Major (later Brigadier General) Robin Olds, a P-38 and later a P-51 pilot, also commented on chasing the jets: “We called the damned things ‘blow jobs,’ and we began running into them pretty steady in March 1945; almost every mission someone was calling out a ‘blow job.’ My first encounter was over Magdeburg, when we saw six of them. We closed very fast, too fast for me to get off a shot head-on in the turn. This one pilot was only about fifty yards away, he had me, but did not fire. I still do not know why, but I probably would not be here if he had. At least we kept them off the bombers.
“The tactic we had devised was a tried and true one. If we could reach their base, especially if we followed them home, we knew they would be low on fuel, maybe even damaged. That was when you hoped for an easy kill, that is without getting nailed by flak. We also had the advantage of being able to out-turn them, and that is critical, especially if you could get a deflection shot within range. In combat I only managed to damage one Me 262, but never got a clean kill.”{4}
While the fighter pilots had a method and inclination to engage the new jets, bomber pilots and crews began to dread the chance of an encounter, and for good reason. However, the crews of the Eighth Air Force bomber command were not the only people concerned with the losses to the bombers from all causes. There were those in the United States Congress and Senate who, although in the minority, were opposed to the funding of the bomber construction program.
The introduction of the Me 262 and the reports hitting Washington only bolstered their anti–heavy bomber campaigns, which had been well underway since Big Week of February 1944. The subsequent events, such as “Black Thursday,” the massive losses in August 1944 during the Schweinfurt-Regensburg mission, and, in particular, the loss record of the Bloody Hundredth, the nickname for the badly mauled 100th Bomb Group, also compounded the problem. The Germans had introduced an effective weapon, but it was the potential psychological and political problems that were perhaps their greatest ally.
On September 1, 1944, USAAF Gen. Carl Spaatz had openly expressed his fear that if greater numbers of German jets were introduced, the losses to the heavy bombers would probably be enough to cause cancellation of the daylight bombing offensive. Congress held the purse strings, and the U.S. Senate had an oversight committee that was always looking to cut back funding on one project or another, in favor of their own personal political interests. Long-range bombing was not supported unanimously in Washington, DC, and bad results could have meant defunding, as stated by General Benjamin O. Davis:
“I think that perhaps the one greatest misunderstanding about the air war was the fact that it was not just a matter of combating the enemy in the air, and trying to survive. It was trying to make sure that we aviators, especially we black pilots, always performed better than expected. The introduction of the jets really created a problem, but not so much from a strategic standpoint. They did not have enough. However, from a politically tactical standpoint, they could have done our service far more harm in Washington than by shooting us down over Germany.”{5}
The senior officers in England knew two things had to be accomplished if they were to save long-range bombing. First, in 1943, they knew that they had to employ a long-range fighter to escort bombers all the way to the targets and back, providing consistent air umbrellas, or losses would continue to exceed 10 percent, which was considered the unacceptable level.
The second was defeating the German fighters, where again long-range fighters would be necessary. The short-legged Thunderbolts, Lightnings and Spitfires were able to penetrate the Third Reich to varying degrees, but the Germans knew this, as stated by Major Kurt Bühligen, who finished the war with 112 victories (all against the British and Americans with JG-2 “Richthofen”) and the Knight’s Cross with Oak Leaves and Swords:
“We knew very well just how far by their range the Allied fighters could come. It was logical that we would take off, and the ground radar plotters would vector us into the bomber formations, and once the enemy fighters turned away, we went to work. This was dangerous enough, attacking four engine bombers, due to the high volume of fire. It was much more risky than dueling with enemy fighters. However, later when we had to attack the bombers and fight off fighters, this became madness, and our losses rose exponentially, mostly due to the introduction of the P-51. That plane and the quality of the pilots was really what killed us.”{6}
It would not be until January 1944 before the P-51B Mustang, and later the C and even longer-range and faster D models, would be able to accomplish that task. Once the long-range fighters appeared, the losses tapered off to a degree (with notable exceptions as previously mentioned), depending upon the targets, how heavily defended they were by antiaircraft batteries and fighter bases and how many Mustangs were available at any given time.
The tactics devised against the Me 262 had to be developed quickly to counter the jet’s great speed advantage. Escort fighters would fly normally very high above the bombers, allowing them the capability of diving from this height, giving them extra speed, thus reducing the speed advantage of the Me 262. Due to the Me 262 being less maneuverable than the Allied fighters, Allied pilots would be able to turn inside the jets, closing the distance in a deflection shot, if the opportunity presented itself.
The only tried-and-true tested method of dealing with the jets was to catch them on the ground and during the takeoff and landing phases. Jet bases were frequently bombed by medium bombers as Allied fighters lurked around the fields to attack jets trying to land or take off. This method was also dangerous, as previously mentioned, due to the overlapping flak array that ringed the perimeters of the airfields along the approach lines in order to protect the jets while Fw 190s or Me 109s flew top cover to intercept any Allied fighters chasing them back to base. This tactic, despite Allied fighter aircraft losses over Me 262 airfields, eventually resulted in greatest loss of the jets and, even more critically, the trained pilots.
Allied fighters were also using nitrous oxide injection in conjunction with the water injection for what pilots called “war emergency power,” much like the Germans’ own GM-1 fuel injection system. When in pursuit of an Me 262, the pilot had the option of injecting the nitrous oxide into the engine to produce a quick burst of speed. This would allow the Allied fighters to have several seconds to accelerate rapidly to catch the jets, closing the distance.
The two units that would feel the brunt of the Allied fighter presence were KG-51 and Kommando Nowotny (and later when it was formed as JG-7). On September 26, 1944, the Eighth Air Force launched a massive raid using the U.S. 1st Bomb Division, which sent 422 B-17s; the 2nd Bomb Division sent 317 B-24s; and the 3rd Bomb Division sent 420 B-17s to hit Hamm and the surrounding primary and secondary targets.{7} Several American fighter escorts were to have their first contact with the Me 262, such as one American pilot, 1st Lt. Urban L. “Ben” Drew of the 361st Fighter Group. Drew’s after action report described the event:
“I was leading cadet Blue Flight in Cadet Squadron. We had just sighted the bombers and the marking flares in the vicinity of the target Hamm. We were flying at about twenty thousand feet. I saw this unidentified aircraft cross me about ten thousand feet below. He was flying on a course ninety degrees to ours. I could see it was a twin-engine ship of some sort. I called the squadron leader and got permission to go down on a bounce.