[12] Or, "from tasting to any extent worth speaking of the most necessary and all-pervading sources of happiness."
You speak the words of truth[13] (he answered).
[13] Lit. "What you say is absolutely and entirely true" (the "vraie verite" of the matter).
Soc. Furthermore,[14] if there be any joy in learning aught "beautiful and good," or in patient application to such rules as may enable a man to manage his body aright, or to administer his household well, or to prove himself useful to his friends and to the state, or to dominate his enemies--which things are the sources not only of advantage but of deepest satisifaction[15]--to the continent and self-controlled it is given to reap the fruits of them in their performance. It is the incontinent who have neither part nor lot in any one of them. Since we must be right in asserting that he is least concerned with such things who has least ability to do them, being tied down to take an interest in the pleasure which is nearest to hand.
[14] Or, "But indeed, if there be joy in the pursuit of any noble study or of such accomplishments as shall enable," etc.
[15] Or, "of the highest pleasures."
Euthydemus replied: Socrates, you would say, it seems to me, that a man who is mastered by the pleasures of the body has no concern at all with virtue.
And what is the distinction, Euthydemus (he asked), between a man devoid of self-control and the dullest of brute beasts? A man who foregoes all height of aim, who gives up searching for the best and strives only to gratify his sense of pleasure,[16] is he better than the silliest of cattle?[17] . . . But to the self-controlled alone is it given to discover the hid treasures. These, by word and by deed, they will pick out and make selection of them according to their kinds, choosing deliberately the good and holding aloof from the evil.[18] Thus (he added) it is that a man reaches the zenith, as it were, of goodness and happiness, thus it is that he becomes most capable of reasoning and discussion.[19] The very name discussion ({dialegesthai}) is got from people coming together and deliberating in common by picking out and selecting things ({dialegein}) according to their kinds.[20] A man then is bound to prepare himself as much as possible for this business, and to pursue it beyond all else with earnest resolution; for this is the right road to excellence, this will make a man fittest to lead his fellows and be a master in debate.[21]
[16] Or, "and seeks by hook and by crook to do what is pleasantest."
[17] i.e. he becomes an animal "feeding a blind life within the brain."
[18] Or, "selecting the ore and repudiating the dross." Kuhner cf. Plat. "Laws," v. 735 B.
[19] Or, "draws nearer to happiness and perfection, and is most capable of truth-disclosing conversation." Cf. Plat. "Apol." 41: "What would not a man give, O judges, to be able to examine the leaders of the great Trojan expedition, or Odysseus, or Sisyphus, or numberless others, men and women too! What infinite delight would there be in conversing with them and asking them questions!" (Jowett).
[20] For {dialegein kata gene} = {dialegesthai}, cf. Grote, "H. G." viii. 590.
[21] Cf. Plat. "Rep." 534 D; "Phaedr." 252 E; "Crat." 390 C; "Statesm." 286 D foll.
VI
At this point I will endeavour to explain in what way Socrates fostered this greater "dialectic" capacity among his intimates.[1] He held firmly to the opinion that if a man knew what each reality was, he would be able to explain this knowledge to others; but, failing the possession of that knowledge, it did not surprise him that men should stumble themselves and cause others to stumble also.[2] It was for this reason that he never ceased inquiring with those who were with him into the true nature of things that are.[3] It would be a long business certainly to go through in detail all the definitions at which he arrived; I will therefore content myself with such examples as will serve to show his method of procedure. As a first instance I will take the question of piety. The mode of investigation may be fairly represented as follows.
[1] Lit. "essayed to make those who were with him more potent in dialectic."
[2] Or, "Socrates believed that any one who knew the nature of anything would be able to let others into his secret; but, failing that knowledge, he thought the best of men would be but blind leaders of the blind, stumbling themselves and causing others to stumble also."
[3] Or add, "'What is this among things? and what is its definition?' --such was the ever-recurrent question for which he sought an answer."
Tell me (said he), Euthydemus, what sort of thing you take piety to be?
Something most fair and excellent, no doubt (the other answered).[4]
[4] Or, "A supreme excellence, no doubt."
Soc. And can you tell me what sort of person the pious man is?[5]
[5] Or, "can you give me a definition of the pious man?"; "tell me who and what the pious man is."
I should say (he answered) he is a man who honours the gods.
Soc. And is it allowable to honour the gods in any mode or fashion one likes?
Euth. No; there are laws in accordance with which one must do that.
Soc. Then he who knows these laws will know how he must honour the gods?
I think so (he answered).
Soc. And he who knows how he must honour the gods conceives that he ought not to do so except in the manner which accords with his knowledge?[6] Is it not so?
[6] i.e. "his practice must square with his knowledge and be the outward expression of his belief?"
Euth. That is so.[7]
[7] "That is so; you rightly describe his frame of mind and persuasion."
Soc. And does any man honour the gods otherwise than he thinks he ought?[8]
[8] "As he should and must." See K. Joel, op. cit. p. 322 foll.
I think not (he answered).
Soc. It comes to this then: he who knows what the law requires in reference to the gods will honour the gods in the lawful way?[9]
[9] Or, "he who knows what is lawful with regard to Heaven pays honour to Heaven lawfully."
Euth. Certainly.
Soc. But now, he who honours lawfully honours as he ought?[10]
[10] "As he should and must."
Euth. I see no alternative.
Soc. And he who honours as he ought is a pious man?
Euth. Certainly.
Soc. It would appear that he who knows what the law requires with respect to the gods will correctly be defined as a pious man, and that is our definition?
So it appears to me, at any rate (he replied).[11]
[11] "I accept it at any rate as mine." N.B.--in reference to this definition of Piety, the question is never raised {poion ti esti nomos}; nor yet {poioi tines eisin oi theoi}; but clearly there is a growth in {ta nomima}. Cf. the conversation recorded in St. John iv. 7 foll., and the words (verse 23) {pneuma o Theos kai tous proskunountas auton en pneumati kai aletheia dei proskunein}, which the philosopher Socrates would perhaps readily have assented to.
Soc. But now, with regard to human beings; is it allowable to deal with men in any way one pleases?[12]
[12] Or, "may a man deal with his fellow-men arbitrarily according to his fancy?" See above, II. vii. 8.
Euth. No; with regard to men also, he will be a law-observing man[13] who knows what things are lawful as concerning men, in accordance with which our dealings with one another must be conducted.[14]
[13] Or, "he is a man full of the law (lawful) and law-abiding who knows," etc.
[14] Reading {kath' a dei pros allelous khresthai}, subaud. {allelois}, or if vulg. {kath' a dei pos allelois khresthai}, translate "must be specifically conducted."
Soc. Then those who deal with one another in this way, deal with each other as they ought?[15]
[15] "As they should and must."
Obviously (he answered).
Soc. And they who deal with one another as they ought, deal well and nobly--is it not so?
Certainly (he answered).
Soc. And they who deal well and nobly by mankind are well-doers in respect of human affairs?
That would seem to follow (he replied).