“We knew that there were other jet aircraft being developed. Later, Pelz became the General of the Bombers, and he wanted jets for his arm. After our discussion, it was decided that if Arado could deliver their bombers, he [Pelz] would ease up on wanting the Me 262 as a bomber. We spoke with Speer, who agreed to intervene, and then we shook hands on it. Now, Speer had two jobs; getting Messerschmitt what they needed, and pushing the other bomber into production, so I had the Me 262 for the fighters.
“Ironically, just a few days before our meeting, the Americans had not very successfully bombed Ploesti, the British had bombed Hamburg to terrible effect, and also Peenemünde, where our top secret V weapons were being built, killing some top scientists. It was due to these events that Pelz saw the need for more fighters, and he helped me. Later, Hitler agreed to release one Me 262 to us for every other jet bomber delivered.”{5}
Because Germany was being bombed intensively, production of the Me 262 was dispersed into hundreds of low-profile small production facilities, sometimes little more than clearings in the forests of Germany proper and in occupied nations. At B8 Bergkristall-Esche II at St. Georgen/Gusen, Austria, Ukrainian and Jewish forced laborers of Concentration Camp Gusen II produced complete fuselages at a rate of almost 450 units per month on the assembly lines from January to April 1945. Wings for the Me 262 were produced in a well-concealed and covered motorway tunnel at Engelberg, just west of Stuttgart.{6} However, these numbers alone were not enough to replace projected losses, as Galland stated:
“This was discussed in the meeting in August 1944 where Milch decided that Speer’s production program should produce four thousand fighters per month. I agreed, but I suggested that one thousand should be jets. Milch was unimpressed with my suggestion, telling me that Hitler did not think we needed the 262 at that time. I was stunned. I could not believe Hitler would throw away the one potential advantage of regaining air superiority, after years of his complaining about the Allied bombing raids.
“I had a talk with Speer behind Milch’s back, and he promised me that he would speak with Professor Messerschmitt about getting us some pure jet fighters, while still making a few bomber versions for Hitler. Speer knew the situation. He also knew that the Arado and Heinkel companies were building jets as potential bombers, and this gave me hope.”{7}
Under Speer’s direct guidance, and being armed with the written word of Hitler behind him, he was able to construct large, heavily protected underground factories to take up production of the Me 262, similar to the facilities building the V-2 rockets, making them relatively safe from bomb attacks, but the war ended before they could be completed. Speer also managed to support Heinkel and Arado with their jet bomber productions, thus releasing the Me 262s for fighter service. However, Allied intelligence was aware of these facilities.
The previous information passed to the British in Bern in July 1943 was supplemented by more critically valuable intelligence over the next year. The Enigma intercepts also clearly told the British that the Luftwaffe had been selecting the best-qualified pilots for the jet programs, including all of the information on the creation, staffing, and location of Kommando Thierfelder at Lechfeld.
The information regarding the location and exact purpose of the Augsburg factory was smuggled out by French conscripted workers. One French laborer, Lucien Pericaud, had managed to smuggle out the technical data on the jets flown, weight, and power displacement information along with schematics. He was arrested and sent to a concentration camp, probably Dachau, and his fate is, as of yet, undetermined.
In fact, what the British had learned later in the spring and summer of 1944 alarmed them to the point that Air Ministry ordered 120 Gloster Meteors to be delivered as soon as possible. This was an impossible order to fulfill for several reasons, not the least of which was the incomplete assembly of a functional Whittle engine, as stated by Group Captain John Cunningham:
“I had been a test pilot, fighter pilot, and night fighter pilot, and I was very much in the information circles regarding the Meteor. I knew that there would be no possible way that the RAF could field even a dozen operational jets by the end of 1944, let alone an air fleet capable of combating the German jet threat. It was not going to happen.”{8}
Like the U-boat pens on the French coast, they were well known, but sometimes hard to hit. Through the end of February to the end of March 1945, approximately sixty Me 262s were destroyed in attacks on the Obertraubling assembly plant, and another thirty jets were damaged at the Leipheim facility, when the Neuberg plant was bombed on March 19, 1945. It should be mentioned that by creating these ad-hoc factories, Speer helped integrate the hundreds of small components and fabrication points into a cohesive assembly and production program.
One of the great tragedies of the modern jet miracle was the fact that hundreds of these workers were forced slave laborers, many from the Ukraine, who were worked to death or killed in the bombings. Yet, by any means, and with Pelz keeping his word, the Luftwaffe fighter units began receiving their jets. According to Pelz:
“Once we had several dozen of the Me 262s arriving to KG-54, KG-51, and KG-76, I was informed that the Arado models were coming and already assembled. I had the meeting with Galland and Speer where we agreed to support each other. Besides, erring on the side of pragmatism, the Ar 234 was actually better suited as a bomber for many reasons. It was fast, used the same engines, but was a lighter aircraft and suited for level bombing, which was better than dive-bombing at very high speeds. I received a call from Göring, and he asked me about this. I told him that, as Inspector of Bombers, as long as I had jets, I would use whatever was capable of getting the job done. Hitler finally decided to release the 262s that were still being built to the fighters. All the Ar 234s were to go to my units, and everyone was happy.”{9}
British intelligence from the Enigma machines also brought more unwelcomed information in early 1944; data that was corroborated in intercepts deciphered codes that confirmed their worst suspicions a few months later. RAF Bomber Command had already endured almost five years of German radar–controlled and day fighter–operated night fighters, which had cost them nearly 50,000 aircrew killed, captured, or missing. The newest intelligence informed Sir Arthur Harris, Commander in Chief of Bomber Command, that the new jets were being prepared as night fighters. This information was not openly disseminated throughout Bomber Command due to the fear that it may have affected morale.
The first bomber units were formed in September 1944, at the same time that Kommando Nowotny was being created from the remnants of Kommando Thierfelder, and per Hitler’s order, the first twelve Me 262s with bomb racks were delivered. The first bomber units created were Kampfgeschwader (KG-51, transitioning from conventional aircraft), also known as Kommando Schenck, commanded by Major (later Oberstleutnant) Wolfgang “Bombo” Schenck, who wore the Knight’s Cross with Oak Leaves and was a well-known and very effective bomber and ground attack pilot. Kommando Edelweiss was also created as well as a bomber-training unit designated IV/(Erg)/KG-51, also under Schenck, as he explained: