89
1,075,773 were reported as killed in action or missing according to Der Heeresarzt b. Oberkommando des Heeres Nr. I/080/44 g.Kdos, Personelle Blutige Verluste vom 22. juni 1941 bis 31. Dezember 1943, T78, R414, F6383333.
90
This is an estimate. Up to 20 February 1944, the German army lost 795,698 killed in action and 32,724 who died of accidents or disease (Der heeresarzt im OKH GenStdH/GenQu Az 1335 (IIb) Nr I./01867/44 g.Kdos 6.3.1944, BA-MA RW 6/v. 555). This gives a ratio of 24:1, which has been used to calculate the number killed on the Eastern Front up to 31 December 1943 (655,164, source as in the note above). This is of course an estimate, but since more than 80% of all deaths in action were incurred on the Eastern Front, this can hardly be considered a daring estimate.
91
2,438,198 were reported as killed in action or missing according to Der Heeresarzt b. Oberkommando des Heeres Nr. I/080/44 g.Kdos, Personelle Blutige Verluste vom 22. juni 1941 bis 31. Dezember 1943, T78, R414, F6383333.
92
Der heeresarzt im OKH GenStdH/GenQu Az 1335 (IIb) Nr I./01867/44 g.Kdos 6.3.1944, BA MA RW 6/v. 555. This document gives losses for the entire army from the beginning of the war up\to 20 February 1944. Here it has been assumed that 80% of the losses were incurred on the Eastern Front 22 June 1941–31 December 1943.
93
See J. Erickson & D. Dilks (eds.), Barbarossa–The Axis and the Allies (Edinburgh University Press, Edinburgh 1994), p. 261.
94
How the Korps-Abteilungen were to be organized is described in the document Oberkommando des heeres GenStdH/Org.Abt. Nr. I/430/43 g.Kdos, ”Zusammenlegung von Inf.div., 24 September 1943.” A copy of this document can be found in Anlagenband Nr. 1 zum KTB Nr. 9 XXXXVII. Pz.Korps Ia, T314, R1132, F000615ff.
95
G. Tessin, Verbände und Truppen der deutschen Wehrmacht und Waffen-SS (Mittler & Sohn, Frankfurt am Main and Biblio Verlag, Osnabrück 1966–1975), entry for units beginning with letter “B.”
96
11. Pz.Div. Monatliche Zustandmeldung, Stand 1.2.44, in Anlagenband Nr. 1 zum KTB Nr. 9 XXXXVII. Pz.Korps Ia, T314, R1132, F000656.
97
13. Pz.Div. Monatliche Zustandmeldung, Stand 1.2.44, in Anlagenband Nr. 1 zum KTB Nr. 9 XXXXVII. Pz.Korps Ia, T314, R1132, F000668.
98
See reports on the condition of the divisions of the XXXXVII. Pz.Korps, in Anlagen zum KTB XXXXVII. Pz.Korps Ia, T314, R1132, F000629674.
99
3. Pz.Div. Monatliche Zustandmeldung, Stand 1.2.44, in Anlagenband Nr. 1 zum KTB Nr. 9 XXXXVII. Pz.Korps Ia, T314, R1132, F000649ff; 14. Pz.Div. Monatliche Zustandmeldung, Stand 1.2.44, in Anlagenband Nr. 1 zum KTB Nr. 9 XXXXVII. Pz.Korps Ia, T314, R1132, F000668.
100
Omer Bartov presented this argument in a 1983 PhD thesis and in subsequent books, for example: The Eastern Front 1941–1945: German Troops and the Barbarisation of Warfare and Hitler’s Army (Houndmills, Palgrave 1986); Hitler’s Army (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1992).
