Soc. I presume that those who obey the laws do what is just and right?
Without a doubt, (he answered).
Soc. And by things right and just you know what sort of things are meant?
What the laws ordain (he answered).
Soc. It would seem to follow that they who do what the laws ordain both do what is right and just and what they ought?[16]
[16] "What they should and must."
Euth. I see no alternative.
Soc. But then, he who does what is just and right is upright and just?[17]
[17] This proposition, as Kuhner argues (ad loc.), is important as being the middle term of the double syllogism (A and B)--
A. Those who do what the law demands concerning men do what is just and right.
Those who do what is just and right are righteous and just.
Ergo--Those who do what the law demands concerning men are righteous and just.
B. Those who know what is just and right ought (and are bound, cf. above, III. ix. 4) to do also what is just and right.
Those who do what is just and right are righteous and just.
Ergo--Righteous and Just ({dikaioi}) may be defined as "Those who know what the law demands (aliter things right and just) concerning men."
I should say so myself (he answered).
Soc. And should you say that any one obeys the laws without knowing what the laws ordain?
I should not (he answered).
Soc. And do you suppose that any one who knows what things he ought to do supposes that he ought not to do them?[18]
[18] Or, "and no one who knows what he must and should do imagines that he must and should not do it?"
No, I suppose not (he answered).
Soc. And do you know of anybody doing other than what he feels bound to do?[19]
[19] Or, "and nobody that you know of does the contrary of what he thinks he should do?"
No, I do not (he answered).
Soc. It would seem that he who knows what things are lawful[20] as concerning men does the things that are just and right?
[20] Or, "of lawful obligation."
Without a doubt (he answered).
Soc. But then, he who does what is just and right is upright and just?[21]
[21] N.B.--In reference to this definition of justice, see K. Joel, op. cit. p. 323 foll., "Das ist eine Karrikatur des Sokratischen Dialogs."
Who else, if not? (he replied).
Soc. It would seem, then, we shall have got to a right definition if we name as just and upright those who know the things which are lawful as concerning men?
That is my opinion (he answered).
Soc. And what shall we say that wisdom is? Tell me, does it seem to you that the wise are wise in what they know,[22] or are there any who are wise in what they know not?
[22] Or, "in that of which they have the knowledge ({episteme})."
Euth. Clearly they are wise in what they know;[23] for how could a man have wisdom in that which he does not know?
[23] Or, "their wisdom is confined to that of which they have the {episteme}. How could a man be wise in what he lacks the knowledge of?"
Soc. In fact, then, the wise are wise in knowledge?
Euth. Why, in what else should a man be wise save only in knowledge?
Soc. And is wisdom anything else than that by which a man is wise, think you?
Euth. No; that, and that only, I think.
Soc. It would seem to follow that knowledge and wisdom are the same?
Euth. So it appears to me.
Soc. May I ask, does it seem to you possible for a man to know all the things that are?
Euth. No, indeed! not the hundredth part of them, I should say.
Soc. Then it would seem that it is impossible for a man to be all- wise?
Quite impossible (he answered).
Soc. It would seem the wisdom of each is limited to his knowledge; each is wise only in what he knows?
Euth. That is my opinion.[24]
[24] Cf. Plat. "Theaet." 145 D. N.B.--For this definition of wisdom see K. Joel, ib. p. 324 foll.
Soc. Well! come now, Euthydemus, as concerning the good: ought we to search for the good in this way?
What way? (he asked).
Soc. Does it seem to you that the same thing is equally advantageous to all?
No, I should say not (he answered).
Soc. You would say that a thing which is beneficial to one is sometimes hurtful to another?
Decidedly (he replied).
Soc. And is there anything else good except that which is beneficial, should you say?[25]
[25] Or reading (1) {allo d' an ti phaies e agathon einai to ophelimon}; or else (2) {allo d' an ti phaies agathon einai to ophelimon}; (in which case {alloti} = {allo ti e};) translate (1) "and what is beneficial is good (or a good), should you not say?" lit. "could you say that the beneficial is anything else than good (or a good)?" or else (2) "and what is beneficial is good (or a good)? or is it anything else?"
Nothing else (he answered).
Soc. It would seem to follow that the beneficial is good relatively to him to whom it is beneficial?
That is how it appears to me (he answered).
Soc. And the beautifuclass="underline" can we speak of a thing as beautiful in any other way than relatively? or can you name any beautiful thing, body, vessel, or whatever it be, which you know of as universally beautiful?[26]
[26] i.e. "beautiful in all relations into which it enters." Reading {to de kalon ekhoimen an pos allos eipein e estin onomazein kalon e soma e skeuos e all' otioun, o oistha pros tanta kalon on; Ma Di', ouk egog', ephe}. For other emendations of the vulg., and the many interpretations which have been given to the passage, see R. Kuhner ad loc.
Euth. I confess I do not know of any such myself.[27]
[27] Or, adopting the reading {ekhois an} in place of {ekhoimen an} above, translate "I certainly cannot, I confess."
Soc. I presume to turn a thing to its proper use is to apply it beautifully?
Euth. Undoubtedly it is a beautiful appliance.[28]
[28] Or, "I presume it is well and good and beautiful to use this, that, and the other thing for the purpose for which the particular thing is useful?"--"That nobody can deny (he answered)." It is impossible to convey simply the verbal play and the quasi- argumentative force of the Greek {kalos ekhei pros ti tini khresthai}. See K. Joel, p. 426.
Soc. And is this, that, and the other thing beautiful for aught else except that to which it may be beautifully applied?
Euth. No single thing else.
Soc. It would seem that the useful is beautiful relatively to that for which it is of use?
So it appears to me (he answered).
Soc. And what of courage,[29] Euthydemus? I presume you rank courage among things beautiful? It is a noble quality?[30]
[29] Or, perhaps better, "fortitude." See H. Sidgwick, "Hist. of Ethics," p. 43.
[30] It is one of {ta kala}. See K. Joel, ib. p. 325, and in reference to the definitions of the Good and of the Beautiful, ib. p. 425 foll.
Nay, one of the most noble (he answered).
Soc. It seems that you regard courage as useful to no mean end?
Euth. Nay, rather the greatest of all ends, God knows.
Soc. Possibly in face of terrors and dangers you would consider it an advantage to be ignorant of them?
Certainly not (he answered).
Soc. It seems that those who have no fear in face of dangers, simply because they do not know what they are, are not courageous?
Most true (he answered); or, by the same showing, a large proportion of madmen and cowards would be courageous.
Soc. Well, and what of those who are in dread of things which are not dreadful, are they--
Euth. Courageous, Socrates?--still less so than the former, goodness knows.
Soc. Possibly, then, you would deem those who are good in the face of terrors and dangers to be courageous, and those who are bad in the face of the same to be cowards?
Certainly I should (he answered).
Soc. And can you suppose any other people to be good in respect of such things except those who are able to cope with them and turn them to noble account?[31]
[31] {kalos khresthai}, lit. "make a beautiful use of them."
No; these and these alone (he answered).