60. REPORT BY A POLISH NATIONAL CONTROLLED BY A WESTERN INTELLIGENCE SERVICE (EXCERPT).
… Colonel Puszinsky of the Intelligence Service reported to the deputy foreign minister on 26 June that the requirements laid down for a joint Polish-Soviet operation in Africa had been fulfilled. The deputy foreign minister declined to be told full details of the operation and asked for an outline report only. Colonel Puszinsky assured him that a suitable Polish citizen, trained in intelligence work, had been assigned as a liaison between the Soviet Embassy in an East African country and an organization of freedom fighters in a different but neighboring country. The agent was en route to his assignment and on arrival would fall under control of the responsible Soviet officials. An official expression of gratitude on the part of the Soviets had been received by Colonel Puszinsky for communication to the deputy foreign minister.
61. DISPATCH FROM THE AMERICAN STATION IN VIENNA (EXCERPT).
In the hope of allaying Geneva’s anxiety over the apparent confusion surrounding Christopher’s border-crossing operation, we have conducted a full debriefing of the Czech officer in command of Point Zebra. He states that the crossing by Christopher and Zofia Miernik was authorized by the Czech counterintelligence arm. The Czech CI officer who made the authorization was accompanied by a Russian known to our source as “Major Shigalov.” Our source believes that Shigalov is an officer of the KGB. It was Shigalov who instructed our source to create a diversion and permit the crossing by Christopher and the Miernik woman. There were no instructions to hold fire if Christopher and Zofia Miernik were discovered by the troops. Chances of that happening were regarded as minimal by Shigalov. Our source assumes that the crossing was a KGB operation designed to infiltrate personnel into the West with the credibility that accrues from a hazardous escape across the frontier. He has taken part in a number of other episodes that followed a similar operational script. We tend to agree with his judgment, assuming that his version of events is accurate. He has in the past been highly reliable.
62. INTERCEPTED TRAFFIC FROM SOVIET TRANSMITTER IN DAR ES SALAAM (DECODED 5 JULY).
1. Initiate Golgotha 7 July.
2. Rendezvous 0147 15 July [map coordinates for a point 48 miles west-northwest of El Fasher] with Richard. Recognition code: Heaven is far away. Reply: Allah awaits us near at hand.
3. Long live the brave fighters of the Anointed Liberation Front and the great cause of the workers.
63. CABLE FROM THE AMERICAN STATION IN KHARTOUM.
1. AT DAWN ON 7 JULY THE BODIES OF THREE OFFICIALS OF CENTRAL GOVERNMENT WERE FOUND IN MARKETPLACES OF EL OBEID, OTBARA, AND KASSALA, THREE IMPORTANT TOWNS LYING IN A CRESCENT AROUND KHARTOUM AT AN AVERAGE DISTANCE OF 200 MILES.
2. IN ALL CASES VICTIMS WERE MUTILATED INCLUDING CASTRATION AND CRUCIFIED HEAD DOWNWARDS ON X-SHAPED CROSSES.
3. FIRECRACKER CONFIRMS ALL THREE MURDERS WERE CARRIED OUT BY CELLS OF ANOINTED LIBERATION FRONT AS FIRST STAGE OF “OPERATION GOLGOTHA.”
4. “OPERATION GOLGOTHA” IS TERROR CAMPAIGN LONG PLANNED BY ALF. MURDERS, WITH MUTILATION AND CRUCIFIXION OF VICTIMS, ARE INTENDED TO DEMONSTRATE THAT ALF CAN STRIKE ANYWHERE AND ANYTIME IT PLEASES AGAINST CENTRAL GOVERNMENT AND ITS OFFICIALS.
5. MURDERS WILL CONTINUE WITH CRUCIFIED VICTIMS BEING DISPLAYED PROGRESSIVELY CLOSER TO KHARTOUM. OPERATIONAL PLAN OF “GOLGOTHA” CALLS FOR CRUCIFIXION OF NEXT VICTIMS TEN DAYS HENCE AT POINTS 20 MILES CLOSER TO KHARTOUIN ON MAIN ROADS EAST NORTH AND WEST OF THE CAPITAL.
6. FIRECRACKER WAS UNABLE FOREWARN US OF THIS ACTION AS ITS LEADER IS “AHMED” (TRUE NAME UNKNOWN), THE OTHER PRINCIPAL ALF FIGURE TRAINED IN THE USSR. DETAILS OF “GOLGOTHA” WERE COMMUNICATED TO “AHMED” BY A SOVIET CASE OFFICER WHOM HE MET IN LATE JUNE (DATE UNCERTAIN) IN KHARTOUM. INSTRUCTIONS TO INITIATE “GOLGOTHA” WERE SIGNALED BY SOVIET CLANDESTINE RADIO ON 5 JULY. (WE INTERCEPTED AND DECODED BUT WERE UNABLE DETERMINE DETAILS “GOLGOTHA” UNTIL AFTER IT WAS LAUNCHED.)
