“In June 1944, I was given responsibility for developing the Me 262 as a fighter-bomber, and so I headed up the unit which became known as Kommando Schenck. I soon found myself a major at age thirty-one, appointed by Pelz as the Geschwaderkommodore of KG-51, which was converting to the Me 262. I maintained this position until I was promoted to oberstleutnant, and on the day after I turned thirty-two years of age I became the final Inspector for Jet Fighters from February 1945 up to the end of the war.
“I must say that the controversy over the Me 262 as a fighter or a bomber was far above my level. I was not really involved at all, as all of this occurred in 1943 until early 1944. I was still flying Fw 190F models in a ground attack unit on the Russian Front, where I was wounded again, and then given the new assignment. I will say that I was very much looking forward to flying the jet, as it was perhaps the worst-kept secret in the Luftwaffe.
“I was in the meeting with Galland, Pelz, Baumbach, Trautloft, and a few others—even Hajo Herrmann was there, and this was in October 1944. We were discussing the jets, the allocations of replacement parts, supplies, fuel, ammunition, everything, since there were limited supplies to go around. Galland wanted his fighters using the jet to receive priority, given that they were flying against the bomber formations. I understood this, and I even supported his conclusions.
“However, Baumbach was adamant that we needed the 262 as a bomber, since the Soviets were rolling west faster than we could field replacement units. The bomber argument was that we needed to hit the enemy at their supply depots and troop concentrations. Given the coming of the Arado jet bombers for our purposes, this argument did not go much further, but this is an example of how we could not really agree on anything, even as we were losing the war. What I found interesting was the fact that Göring appeared to be playing both sides, fighters against bombers, never really taking a position one way or the other.”{10}
Adolf Galland recalled Göring’s reaction and his initial position on the jet, a position that would waver with the prevailing winds: “However, as the world knows, Hitler had other ideas. Göring knew the reality, and he was very excited by the 262 and told me personally that he would see to it we received the new fighter. He read the reports on how and why it was a better fighter. It was not just the faster speed and heavier armament, it was also able to operate on much cheaper and readily available fuel and did not require the high-octane fuel that the conventional fighters did. Speer also mentioned that in order to appease Hitler, he would increase construction on the Arado and Heinkel jet models as bombers, allowing us to have the 262 as a fighter.
“Speer and I again met with Hitler, and Speer tried to get him to rescind the order to have the two thousand new fighters just built sent to the Western Front. I agreed, and I explained to Hitler that, given the tactical situation, lack of fuel, few highly qualified and experienced pilots, that the best we could do would be to use these aircraft as a protective force at our critical industries, especially the petroleum and aircraft locations. Speer even gave him the data, which normally Hitler would examine in great detail.
“Speer and I did our best to persuade him. It was like talking to a deaf man. I explained the situation to Hitler, and also gave him proven statistics, but he went mad. He then stated that he would order the halt to all fighter aircraft production, the fighter arm was to be disbanded, and those industries were to be then focused upon building flak guns. He firmly believed that flak guns alone would keep Germany safe. I could not believe it.”{11}
Another great problem plaguing the Me 262 production and development as a designated fighter aircraft was the incomprehensible political machinations involving most of the upper echelons within the Third Reich. Propaganda Minister Josef Goebbels, never at a loss to jump on a political opportunity, had joined forces with Heinrich Himmler in proposing that the SS take charge of the jet program. Galland provided his thoughts on this development:
“Himmler did not strike me as being a very intelligent person in any manner. In meetings, he always waited until the end, before saying anything. He seldom had a logical suggestion. Once, he even proposed that the SS take over the Me 262 project, which I said was absolutely insane and did say so in so many words. He also had the ability to make you feel very nervous, as if he were looking for a way to find fault with you.
“Despite all of Göring’s faults, I must say that he did support me in the position that the 262 should be specifically built as a fighter. I had his support by the time of my meeting with him in May 1944, after he had come to his senses regarding just how deep American fighters were entering German airspace.”{12}
Galland was to later learn just how much grief he was to experience due to his insistence in fighting Goebbels, Göring, and even Himmler in open warfare, which he preferred. Galland was not one to do things behind someone’s back. He was an honorable fighter and would take on all comers, as he stated:
“I still had to convince Hitler to continue the flow of jets to JG-7 and other units. The men flying them needed more familiarity before committing them to combat, and the jet never really went through the type of peacetime evolution of refinement through research and development as it should have. The greatest problems were the engines, which were very delicate and often flamed out on takeoff. Even worse, we had reports of flameouts and burned out engines in flight.
“This was not a comforting thought for pilots expecting to go into battle outnumbered fifty to one on a very good day. The unit at Achmer had been doing great things since July 1944 under Werner Thierfelder, proving the value of the jet in combat. This success allowed us to push the issue to Hitler again, building upon that success once we began to get more 262s in the field.
“Before all of this occurred, I had been telling Milch, Göring, and Hitler for a year, since my first flight in an Me 262 in May 1943 at Lechfeld, that only Focke-Wulf Fw 190 fighter production should continue in conventional aircraft, specifically the Dora model and later variants, and to discontinue the Me 109, which was outdated, and to focus on building a massive jet-fighter force.
“Speer was a smart fellow, and he knew that the war was lost, as did I, and much sooner than later unless massive changes were made. Like most clear-headed people late in the war, he also knew that negotiating a peace from a position of strength was preferable to accepting defeat while powerless. Speer even once said that, given the alternative, having Americans and British with our technology was far preferable to the Soviets.”
Galland’s arguments were sound and his logic undeniable. Everyone knew that fighters were needed, not bombers. Hannes Trautloft recalled the events during his moments within the inner circle: “Milch openly supported him [Galland], but only to a point, and Göring supported him when not in Hitler’s presence, and then he would either be silent or side with whatever silliness Hitler was spouting at that time. It was very frustrating, and this one event, perhaps above all others, really led to the forthcoming Fighters Revolt.
“We needed assistance, and quickly, and all we received were accusations and the blame for losing the war. Göring, much like Hitler, could not see the reality of what was happening. I still wonder if it was a matter of false hope or self-delusion. Seeing what kinds of men were leading my nation created a serious dilemma for me, and I spoke to my wife, Marga, about this many times and with Galland and a few trusted men on occasion.”{13}