3
The Red Army suffered 255,566 casualties during the Belgorod-Kharkov operation according to Krivosheev, Grif Sekretnosti Sniat, p. 190. This can be compared to the fact that the defending German armies (4th Panzer Army and Army Detachment Kempf) reported 51,724 casualties 1-31 August. See Zetterling and Frankson, Kursk 1943, p. 200.
4
The exact figures are 2,864,661 casualties. Of these, 1,829,666 were wounded and 231,139 were hospitalized due to disease. See Krivosheev, Grif Sekretnosti Sniat, pp. 146f.
5
German combat losses were 533,025 (see BA-MA RH 2/1343), of which 72% were wounded. The rest were killed in action or missing. The percentage is derived from the ten-day reports of the Heeresarzt for the period, found in NARA T78, R414, F6383353-6383369. Since these reports sometimes suffer from delayed reporting, we have opted to use the BA-MA RH 2/1343 file to establish overall losses for the period.
6
The more precise figure of 176,871 is given by BA-MA RH 2/1343.
7
BA-MA RH 2/1343. Another document–NARA T78, R 414, F6383154–shows marginally higher figures. According to this document 114,000 convalescents and 188,000 replacements were sent to the Eastern Front during July, August and September 1943. Given the small disagreement (only 8%) between the two documents, it is quit e possible that one document gives the number of replacements dispatched, or ordered, while the other gives the number that had actually arrived. Thus the difference between the two figures is actually the soldiers in transit. If this assumption is true, it would be expected that the error (in percent) would get smaller the longer the time period studied. This is indeed the case. Both documents give replacements and convalescents also for the period 1 July 1943–31 May 1944. The RH 2/1343 shows 1,205,030 replacements and convalescents, while NARA T78, R414, F6383154 shows 542,000 convalescents and 685,000 replacements, which gives a difference of less than 2%.
8
On 1 July 1943 the manpower ratio was 6,856,800 soldiers on the Soviet side vs 3,138,000 Germans, or 2.2:1. Had neither side received any new manpower, the force ratio would have been reduced to 4 million vs 2.4 million, or 1.67:1. As it was, in October the Red Army numbered 6.6 million men pitted against 2.68 million Germans, or a ratio of 2.5:1.
9
Evgeni Bessonov, Tank Rider (London: Greenhill, 2003) p. 33.
10
Ibid, pp. 35–36.
11
Bessonov, Tank Rider, pp. 36–37.
12
Ibid, pp. 37–38.
13
Bessonov, Tank Rider, pp. 38–40.
14
See casualty chart in BA-MA RH 2/1343.
15
Examples of documents on this can be found in Anlagenband zum KTB AOK 8 Qu., Jan–März 1944, T312, R63, F7580590 and F7580602.
16
Up to 31 May 1944, the German casualties on the Eastern Front amounted to 751,237 killed in action, 2,824,807 wounded in action and 541,043\missing in action (Der Heeresarzt om OKH GenSt\d H/GenQu Az 1335 c/d (IIb), Personelle blutige\Verluste des Feldheeres, Berichtigte Meldun für\die Zeit vom 1.6.1944 bis 10.1.1945, T78, R414, F6383234). This means that wounded constituted\69% of the casualties. However, since this figure includes some cases where German forces were surrounded, the wounded must have constituted a\slightly greater share than in those situations where German units were not surrounded.
Between 1 July 1943 and 1 June 1944 1,900,490 losses were suffered (OKH/Gen.St.d.H./Org.Abt.\Nr. I/18941/44 g.Kdos, v. 7.9.44 (National Ar\chives, Microfilm Publication T78, Roll 414,\Frame 6383114). The figure does not include forces in Finland. Of these about 1.3 million were wounded. Simultaneously 542,000 convalescents\returned to the eastern front (NARA T78, R414,\F6383154).
17
Anton Meiser, Die Hölle von Tscherkassy (Schnellbach, Verlag S. Bublies 2000), pp. 12–37.
18
Idem.
19
Meiser, Die Hölle von Tscherkassy, pp. 12–37.
20
G. F. Zhukov, Vospominanija i razmysjlenija, vol III (Novosti, Moscow 1986), p. 83.
21
K. S. Moskalenko, Na Yugo-Zapadnom Napravlenii 1943–1945, Kniga 2. (Nauka, Moscow 1973), p. 162.
22
Richard Armstrong, Red Army Tank Commanders, The Armored Guards. (Schiffer Military/Aviation History, Atglen 1994), p. 201.
23
The Germans also held along the west bank of the Dnepr between Nikopol and the river estuary.
24
K.V. Krainyukov, Ot Dnepra do Visly (Voenizdat, Moscow 1971), page 92.
25
Vatutin had 831,000 front troops, almost 11,400 guns and mortars, 297 rocket artillery launchers and over 1,100 tanks and assault guns combat ready at his disposal (see A. N. Grylev; Dnepr. Karpaty, Krim [Nauka, Moscow 1970], pp. 40-41). The German 4th Panzer Army, which faced Vatutin’s front, had a ration strength of 360,000 (Anlage 7 zum KTB Meldungen (Beute, Verpflegungsstärken) v. 1.7.1943–31.12.1943). As German army ration strengths included large numbers of men from categories not included in the Soviet returns, the true force ratio was even more favorable to Vatutin than these figures suggest.
26
Krainyukov, Ot Dnepra do Visly, p. 101.
27
The report was written by Lieutenant-Colonel Robert E.McCabe. See Public Record Office, War Office 193/651. Trip to Kiev Front 3–16 January 1944.
28
A. S. Zjadov, Tjetyre Goda Vojny (Moscow: Voenizdat 1978), p. 157.
29
P.A. Rotmistrov. Stalnaja Gvardija. (Voenizdat, Moscow 1984.) p. 254.
30
Rotmistrov, Stalnaja Gvardija, p. 256.
31
PzAOK 1 Ia KTB Nr. 13, 6 January 1944, T313, R69, F7305767f.
32
PzAOK 1 Ia KTB Nr. 13, 7 January 1944, T313, R69, F7305769f.
33
PzAOK 1 Ia KTB Nr. 13, 8 January 1944, T313, R69, F7305773f.
34
PzAOK 1 Ia KTB Nr. 13, 10 January 1944, T313, R69, F7305779.
35
PzAOK 1 Ia KTB Nr. 13, 11-16 January 1944, T313, R69, F7305783-99.
36
PzAOK 1 Ia KTB Nr. 13, 17 January 1944, T313, R69, F7305800.
37
These units–according to German intelligence consisting of elements from the 32nd, 136th, and 167th Rifle Divisions–were not particularly strong, but nevertheless far more than a nuisance (See PzAOK 1 Ia KTB Nr. 13, 17 January 1944, T313, R69, F7305801). It seems that the German intelligence was at least partially accurate, since the Soviet General Staff Study says that elements of the 136th and 167th Rifle Divisions, plus the 6th Motorized Rifle Brigade were encircled in the area (The Korsun’-Shevchenkovskii Operation [The Cherkassy Pocket] [January-February 1944] The Soviet General Staff Study. Translated and edited by David M. Glantz and Harold S. Orenstien. p. 12).