101
This is discussed further in N. Zetterling, German Ground Forces in Normandy (Fedorowicz, Winnipeg, 2000), pp. 434–6 and the footnotes on pp. 437f
102
Knut Pipping, Kompaniet som samhälle (Åbo Akademi, Åbo 1947); Ben Shalit, Konfliktens och stridens psykologi (Liber, Stockholm 1983); S.A. Stouffer, The American Soldier, vol 1 & 2 (Princeton University Press, 1977); E.A. Shils & M. Janowitz, “Cohesion and Disintegration in the Wehrmacht in World War II,” Public Opinion Quarterly, Summer 1948. For further discussion of the issue, see for example, Bruce Newsome, “The Myth of Intrinsic Combat Motivation,” Journal of Strategic Studies, vol 26, no 4 (December 2003). For examples of how soldiers react in adverse military situations, see M. Connelly & W. Miller, “The BEF and the Issue of Surrender on the Western Front in 1940,” War in History 2004, 11 (4).
103
More on this can be found in Stouffer, The American Soldier, vol 1 & 2.
104
Meiser, Die Hölle von Tscherkassy, pp. 229–40.
105
Olaf Ehlers’ Diary, BA-MA MSg 2/3200.
106
Meiser, Die Hölle von Tscherkassy, p. 164.
107
Meiser, Die Hölle von Tscherkassy, p. 164.
108
A. Frankson, “Summer 1941,” Journal of Slavic Military Studies, vol 13, no 3 (September 2000); N. M. Rekkedal & N. Zetterling, Grundbok i operatioonskonst (Försvarshögskolan, Stockholm 2004), pp. 281-4.
109
“Entwicklung der Iststärke des Ostheeres,” NARA T78, R414, F6383128; Geschichte des Grossen Vaterländichen Krieges der Sowjetunion, vol 4, page 25, Deutscher Militärverlag, Berlin 1965. The book is a translation of Istoria Velikoi Otechestvennoy Voiny Sovetskogo Soyoza (Moscow 1964). The figure does include STAVKA reserves, but not personnel in the air force and the navy.
110
The Red Army had 7,753 tanks and assault guns in the frontline units and 2,232 in operational reserves. In comparison, the German forces in the East merely numbered 3,356 tanks and assault guns. Of these only 1,285 were operational, the remainder were in workshops. Of course there were Soviet tanks in workshops too. It seems that there were 5,357 operational tanks in the Soviet frontline forces, plus an unknown number in the operational reserves. Thus the Red Army enjoyed a 3:1 advantage in tanks and assault guns, if all vehicles are included, and more than 4:1 if only operational vehicles are included. Panzer-Lage Ost (Nach Gen.Qu.), BA-MA RH 10/61 and StuG-Lage Ost (Nach Gen.Qu.), BA-MA RH 10/62. Included in the figures are 118 obsolete tanks (Pz II, Pz 38, Pz III L42, Pz IV L24) 135 command tanks, 349 Panthers and 232 Tigers. The Soviet tank strength comes from Geschichte des Grossen Vaterländichen Krieges der Sowjetunion (East German translation of Istoriya Velikoy Otechestvennoy Voyny Sovetskogo Sojuz), vol 4 (Deutscher Militärverlag, Berlin 1965), p.26
111
Soviet strength from N. Tereshchenko, “Korsun-Shevchenkovskaia operatiia v tsifrakh,” Voennoistoricheskii zhurnal (July 1969), German strength from Appendix 2, table 1 and “Gefechtsstärken und einsatzber. Waffen,” 22.1.44, in Anlagen zum KTB XXXXVII Pz.Korps Ia, T314, R1132, F000577-82.
112
Tereshchenko, “Korsun-Shevchenkovskaia operatiia v tsifrakh.”
113
Krivosheev, Grif Sekretnosti Sniat, p. 227.
114
A useful concept is the “divisional slice,” which means that the front, army, and corps assets are distributed equally on the divisions. It is of course an abstraction, but it shows how strong the average division was, when the support from higher echelons is included. When 1943 shifted to 1944 the German Ostheer had a divisional slice of almost exactly 15,000 men per division. Note that the German strength is Iststärke, thus it actually include soldiers on leave, hospitalized (except those who were evacuated from their units) or on separate training. The real divisional slice probably was less than 14,000. (168 divisions on 26 December 1943 [KTB OKW 1943, pp. 1397ff] and 2,528,000 men on the Eastern Front [”Entwicklung der Iststärke des Ostheeres,” NARA T78, R414, F6383128])