Then Hippias: Well, but laws, Socrates, how should any one regard as a serious matter either the laws themselves, or obedience to them, which laws the very people who made them are perpetually rejecting and altering?
Which is also true of war (Socrates replied); cities are perpetually undertaking war and then making peace again.
Most true (he answered).
Soc. If so, what is the difference between depreciating obedience to law because laws will be repealed, and depreciating good discipline in war because peace will one day be made? But perhaps you object to enthusiasm displayed in defence of one's home and fatherland in war?
No, indeed I do not! I heartily approve of it (he answered).
Soc. Then have you laid to heart the lesson taught by Lycurgus to the Lacedaemonians,[24] and do you understand that if he succeeded in giving Sparta a distinction above other states, it was only by instilling into her, beyond all else, a spirit of obedience to the laws? And among magistrates and rulers in the different states, you would scarcely refuse the palm of superiority to those who best contribute to make their fellow-citizens obedient to the laws? And you would admit that any particular state in which obedience to the laws is the paramount distinction of the citizens flourishes most in peace time, and in time of war is irresistible? But, indeed, of all the blessings which a state may enjoy, none stands higher than the blessing of unanimity. "Concord among citizens"--that is the constant theme of exhortation emphasised by the councils of elders[25] and by the choice spirits of the community;[26] at all times and everywhere through the length and breadth of all Hellas it is an established law that the citizens be bound together by an oath of concord;[27] everywhere they do actually swear this oath; not of course as implying that citizens shall all vote for the same choruses, or give their plaudits to the same flute-players, or choose the same poets, or limit themselves to the same pleasures, but simply that they shall pay obedience to the laws, since in the end that state will prove most powerful and most prosperous in which the citizens abide by these; but without concord neither can a state be well administered nor a household well organised.
[24] Cf. "Pol. Lac." viii. See Newman, op. cit. i. 396.
[25] Lit. "the Gerousiai." {S} or {X S} uses the Spartan phraseology.
[26] Lit. "the best men." {S} or {X S} speaks as an "aristocrat."
[27] Cf. "Hell." II. iv. 43; Lys. xxv. 21 foll.; Schneid. cf. Lycurg. "u Leocr." 189.
And if we turn to private life, what better protection can a man have than obedience to the laws? This shall be his safeguard against penalties, his guarantee of honours at the hands of the community; it shall be a clue to thread his way through the mazes of the law courts unbewildered, secure against defeat, assured of victory.[28] It is to him, the law-loving citizen, that men will turn in confidence when seeking a guardian of the most sacred deposits, be it of money or be it their sons or daughters. He, in the eyes of the state collectively, is trustworthy--he and no other; who alone may be depended on to render to all alike their dues--to parents and kinsmen and servants, to friends and fellow-citizens and foreigners. This is he whom the enemy will soonest trust to arrange an armistice, or a truce, or a treaty of peace. They would like to become the allies of this man, and to fight on his side. This is he to whom the allies[29] of his country will most confidently entrust the command of their forces, or of a garrison, or their states themselves. This, again, is he who may be counted on to recompense kindness with gratitude, and who, therefore, is more sure of kindly treatment than another whose sense of gratitude is fuller.[30] The most desirable among friends, the enemy of all others to be avoided, clearly he is not the person whom a foreign state would choose to go to war with; encompassed by a host of friends and exempt from foes, his very character has a charm to compel friendship and alliance, and before him hatred and hostility melt away.
[28] Or, "ignorant of hostile, assured of favourable verdict."
[29] Lit. "the Allies," e.g. of Sparta or of Athens, etc.
[30] Lit. "From whom may the doer of a deed of kindness more confidently expect the recompense of gratitude than from your lover of the law? and whom would one select as the recipient of kindness rather than a man susceptible of gratitude?"
And now, Hippias, I have done my part; that is my proof and demonstration that the "lawful" and "law-observant" are synonymous with the "upright" and the "just"; do you, if you hold a contrary view, instruct us.[31]
[31] For the style of this enconium (of the {nomimos}) cf. "Ages." i. 36; and for the "Socratic" reverence for law cf. Plat. "Crito."
Then Hippias: Nay, upon my soul, Socrates, I am not aware of holding any contrary opinion to what you have uttered on the theme of justice.[32]
[32] Lit. "the just and upright," {tou dikaiou}.
Soc. But now, are you aware, Hippias, of certain unwritten laws?[33]
[33] See Soph. "Antig." "Oed. T." 865, and Prof. Jebb ad loc.; Dem. "de Cor." 317, 23; Aristot. "Rhet." I. xiii.
Yes (he answered), those held in every part of the world, and in the same sense.
Can you then assert (asked Socrates) of these unwritten laws that men made them?
Nay, how (he answered) should that be, for how could they all have come together from the ends of the earth? and even if they had so done, men are not all of one speech?[34]
[34] Or, "there would be difficulty of understanding each other, and a babel of tongues."
Soc. Whom then do you believe to have been the makers of these laws.
Hipp. For my part, I think that the gods must have made these laws for men, and I take it as proof that first and foremost it is a law and custom everywhere to worship and reverence the gods.
Soc. And, I presume, to honour parents is also customary everywhere?
Yes, that too (he answered).
Soc. And, I presume, also the prohibition of intermarriage between parents and children?
Hipp. No; at that point I stop, Socrates. That does not seem to me to be a law of God.
Now, why? (he asked).
Because I perceive it is not infrequently transgressed (he answered).[35]
[35] Or, "as I perceive, it is not of universal application, some transgress it."
Soc. Well, but there are a good many other things which people do contrary to law; only the penalty, I take it, affixed to the transgression of the divine code is certain; there is no escape for the offender after the manner in which a man may transgress the laws of man with impunity, slipping through the fingers of justice by stealth, or avoiding it by violence.
Hipp. And what is the inevitable penalty paid by those who, being related as parents and children, intermingle in marriage?
Soc. The greatest of all penalties; for what worse calamity can human beings suffer in the production of offspring than to misbeget?[36]
[36] Or, "in the propagation of the species than to produce misbegotten children."
Hipp. But how or why should they breed them ill where nothing hinders them, being of a good stock themselves and producing from stock as good?
Soc. Because, forsooth, in order to produce good children, it is not simply necessary that the parents should be good and of a good stock, but that both should be equally in the prime and vigour of their bodies.[37] Do you suppose that the seed of those who are at their prime is like theirs who either have not yet reached their prime, or whose prime has passed?
[37] Cf. Plat. "Laws," viii. 839 A; Herbst, etc., cf. Grotius, "de Jure," ii. 5, xii. 4.
Hipp. No, it is reasonable to expect that the seed will differ.
Soc. And for the better--which?
Hipp. Theirs clearly who are at their prime.
Soc. It would seem that the seed of those who are not yet in their prime or have passed their prime is not good?
Hipp. It seems most improbable it should be.
Soc. Then the right way to produce children is not that way?