Kopfstärke
This is a rather unusual term but it seems to be used to depict the same kind of strength as Verpflegungsstärke.
Iststärke
Actual strength, includes all men that are part of the units composition. Men on leave or temporarily detached to other units are included. Also men sick or wounded are included if they are assumed to return to service within eight weeks. Thus, despite its name, this strength category does not give the actual number of men available for service with the unit at the given time.
Tagesstärke
Daily strength, this includes all men momentarily available for service with the unit. Temporarily attached personnel is included too.
Gefechtstärke
Combat strength, i.e. the number of fit men in units of combat type, e. g. armour, infantry, combat engineer, reckon etc.
Kampfstärke
Front strength, i. e. those men in units of combat type who were up front, e. g. tank crews, rifle men, anti-tank gun crews, etc.
For the condition of battalions, another set of terms is used. The strength of battalions are often given by using the following terms2:
Starkes Battailon
Kampfstärke more than 400 men
Mittelstarkes Battailon
Kampfstärke 300–400 men
Durchschnittliches Battailon
Kampfstärke 200–300 men
Schwaches Battailon
Kampfstärke 100–200 men
Abgekäpftes Battailon
Kampfstärke less than 100 men
In the following pages we show the units in alphabetical order, with numbered units after those that only had a name or letter for identification. This appendix does not claim to give a complete coverage of the units involved, even though we have included all units shown in the organization charts of the armies and corps involved in the battle. However, the amount of information available on each unit varies considerably.
Korps-Abteilung B had been formed around the staff of 112th Infantry Division. To this was added elements from the 112th, 255th and 332nd Infantry Divisions.3 These three formed “Divisions-Gruppen” within the Korps-Abteilung: Div.Gr. 112 with Rgts.Gr. 110 and 258, Div.Gr. 255 with Rgts.Gr. 465 and 475, Div.Gr. 332 with Rgts.Gr. 677 and 678. It is worth noting that the Regiments-gruppen were also referred to as the battalion that had provided most of its composition:4
Rgts.Gr. 110: III./Inf.Rgt. 110
Rgts.Gr. 258: II./Inf.Rgt. 258
Rgts.Gr. 465: I./Inf.Rgt. 465
Rgts.Gr. 475: III./Inf.Rgt. 465
Rgts.Gr. 677: I./Inf.Rgt. 475
Rgts.Gr. 678: II./Inf.Rgt. 475
When the battle began, the Rgts.Gr. 677 had been attached to 34. Inf.Div. The other five were with the Korps-Abteilung and four of them were rated as mittelstark and one as durchschnittlich.5
The Korps-Abt. also had a Füsilier battalion (from 112. Inf.Div.) which was rated strong.6
The engineer battalion was rated schwach and the field replacement battalion mittelstark.7
In addition to Rgts.Gr. 677, the Korps-Abt. B had sent away part of its artillery and its anti-tank guns. What remained was five batteries with 10.5 cm howitzers, three with captured Russian 7.62 cm guns and two batteries with 15 cm howitzers. It retained eleven medium anti-tank guns and five heavy (motor drawn).8
At the beginning of the battle, Korps-Abt. B was subordinated to XXXXII. Korps, but was soon forced to send some of its units to the ad hoc formation “Sperrverband Fouquet.” It seems that 4,831 officers and men from the Korps-Abteilung B, plus 382 HiWi, managed to break out from the pocket.9 Also 1,597 soliders who had returned from leave had assembled in Novo Ukrainka, Novo Archangelsk and Uman.10 Probably there were further men who had been outside the pocket when the Soviet pincers closed.
Some books claim that elements of the Grossdeutschland Division took part in the Korsun battle. However, this seems to be a mistake, caused by the fact that some officers—e.g. Büsing and Wallroth from the Grossdeutschland—were involved. No combat units from the division seems to have reached the battlefield.
Formed from “Freiwillige Legion Wallonien” (verstärkt III. (Jäger) Battalion/373.Infantry Regiment/97.Jaeger Division) summer 1943. The brigade arrived on the Eastern Front and Army Group South in November 1943. It consisted of one infantry battalion, with a number of supporting companies. The infantry battalion had three infantry companies—each with 18 light MG, 2 heavy MG and 2 mortars—and a heavy company with 8 heavy MG and 6 mortars. The supporting companies included a Infanteriegeschütz company with four 7.5 cm infantry howitzers and two 15 cm infantry howitzers, the AT gun company had nine 7.5 cm Pzk 40, the light Flak company had 12 light Flak guns and the heavy Flak company had four 8.8 cm Flak guns and finally there was an assault gun company with 10 StuG III. The brigade had an authorized strength of 1,967 and on 1 January 1944 it was short of 199.11
Probably most of the brigade was encircled in the pocket. It seems that about 650 men from the brigade escaped during the breakout.
The division was formed in 1935. It returned to Eastern Front in November 1943 from deployment in Greece. It had been fighting with Army Group South since then. The division was subordinated to 4th Panzer Army when the Red Army initiated the Korsun operation. Soon it was decided to transfer the 1. Pz.Div. to III. Pz.Korps for the relief of Gruppe Stemmermann. However, it took time to relieve the 1. Pz.Div. and it arrived piecemeal. This is also reflected in the tank strength returns given below, as they only refer to operational tanks with the division employed for this operation. On 5 February the division had 33 Pz IV and 51 Panther operational.12
First to arrive was Kampfgruppe Huppert, which consisted of one Pz IV battalion (II./Pz.Rgt. 1), one panzer grenadier battalion (II./Pz.Gren.Rgt. 1), the reconnaissance battalion, minus one company (Pz. Aufkl.Abt. 1 ohne 3. Kp.) and the SP artillery battalion (I./Pz.Art.Rgt. 73).13 On 6 February elements of the division made contact with the enemy.14
The division was quite strong. According to its monthly report to the Inspector-general of Panzer troops, it had 39 Pz IV and 29 Panthers operational on 1 February and also 1 Pz IV and 7 Panthers in short term repair.15
Operational Tanks During the Operation:
6 February (early)16: 30 Pz IV
7 February17: 18 Pz IV, 2 Pz III (Bef)
9 February (early)18: 18 Pz IV, 2 Pz III (Bef), 48 Panther, 1 Panther (Bef)
9 February (late)19: 18 Pz IV, 48 Panther
10 February20: 18 Pz IV, 48 Panther
13 February (early)21: 12 Pz IV, 18 Panther
15 February (early)22: 11 Pz IV, 9 Panther fully operational, 3 Panthers conditionally combat ready and four with only machine guns operational (probably caused by ammunition shortages due to supply difficulties).
The division did not suffer unduly during the relief attempt of Gruppe Stemmerman. Its casualties 1–20 February 1944 amounted to 35 killed in action, 212 wounded and 3 missing.23