division, which had been almost continuously engaged since the beginning of the battle at Kursk in July 1943, was so exhausted that it was decided to send it to southern France for rest and refit. The 13th Panzer Division was very low on combat-ready tanks, but otherwise in fairly good shape. The 376th, on the other hand, complained about lack of many personal items for the soldiers, such as tents, water bottles, mess tins, boots, socks, uniforms, and means for taking care of hygiene. Furthermore, some of its replacements had been conscripted from Slovenia and Croatia, and these soldiers seem to have been more prone to leave the front line without permission. Even cases of self-mutilation had occurred in order to avoid combat.765
Still, the several months of fighting before the Korsun Battle was the main reason for the strains experienced by the units of XXXXVII Panzer Corps.
Unfortunately it is much more difficult to establish tank losses for XXXXVII Panzer Corps, compared to III Panzer Corps. One thing is clear: the number of operational tanks was generally much lower for XXXXVII Panzer Corps. In fact for much of the operation the number of operational tanks was so low that major tank losses due to enemy action were simply impossible. Reports for a few units are available. For example, the I./Pz.Rgt. 26 Panther battalion lost 10 Panthers on 28 January, but thereafter only five more during the Korsun battle. Similarly, its personnel casualties were low during February, only 10 officers and men.766