[1] L. Dindorf suspects [SS. 1-6, {'Alla men . . . pollakis}], ed. Lips. 1872. See also Praef. to Ox. ed. p. viii.
[2] Or, "by his conduct to all, which was not merely innocent in the eye of law and custom but positively helpful."
[3] See above, I. i. 18; "Hell." I. vii. 14, 15; Grote, "H. G." viii. 272.
[4] See above, I. ii. 35.
[5] Leon of Salamis. See "Hell." II. iii. 39; Plat. "Apol." 32 C; Andoc. "de Myst." 46.
[6] See above, I. i. 1; Plat. "Apol." 19 C.
[7] Kuhner cf. Quintil. VI. i. 7: "Athenis affectus movere etiam per praeconem prohibatur orator"; "Apol." 4; Plat. "Apol." 38 D, E.
[8] See Grote, "H. G." viii. p. 663 foll.
These views he frequently maintained in conversation, now with one and now with another, and one particular discussion with Hippias of Elis[9] on the topic of justice and uprightness has come to my knowledge.[10]
[9] For this famous person see Cob. "Pros. Xen." s.n.; Plat. "Hipp. maj." 148; Quint. xii. 11, 21; Grote, "H. G." viii. 524.
[10] Or, "I can personally vouch for."
Hippias had just arrived at Athens after a long absence, and chanced to be present when Socrates was telling some listeners how astonishing it was that if a man wanted to get another taught to be a shoemaker or carpenter or coppersmith or horseman, he would have no doubt where to send him for the purpose: "People say,"[11] he added, "that if a man wants to get his horse or his ox taught in the right way,[12] the world is full of instructors; but if he would learn himself, or have his son or his slave taught in the way of right, he cannot tell where to find such instruction."
[11] L. Dindorf, after Ruhnken and Valckenar, omits this sentence {phasi de tines . . . didaxonton}. See Kuhner ad loc. For the sentiment see Plat. "Apol." 20 A.
[12] Cf. "Cyrop." II. ii. 26; VIII. iii. 38; also "Horsem." iii. 5; "Hunting," vii. 4.
Hippias, catching the words, exclaimed in a bantering tone: What! still repeating the same old talk,[13] Socrates, which I used to hear from you long ago?
[13] This tale is repeated by Dio Chrys. "Or." III. i. 109. Cf. Plat. "Gorg." 490 E.
Yes (answered Socrates), and what is still more strange, Hippias, it is not only the same old talk but about the same old subjects. Now you, I daresay, through versatility of knowledge,[14] never say the same thing twice over on the same subject?
[14] Or, "such is the breadth of your learning," {polumathes}. Cf. Plat. "Hipp. maj."
To be sure (he answered), my endeavour is to say something new on all occasions.
What (he asked) about things which you know, as for instance in a case of spelling, if any one asks you, "How many letters in Socrates, and what is their order?"[15] I suppose you try to run off one string of letters to-day and to-morrow another? or to a question of arithmetic, "Does twice five make ten?" your answer to-day will differ from that of yesterday?
[15] Cf. "Econ." viii. 14; Plat. "Alc." i. 113 A.
Hipp. No; on these topics, Socrates, I do as you do and repeat myself. However, to revert to justice (and uprightness),[16] I flatter myself I can at present furnish you with some remarks which neither you nor any one else will be able to controvert.
[16] Or, "on the topic of the just I have something to say at present which," etc.
By Hera![17] (he exclaimed), what a blessing to have discovered![18] Now we shall have no more divisions of opinion on points of right and wrong; judges will vote unanimously; citizens will cease wrangling; there will be no more litigation, no more party faction, states will reconcile their differences, and wars are ended. For my part I do not know how I can tear myself away from you, until I have heard from your own lips all about the grand discovery you have made.
[17] See above, I. v. 5.
[18] Or, "what a panacea are you the inventor of"; lit. "By Hera, you have indeed discovered a mighty blessing, if juries are to cease recording their verdicts 'aye' and 'no'; if citizens are to cease their wranglings on points of justice, their litigations, and their party strifes; if states are to cease differing on matters of right and wrong and appealing to the arbitrament of war."
You shall hear all in good time (Hippias answered), but not until you make a plain statement of your own belief. What is justice? We have had enough of your ridiculing all the rest of the world, questioning and cross-examining first one and then the other, but never a bit will you render an account to any one yourself or state a plain opinion upon a single topic.[19]
[19] See Plat. "Gorg." 465 A.
What, Hippias (Socrates retorted), have you not observed that I am in a chronic condition of proclaiming what I regard as just and upright?
Hipp. And pray what is this theory[20] of yours on the subject? Let us have it in words.
[20] {o logos}.
Soc. If I fail to proclaim it in words, at any rate I do so in deed and in fact. Or do you not think that a fact is worth more as evidence than a word?[21]
[21] Or, "is of greater evidential value," "ubi res adsunt, quid opus est verbis?"
Worth far more, I should say (Hippias answered), for many a man with justice and right on his lips commits injustice and wrong, but no doer of right ever was a misdoer or could possibly be.
Soc. I ask then, have you ever heard or seen or otherwise perceived me bearing false witness or lodging malicious information, or stirring up strife among friends or political dissension in the city, or committing any other unjust and wrongful act?
No, I cannot say that I have (he answered).
Soc. And do you not regard it as right and just to abstain from wrong?[22]
[22] Or, "is not abstinence from wrongdoing synonymous with righteous behaviour?"
Hipp. Now you are caught, Socrates, plainly trying to escape from a plain statement. When asked what you believe justice to be, you keep telling us not what the just man does, but what he does not do.
Why, I thought for my part (answered Socrates) that the refusal to do wrong and injustice was a sufficient warrent in itself of righteousness and justice, but if you do not agree, see if this pleases you better: I assert that what is "lawful" is "just and righteous."
Do you mean to assert (he asked) that lawful and just are synonymous terms?
Soc. I do.
I ask (Hippias added), for I do not perceive what you mean by lawful, nor what you mean by just.[23]
[23] Lit. "what sort of lawful or what sort of just is spoken of."
Soc. You understand what is meant by laws of a city or state?
Yes (he answered).
Soc. What do you take them to be?
Hipp. The several enactments drawn up by the citizens or members of a state in agreement as to what things should be done or left undone.
Then I presume (Socrates continued) that a member of a state who regulates his life in accordance with these enactments will be law- abiding, while the transgressor of the same will be law-less?
Certainly (he answered).
Soc. And I presume the law-loving citizen will do what is just and right, while the lawless man will do what is unjust and wrong?
Hipp. Certainly.
Soc. And I presume that he who does what is just is just, and he who does what is unjust is unjust?
Hipp. Of course.
Soc. It would appear, then, that the law-loving man is just, and the lawless unjust?