7. WE EMPHASIZE TO FIRECRACKER IMPORTANCE OF LEARNING AND COMMUNICATING DETAILS NEXT PHASE “GOLGOTHA” BEFORE THIS TAKES PLACE.
8. REQUEST HEADQUARTERS CLEARANCE TO BRIEF SUDANESE POLICE LIAISON ON DETAILS KNOWN TO US INCLUDING SOVIET INVOLVEMENT BUT NOT REPEAT NOT INCLUDING DISCLOSURE OUR CONTROL OF FIRE-CRACKER
9. FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF ALF HANDBILL POSTED AFTER ASSASSINATIONS IN MARKETPLACES PRINCIPAL SUDANESE TOWNS (TRANSLATION FROM ARABIC):
BELOVED BELIEVERS!
O BELOVED OF ALLAH! TODAY THREE CURSED LICKSPITTLES OF THE KHARTOUM CLIQUE THAT OFFENDS GOD AND THE TEACHING OF HIS PROPHET HAVE BEEN SENT TO ETERNAL PUNISHMENT. GOD IS GREAT. YOU WILL FIND THEM IN YOUR MARKETPLACE WITH THEIR FACES IN THE DUST. OTHERS WILL DIE AS THEY HAVE DIED. O BELOVED OF ALLAH! IT IS WE THE ANOINTED LIBERATION FRONT WHO HAVE TAKEN GOD’S VENGEANCE ON THESE MEN WHO SELL OUR BIRTHRIGHT TO THE IMPERIALISTS! THE HOUR COMES NEARER WHEN ALL THESE VICTIMS IN KHARTOUM SHALL DIE OR FLEE OUR VENGEANCE! NEXT TIME WE STRIKE CLOSER. WE SHALL STRIKE EVER CLOSER!
64. DISPATCH FROM WASHINGTON TO THE AMERICAN STATIONS IN KHARTOUM AND GENEVA (8 JULY).
1. Khartoum is instructed to inform the Sudanese authorities of the details of “Operation Golgotha,” and to brief the head of the Sudanese Special Branch on the activities, membership, and plans of the Anointed Liberation Front.
2. No operation is authorized that involves any risk to the life of Prince Kalash el Khatar. Khartoum may suggest the infiltration of Prince Kalash into the ALF to Special Branch and to the Amir of Khatar. Any decision to utilize Prince Kalash in this manner must, however, be made by the Amir and by the appropriate Sudanese officials. Khartoum may assure all parties of its cooperation, but it may not assume operational responsibility, which belongs to the Sudanese. Not only the appearance but also the reality of noninterference in the internal affairs of Sudan must be preserved.
3. Surveillance and reporting by Christopher with regard to the activities of the party traveling with Prince Kalash will be continued. Christopher will be handled by [his case officer from Geneva], who is assigned to temporary duty in Khartoum for the duration of Christopher’s activity within Sudan. Control of all U.S. aspects of this operation remains the responsibility of Khartoum.
4. In addition to his reporting function, Christopher is authorized to involve himself in covert action against all opposition elements, short of the use of violence. Khartoum will fully brief Christopher on all operational aspects of which he does not already have knowledge.
5. Khartoum’s briefing of Christopher should include the information that Headquarters has tentatively concluded that Tadeusz Miernik and Ilona Bentley are agents of the Soviet intelligence service. We believe Miernik is probably an asset of the Polish intelligence service on loan to the Soviets as principal agent in charge of their operations with regard to the ALF. Bentley is believed to be a Soviet agent assigned to monitor the performance of Miernik. These conclusions are based on evaluation of information from a variety of sources, [7] all of which tend to confirm that Miernik is the key to Soviet control and exploitation of the ALF in its terrorist phase. (The role of Zofia Miernik cannot at this time be determined. It is possible that she was employed as a courier to supply funds to Miernik, although her use in this role would not conform to normal Soviet funding techniques. It is somewhat less possible that she was defected as a payment to Miernik in order to assure his optimum operational performance. The entire scenario of double defection of a brother and sister is typical of the elaborate cover mechanisms of the Poles, and the anomalies in the Miernik situation may well be explained by the involvement of the Polish intelligence service in what is essentially a Soviet operation.)
[7] The sources referred to here are Christopher’s reporting, particularly his discovery that Miernik was communicating with a third person through use of a book code; the reports by a Polish agent that a Pole was being sent into Africa under Soviet control; and the account by the Czech frontier guards officer relating the peculiar circumstances surrounding the border crossing by Zofia Miernik. Other scraps of information, seemingly minor, also aided in fastening suspicion on Miernik. In regard to Bentley, her correspondence with Soviet letter-drops under a cover name and her meeting in Cairo with a Russian intelligence officer were sufficient to remove any but the most marginal doubts about her role. Miernik’s presence in Vienna, and in West Germany at the time of the cyanide murders in Munich and Berlin, was given some weight, but we regarded it as unlikely that he had been used as an assassin.