The 3rd Panzer Division suffered more extensive losses, reporting that it had lost 26 tanks during the Korsun battle. To a significant degree, this was due to the lack of towing vehicles, which meant that equipment with only slight damage or that had simply bogged down in mud had to be abandoned.767
It has been more difficult to establish the tank losses for other units of the XXXXVII Panzer Corps involved in the Korsun battle, but they seem to have been slight, as is indicated by their strength on 1 March, as shown in Table 6. Of the Panzer divisions, it seems that von Wietersheim’s 11th Panzer Division contributed most of the tank strength, and it mainly possessed Panthers. On 20 January, it had eight operational Panthers and 39 in workshops, thus its number of Panthers on hand actually increased by at least 17 by 1 March, possibly more as some of the four command tanks may well have been Panthers. However, as the I./Pz.Rgt. 31 Battalion had been ordered to hand over its Panthers to the 11th Panzer Division, it must be considered that the I./Pz.Rgt. 31 had 39 Panthers on 20 January.768
To what extent the I./Pz.Rgt. 31 really handed over its tanks is unclear. Although orders instructed it to hand over all its Panthers, and probably the battalion retained no Panthers when it departed from the Eastern Front, not all the tanks were necessarily given to the 11th Panzer Division (for example, tanks requiring extensive repairs may have been sent back to Germany). However, it is most likely that the majority of them were handed over to 11th Panzer Division. Thus it would seem reasonable to assume that the 11th Panzer Division lost about 20 Panthers between 20 January and 1 March, and perhaps 15 of them were lost during the Korsun battle. As the division hardly had any operational tanks except its Panthers, it seems likely that no more than about 20 tanks were lost irretrievably in the Korsun battle.769
The war diary of III./Pz.Rgt. 36, the only tank battalion in the 14th Panzer Division, shows one tank lost on 26 January and an assault gun the following day. A further tank was lost on 1 February. Of these three vehicles the assault gun was burnt out and destroyed, while the two tanks had been damaged by enemy fire and could not be recovered due to enemy action. On 16 February the battalion lost two tanks in a more peculiar way. They were trying to tow away an SPW, but they all bogged down in mud and all attempts to recover the vehicles failed, partly due to the fact that the area was under Soviet fire.770
For the remaining tank units of XXXXVII Panzer Corps we have found no useful information in the German archival records. However, as the units discussed above contained the bulk of the armor employed in the fighting, it seems that an estimate of about 80 tanks and assault guns lost for the entire XXXXVII Panzer Corps is not far off the true figure. Thus the German forces outside the pocket probably lost about 240 tanks and assault guns. The SS-Wiking Division probably had around 25 tanks and assault guns, the SS-Wallonien Brigade had about 10 assault guns, and the two army assault gun battalions within the pocket—the 228th and 239th—probably had about 15 assault guns. Hence, about 50 tanks were lost to Gruppe Stemmermann. All in all it seems that the Korsun battle cost the Germans close to 300 tanks and assault guns.771
Soviet claims asserted that the Germans lost all tanks within the pocket, which seems quite correct, but erroneously stated that they possessed at least 270 tanks. Furthermore, Soviet sources claim that the German forces outside the pocket—mainly III and XXXXVII Panzer Corps—lost more than 600 tanks. In total, the Germans should have lost approximately 900 tanks, or about three times the true number.772
Unfortunately, Soviet sources are much more silent on their own tank losses. According to German claims, the Soviet tank losses were considerable. For example, the III Panzer Corps claimed to have destroyed or captured 606 tanks and assault guns during 4–18 February. How well these claims stand up to scrutiny is somewhat difficult to tell, but at least some observation can be concluded from the available figures.773
To begin with, the Soviet forces engaged in the liberation of the western Ukraine between 24 January 1943 and 17 April 1944 lost on average 40 tanks and assault guns per day. If this figure is also representative for the period when the Korsun battle was fought, about 920 tanks would have been lost irretrievably in the days between 25 January and 17 February. Of course, that would include losses in other sectors too, but it seems that most of the fighting involving Soviet tank forces during that period took place at Korsun. Nevertheless, such a figure is of course only a very crude estimate. Fortunately somewhat more useful figures are available, as presented in Table 7.774
During the period 1–20 February the 1st Ukrainian Front was not engaged in any heavy fighting except the Korsun battle. This seems to have been especially true for its tank units. Consequently almost all the losses of 1–20 February, 569 tanks and assault guns, as given in Table 5, must have been incurred at the Korsun battle, in particular in the actions against III Panzer Corps.775
It seems that the claims made by III Panzer Corps were not too far off the mark. Admittedly, not all the tank losses sustained by the 1st Ukrainian Front were caused by the III Panzer Corps, but on the other hand the III Panzer Corps also fought against units of 5th Guards Tank Army, which belonged to 2nd Ukrainian Front. Nevertheless, it seems that III Panzer Corps claims were exaggerated, but not by much, and certainly were far less inflated than the Soviet claims.776
To assess the tank losses sustained by 1st Ukrainian Front during the initial phase, from 26 January to 31 January, is somewhat tricky. While Vatutin’s troops on his eastern flank attacked, the Germans conducted offensive operations against his center. The latter fighting seems to have resulted in far heavier tank losses than the actions by 6th Tank Army and 27th and 40th Armies, but given the archival data in Table 5 it seems that about 600 tanks lost irretrievably is a reasonable estimate for 1st Ukrainian Front.
The tank losses sustained by the 2nd Ukrainian Front are more difficult to establish. There is little doubt that they were smaller than for 1st Ukrainian Front, as the latter had to ward off the attack from III Panzer Corps. The threat from the XXXXVII Panzer Corps was much less menacing, as is evidenced by the fact that parts of the 5th Guards Tank Army were shifted toward the area where III Panzer Corps attacked. It is clear that Konev’s front lost as complete write-offs 324 tanks and assault guns in the period of 20 January–20 February. Of these, the vast majority must have been lost during the Korsun battle. If we assume that 250 were lost in the Korsun battle, the overall Soviet tank and assault gun losses in the Korsun operation would be approximately 850.777
As is evident, it has been impossible for us to establish German as well as Soviet losses without resorting to estimates. However, it seems clear that the Soviet casualties were about twice as high as those incurred by the Germans. Soviet tank losses seem to have been close to three times as high. Furthermore, it must be remembered that German data on tank losses may include vehicles lost due to action between 20 and 29 February. Corresponding losses for the Soviet side have not been included in the estimates, as we have no data at all for that period.
Despite the fact that our figures are partly based on estimates, it is clear that Soviet casualties were about twice as high, and tank losses about three times as high, as the Germans incurred. Given their preponderance of strength and favorable strategic situation, that does not appear to be a particularly impressive achievement, but it still seems to be a considerable improvement compared to the performance of the Red Army during the summer and fall of 1943. Furthermore, the German casualties in the Korsun battle included an unusually high proportion of killed and missing, which made the German losses more difficult to replace. Of the wounded soldiers, a significant share could return to service eventually, but hardly any of the men taken prisoner returned.