For the Red Army the divisional slice was about 12,500 men per division (calculation based on the number of soldiers, taken from Geschichte des Grossen Vaterländichen Krieges der Sowjetunion, vol 4 [Deutscher Militärverlag, Berlin 1965], p. 25. The book is a translation of Istoria Velikoi Otechestvennoy Voiny Sovetskogo Soyoza (Moscow 1964). The figures do include STAVKA reserves, but not personnel in the air force and the navy. Soviet Tank, Mechanized, and Cavalry corps have been equated with divisions. Thus, counting divisions may actually provide a quite reasonable picture of the manpower ratio.
115
It should be emphasized that the number of divisions employed is partly a matter of definition, as neither side only employed complete corps or armies. Rather the boundaries of the operation did not fully coincide with the boundaries of the corps and army sectors.
116
The Korsun’-Shevchenkovskii Operation, p. 9, gave these ratios. However, as it usually inflates the German strength, it is possible that the real Soviet advantage was greater.
117
The Soviet divisions were, from north to south: 31st Rifle Division, 375th Rifle Division, 69th Guards Rifle Division, 25th Guards Rifle Division, 1st Guards Airborne Division, 66th Guards Rifle Division, and 14th Guards Rifle Division. See The Korsun’-Shevchenkovskii Operation, maps on pp. 184–5.
118
AOK 8 Ia KTB Nr. 3, 24 January 1944, T312, R64, F7581743.
119
The Rifle Divisions were the 252nd and 214th. See The Korsun’-Shevchenkovskii Operation, pp. 9 & 185.
120
AOK 8 Ia KTB Nr. 3, 25 January 1944, T312, R64, F7581745-7. See also The Korsun’-Shevchenkovskii Operation, p. 127.
121
KTB XXXXVII. Pz.Korps Ia, 25 January 1944, T314, R1132, F000425; AOK 8 Ia KTB Nr. 3, 25 January 1944, T312, R64, F7581745-7. See also The Korsun’-Shevchenkovskii Operation, pp. 18 & 185.
122
KTB XXXXVII. Pz.Korps Ia, 25 January 1944, T314, R1132, F000425-6.
123
AOK 8 Ia KTB Nr. 3, 25 January 1944, T312, R64, F7581747.
124
The Korsun’-Shevchenkovskii Operation, p. 127 and map on p. 185. Strangely the Soviet General Staff Study maintains that “the tank corps had advanced from 18–20 kilometers during the 5–6 hours of combat” (p. 127). This cannot be true. When the two tanks corps were committed, Soviet forces were already fighting along the Reyementarovka–Ositjyashka line, which is only 6–8 kilometers from the Kapitanovka–Tishkovka line.
125
The exact composition was Pz.Gren.Rgt. 108, Pz.Aufkl.Abt. 14, II./Pz.Art.Rgt. 4 and a Flak-Kampftrupp.
126
Langkeit’s group consisted of Pz.Rgt. 36, I./Pz.Gren.Rgt. 103 and I./Pz.Art.Rgt. 4. KTB AOK 8 Ia, 25 January, T312, R64, F7581727-9; R. Grams, Die 14. Pz.Div. 1940–1945 (Podzun, Bad Nauheim 1957), pp. 164-6.
127
KTB III./Pz.Rgt. 36, 25 January, BA-MA RH 39/380.
128
KTB III./Pz.Rgt. 36, 25 January, BA-MA RH 39/380.
129
KTB III./Pz.Rgt. 36, 25 January, BA-MA RH 39/380.
130
Tagesmeldung XI. Armee-Korps Ia vom 25.1.1944, found in Anlagen zum KTB AOK 8 Ia, T312, R66, F7584343.
131
AOK 8 Ia KTB Nr. 3, 25 January 1944, T312, R64, F7581747; The Korsun’-Shevchenkovskii Operation, pp. 127f & 185.
132
AOK 8 Ia KTB Nr. 3, 25 January 1944, T312, R64, F7581747; Proschek papers, MSg 2/5648. The infantry battalion arriving in Ozitniazhka at 11.15hrs was the II./Gren.Rgt. 676.
