38
PzAOK 1 Ia KTB Nr. 13, 18 January 1944, T313, R69, F7305803f.
39
PzAOK 1 Ia KTB Nr. 13, 19 January 1944, T313, R69, F7305806f.
40
PzAOK 1 Ia KTB Nr. 13, 20-21 January 1944, T313, R69, F7305809-15; Tagesmeldung VII. A.K. Ia, 20.1.44 and 21.1.44 in Anlagen zum KTB PzAOK 1 Ia, T313, R69, F7306320 & F7306341.
41
PzAOK 1 Ia KTB Nr. 13, 22 January 1944, T313, R69, F7305816f.
42
PzAOK 1 Ia KTB Nr. 13, 23 January 1944, T313, R69, F7305818.
43
Kriegsliederung PzAOK 1, 22 January 1944, T313, R69, F7306352. Actually both divisions had seven infantry battalions (including Füsilier battalions) but two had been detached from the 88th Division to the 68th Division and one had been detached from Korps-Abteilung B to VII Corps.
44
Kriegsliederung PzAOK 1, 22 January 1944, T313, R69, F7306352.
45
PzAOK 1 Ia KTB Nr. 13, 23 January 1944, T313, R69, F7305818f; VII. A.K. Ia Tagesmeldung 23.1.44, in Anlagen zum KTB PzAOK 1 Ia, T313, R69, F7306377.
46
PzAOK 1 Ia KTB Nr. 13, 24 January 1944, T313, R69, F7305820.
47
VII. A.K. Ia Nr. 159/44 g.Kdos, Fernschreiben an PzAOK 1 Ia, 24.1.44, 13.00 Uhr, in Anlagen zum KTB PzAOK 1 Ia, T313, R69, F7306385.
48
PzAOK 1 Ia KTB Nr. 13, 24 January 1944, T313, R69, F7305820f.
49
PzAOK 1 Ia KTB Nr. 13, 24 January 1944, T313, R69, F7305821.
50
PzAOK 1 Ia KTB Nr. 13, 25 January 1944, T313, R69, F7305823-5.
51
AOK 8 Ia KTB Nr. 3, 22 January 1944, T312, R64, F7581722-5.
52
AOK 8 Ia KTB Nr. 3, 23 January 1944, T312, R64, F7581726-38.
53
Ibid.
54
AOK 8 Ia KTB Nr. 3, 24 January 1944, T312, R64, F7581739f.
55
Meiser, Die Hölle von Tscherkassy, p. 181.
56
Meiser, Die Hölle von Tscherkassy, pp. 181–2.
57
Meiser, Die Hölle von Tscherkassy, p.182.
58
Meiser, Die Hölle von Tscherkassy, pp. 182–3.
59
Meiser, Die Hölle von Tscherkassy, pp. 183–4.
60
Meiser, Die Hölle von Tscherkassy, pp. 183–4.
61
Meiser, Die Hölle von Tscherkassy, pp. 184–5.
62
Meiser, Die Hölle von Tscherkassy, pp. 184–5.
63
AOK 8 Ia KTB Nr. 3, 24 January 1944, T312, R64, F7581740-2.
64
AOK 8 Ia KTB Nr. 3, 24 January 1944, T312, R64, F7581740-4.
65
The Korsun’-Shevchenkovskii Operation, p. 7. Note that the source gives slightly longer distances than we have given. It seems to be a rather common practice by Soviet sources to inflate distances, to produce more impressive advance rates.
66
Studies on Soviet Combat Performance, pp. 20–22.
67
In fact, the Soviet General Staff Study (p. 10) from 1944 says the army had 91 tanks and 16 self-propelled guns, while an article in the Soviet General Staff’s military history journal in 1969 says the army had 168 tanks and 22 self-propelled guns (“Dokumenti i materiali: Korsun-Shevchen kovskaya operatsiya v tsifrakh,” Voenno-Istoricheskii Zhurnal no 7 [1969], pp. 45–52). The latter figure seems more likely. The most likely explanation for this discrepancy is that the General Staff Study actually used a figure that referred to the situation a few days before the offensive began, but during those days, tanks returning from workshops raised the strength of the army to the figure given by the article.
68
Soviet General Staff Study, p. 104.
69
G.T.Zavizion & P.A.Kornjusjin, I na Tikhom okeane. (Voenizdat, Moscow 1967), p. 16.
70
The Korsun’-Shevchenkovskii Operation, p. 10.
71
Ibid, map 4, p. 19.
72
The Korsun’-Shevchenkovskii Operation, pp. 8, 18 and 172; Studies on Soviet Combat Performance, pp. 28–30.
73
The Korsun’-Shevchenkovskii Operation, p. 172.
74
The Korsun’-Shevchenkovskii Operation, pp. 126, 127, 172.
75
I. S. Konev, Zapiski Komandujusjego Frontom. (Voenizdat, Moscow 1982.) p. 98.
76
The Korsun’-Shevchenkovskii Operation, pp. 13–15.
77
The Korsun’-Shevchenkovskii Operation, p. 15.
78
AOK 8 Ia KTB Nr. 3, 22-25 January 1944, T312, R64, F7581722-7581744.
79
AOK 8 Ia KTB Nr. 3, 22 January 1944, T312, R64, F7581725.
80
AOK 8 Ia KTB Nr. 3, 23 January 1944, T312, R64, F7581726.
81
AOK 8 Ia KTB Nr. 3, 23 January 1944, T312, R64, F7581736.
82
AOK 8 Ia KTB Nr. 3, 24.1.44, T312, R64, F7581739-44.
83
The Korsun’-Shevchenkovskii Operation, p. 127.
84
The Korsun’-Shevchenkovskii Operation, p. 147.
85
The Korsun’-Shevchenkovskii Operation, pp. 147–8 & 159.
86
The Korsun’-Shevchenkovskii Operation, pp. 147–8 & 159.
87
This is discussed further in N. Zetterling & A. Frankson, “Analyzing World War II East Front Battles,” Journal of Slavic Military Studies, vol 11, no 1 (March 1998), pp. 176–203.
88
We have used Krivosheev’s figures (see G. F. Krivosheev, Grif Sekretnosti Sniat [Voenizdat, Moscow 1993] p. 146) which should be seen as a minimum. Krivosheev states that 8,708,318 soldiers were killed, died of wounds or went missing 22 June 1941–31 December 1943. Also 10,992,283 were wounded or evacauated due to disease or frostbite. Here it has been assumed that one third of them did not return to duty (note that unlike the German figures, Krivosheev’s figures of dead include those who died of wounds in hospital). This yields a total of 12,374,412. However, most likely Krivosheev’s figure for 1941 is at least one million too low. He records 2,335,482 missing, while the Germans took more than three million prisoners.