“The fighter was almost ready for mass production even at that time, and Hitler wanted to see a demonstration. Later, in November when the 262 was brought out for his viewing at Insterburg, I was standing there next to Hitler, who was very impressed despite the first fighter having engine flameout on takeoff. The second jet lifted off and performed marvelously. Hitler asked the professor: ‘Is this aircraft able to carry bombs?’
“Well, Messerschmitt said: ‘Yes, my Führer, it can carry for sure a two-hundred-fifty-kilogram bomb, perhaps two of them.’ In typical Hitler fashion, he said: ‘Well, nobody thought of this! This is the Blitz [lightning] bomber I have been requesting for years. No one thought of this. I order that this 262 be used exclusively as a Blitz bomber, and you, Messerschmitt, have to make all the necessary preparations to make this feasible.’ I felt my heart sink at that moment.”{1}
One of the men also present during this test exhibition flight was Generalleutnant Hans Baur, a World War I fighter ace with nine victories, world-record long-distance flying record holder for Lufthansa between the wars, and Hitler’s chief personal pilot. Baur remembered well Hitler’s fascination with new weapons, especially jet and rocket aircraft:
“Hitler was always excited about new things, like a child at Christmas, you could say. If there were any new ideas in tank, U-boat, or aircraft designs, he wanted to see all the blueprints and have them explained to him. His memory was photographic, and he forgot nothing. I remember we were having lunch in Berchtesgaden in March or so, this was 1943. Hitler was discussing this Messerschmitt project with Göring, and Speer, Himmler, and Bormann were there also.
“Hitler asked Göring what he thought about this expenditure in developing the jet. Göring, to his credit, supported the idea and even mentioned the names of a few of our greatest pilots who should oversee the testing and flying. Hitler listened with great interest. Then Speer spoke up, and he mentioned the ongoing issues with the necessary raw materials needed. Then after about ten minutes, Hitler told Speer to wait another day for a letter to be typed and signed by him, giving the authority to obtain whatever he needed to expedite the acquisition of these items. Speer agreed.
“I then remembered that the next day Hitler called his secretary, Fraulein Junge, into his study, where he composed the letter. I know because I was discussing the flight plan with him for us to go to the Ukraine for a visit. Later Speer came by, picked it up and gave the party salute and left. The funny thing was that later that day some gauleiter from somewhere had called, demanding to speak with the Führer. Well, Bormann took the call, and I remember him telling the man on the other end of the line to just ‘shut his mouth and give Herr Professor Speer whatever the hell he wanted,’ and his life would be much easier. ‘Bothering the Führer with this complaint would not be advised.’ And then he hung up the phone.
“Apparently, Speer had gone to some mine or quarry that was providing something he needed for the jet program, and the appointed SS official, I would assume of substantial rank, wanted to complain about it. Speer later told me the man went white when he showed him the letter, on Hitler’s letterhead, and signed by him, giving him complete authority. The SS man thought it was a forgery, prompting the phone call that Bormann received. I think that after that event, Speer could have handed a roll of toilet paper with Hitler’s name written on it and secured anything he wanted.”{2}
The contents of the letter were a mystery until 1998, when Traudl Junge remembered the event in question. She had typed hundreds of official letters for Hitler, and yet this one she remembered, because it was one of the few letters Hitler ever signed giving a person complete authority to invoke his name for a specific purpose. Traudl Junge explained:
“Hitler had called me to come upstairs, and I did. He said to me: ‘I have two letters for you to have ready for my signature.’ The first was a memorandum to an army group commander in Russia; I do not remember the details. However, I do remember the letter for Speer, because I did so few like this. In fact, I think I wrote only two for Speer like this during the entire time, with the last being in 1945, when Hitler gave the destruction order.
“In this letter, he clearly stated that Reichsminister Speer had, by his personal directive, the authority to secure or obtain whatever he needed in order to work on a very secret program. There would be no questioning this authority. Well, then I heard that Bormann had taken a call from someone questioning the letter. I also heard that the caller, whoever he was, was removed from his position not long afterwards.”{3}
Hitler’s response regarding creating bombers out of the Me 262 program should have been no great surprise. Even before this event in May 1943, Adolf Hitler had envisioned the Me 262 as a very fast offensive ground-attack tactical bomber rather than a defensive interceptor. With the ability to fly through Allied fighters and attack, it could then escape due to its high rate of speed. The aircraft was planned to be used for just that role to penetrate Allied air superiority and attack rear areas during the expected invasion of France. Galland commented on this development:
“This was really the beginning of the misuse of the 262, as five bomber wings were supposed to be equipped with the jet, with Wolfgang Schenck and Werner Baumbach being given the order to oversee this activity. In June 1944, KG-51 was converted to Me 262 training as a jet bomber unit. These bomber pilots had no fighter experience, such as combat flying or shooting, which is why so many of them were shot down. They could only escape by outrunning the fighters in pursuit. This was the greatest mistake surrounding the 262, in my opinion, and I believe the 262 could have been made operational as a fighter at least a year and a half earlier, and built in large enough numbers so that it could have changed the air war.”{4}
Regarding Hitler’s reflex decision that originally resulted in the concentration upon the bomber variant of the jet, Galland balked and even Speer was concerned. In his memoirs, Inside the Third Reich, Minister of Armaments and War Production Albert Speer claimed that Hitler originally blocked mass production of the Me 262 before agreeing to production in early 1944.
Hitler rejected arguments from the fighter leaders, even Galland, that the plane would be more effective as a fighter against Allied bombers then destroying large parts of Germany. He wanted it as a bomber for revenge attacks against the Allies. This is in itself an incredible indictment by Speer, as it was in fact Reichsmarschall Hermann Göring (and even Hitler himself) who had been demanding a more visible and effective fighter response to the Allied bombers, pounding Germany night and day.
According to Speer, Hitler believed that the Me 262’s superior speed made it perfect for high-altitude straight flying, thereby evading Allied interception. A few historians disagree with this assessment, but Speer is also supported by the German aces who were in their Führer’s presence. Galland stated:
“Hitler became enraged when he was told by Speer and others that there were continued delays in the delivery of the Me 262 ‘bombers’ he wanted, believing (and not too incorrectly) that Messerschmitt and Speer were delaying to have an excuse to build fighters and not bombers. This was partially true, yet the main reason was the constant air bombardments that destroyed production centers, killed or injured workers, and ruined the railway transportation network. We needed the fighters, and Hitler wanted his bombers. In late August 1943, I spoke with Speer, Dietrich Pelz, and Werner Baumbach about this.