133
Strangely there are Soviet statements that the two tank corps advanced 18–20 kilometers during 5–6 hours of fighting on 25 January (The Korsun’-Shevchenkovskii Operation, p. 127). This is clearly at odds with the locations reached, as stated by the Soviet accounts, and which are corroborated by the German war diaries.
134
XI. A.K. Ia Morgenmeldung, 25.1.44, in Anlagen zum KTB AOK 8 Ia, T312, R66, F7584360; XI. A.K. Ia Tagesmeldung, 25.1.44, in Anlagen zum KTB AOK 8 Ia, T312, R66, F7584343. The battalion that became separated from 389th Division was the III./Gren.Rgt. 545.
135
Tsamo RF, fond 4.gd.A.(320), Opis 4522, delo 114.
136
Tsamo RF, fond 4.gd.A.(320), Opis 4522, delo 114.
137
AOK 8 Ia KTB Nr. 3, 25 January 1944, T312, R64, F7581746.
138
AOK 8 Ia KTB Nr. 3, 25 January 1944, T312, R64, F7581746f & F7581727-30; XI. A.K. Ia Tagesmeldung, 25.1.44, in Anlagen zum KTB AOK 8 Ia, T312, R66, F7584343.
139
AOK 8 Ia KTB Nr. 3, 25 January 1944, T312, R64, F7581746f & F7581727-30.
140
AOK 8 Ia Tagesmeldung 25.1.44, T312, r66, f7584340-2; XI. A.K. Ia Tagesmeldung, 26.1.44, in Anlagen zum KTB AOK 8 Ia, T312, R66, F7584323.
141
AOK 8 Ia KTB Nr. 3, 25 January 1944, T312, R64, F7581729-30. AOK 8 Ia,”Morgenmeldungen der Korps 26.1.44”, T312, R66, F7584338.
142
The Korsun’-Shevchenkovskii Operation, p. 128.
143
Some Soviet sources mention a German “second defensive belt.” This suggests a much stronger defense than was actually the case. There was actually no coherent German defense between Slatopol and Ositniazhka.
144
The Korsun’-Shevchenkovskii Operation, p. 128; AOK 8 Ia KTB Nr. 3, 26 January 1944, T312, R64, F7581731-35 & F7581748-51.
145
AOK 8 Ia KTB Nr. 3, 26 January 1944, T312, R64, F7581731-32.
146
AOK 8 Ia KTB Nr. 3, 26 January 1944, T312, R64, F7581734.
147
AOK 8 Ia KTB Nr. 3, 26 January 1944, T312, R64, F7581733-35 &F7581749; KTB XXXXVII. Pz.Korps Ia 26 January 1944, T314, R1132, F000427.
148
The Korsun’-Shevchenkovskii Operation, p. 128.
149
Note that Soviet sources often give higher advance rates. We prefer to check the advance rates ourselves, using the locations given in the sources and measuring the distances on the map. Thus we ensure that we get reliable and consistent figures, useful for anyone who wants to compare advance rates.
150
AOK 8 Ia KTB Nr. 3, 26 January 1944, T312, R64, F7581734.
151
AOK 8 Ia KTB Nr. 3, 26 January 1944, T312, R64, F7581734.
152
AOK 8 Ia KTB Nr. 3, 26 January 1944, T312, R64, F7581735.
153
AOK 8 Ia KTB Nr. 3, 26 January 1944, T312, R64, F7581735 & F7581748.
154
The Korsun’-Shevchenkovskii Operation, p. 128.
155
See Appendix 2 for a discussion of the 11th Panzer Division’s tank strength. Soviet Tank strength from The Korsun’-Shevchenkovskii Operation, pp. 126, 127, 172..
156
KTB III./Pz.Rgt. 36, 26 January, BA-MA RH 39/380; Verlustliste III./Pz.Rgt. 36 BA-MA RH 39/380.