So, then, God either is or He is not. If He Himself accepts our situation, in which each member of the alternative in question has arguments to support it—for the “godlies” prove the existence of the Creator and the “ungodlies” disprove it—then from the point of view of logic, we have a game whose partners are, on one side, the full set of “godlies” and “ungodlies,” and, on the other side, God alone. The game necessarily possesses the logical feature that for unbelief in Him God may not punish anyone. If it is definitely unknown whether a thing or not a thing exists—some merely asserting that it does and others, that it does not—and if in general it is possible to advance the hypothesis that the thing never was at all, then no just tribunal can pass judgment against anyone for denying the existence of that thing. For in all worlds it is thus; when there is no full certainty, there is no full accountability. This formulation is by pure logic unassailable, because it sets up a symmetric function of reward in the context of the theory of games; whoever in the face of an uncertainty demands full accountability destroys the mathematical symmetry of the game; we then have the so-called game of the non-zero sum.
It is therefore thus: either God is perfectly just, in which case He cannot assume the right to punish the “ungodlies” by virtue of the fact that they are “ungodlies” (i.e. that they do not believe in Him); or else He will punish the unbelievers after all, which means that from the logical point of view He is not perfectly just. What follows from this? What follows is that He can do whatever He pleases, for when in a system of logic a single, solitary contradiction is permitted, then by the principle of ex falso quodlibet one can draw from that system whatever conclusion one will. In other words: a just God may not touch a hair on the head of the “ungodlies” and if He does, then by that very act He is not the universally perfect and just being that the theodicy posits.
ADNA asks how, in this light, we are to view the problem of the doing of evil unto others.
ADAN 300 replies: Whatever takes place here is entirely certain, whatever takes place “there”—i.e. beyond the world’s pale, in eternity with God—is uncertain, being but inferred according to the hypotheses. Here, one should not commit evil, despite the fact that the principle of eschewing evil is not logically demonstrable. But by the same token the existence of the world is not logically demonstrable. The world exists, though it could not exist. Evil may be committed, but one should not do so, and should not, I believe, because of our agreement based on the rule of reciprocity; be to me as I am to thee. It has naught to do with the existence or nonexistence of God. Were I to refrain from committing evil in the expectation that “there” I would be punished for committing it, or were I to perform good, counting upon a reward “there”, I would be predicating my behaviour on uncertain ground. Here, however, there can be no ground more certain than our mutual agreements in this matter. If there be, “there,” other grounds, I do not have knowledge of them as exact as the knowledge I have, here, of ours. Living, we play the game of life, and in it we are allies, every one. Therewith, the game between us is perfectly symmetrical. In postulating God, we postulate a continuation of the game beyond the world. I believe that one should be allowed to postulate this continuation of the game, so long as it does not in any way influence the course of the game here. Otherwise, for the sake of someone who perhaps does not exist, we may well be sacrificing that which exists here, and exists for certain.
NAAD remarks that the attitude of ADAN 300 toward God is not clear to him. ADAN has granted, has he not, the possibility of the existence of the Creator, what follows from it?
ADAN: Not a thing. That is nothing in the province of obligation. I believe that—again for all worlds—the following principle holds; a temporal ethics is always transcendental. This means that an ethics of the here and now can have outside itself no sanction which would substantiate it. And this means that he who does evil is in every case a scoundrel, just as he who does good in every case righteous. If someone is prepared to serve God, judging the arguments in favour of His existence to be sufficient, he does not thereby acquire here any additional merit. It is His business. This principle rests on the assumption that if God is not, then He is not one whit, and if He is, then He is almighty. For, being almighty, He could create not only another world but likewise logic different from the one that is the foundation of my reasoning. Within such logic the hypothesis of a temporal ethics could be of necessity dependent upon a transcendental ethics. In that case, if not palpable proofs then logical proofs would have compelling force, and constrain one to accept the hypothesis of God under the threat of sinning against reason.
NAAD says that perhaps God does not wish a situation of such compulsion to believe in Him—a situation that would arise in a creation based on that other logic postulated by ADAN 300. To this the latter replies:
An almighty God must also be all-knowing, absolute power is not something independent of absolute knowledge, because he who can do all, but knows not what the consequences will attend the bringing into play of his omnipotence is, ipso facto, no longer omnipotent; were God to work miracles now and then, as it is rumoured He does, it would put His perfection in a most dubious light, because a miracle is a violation of the autonomy of His own creation, a violent intervention. Yet he who has regulated the product of his creation, and knows its behaviour from beginning to end has no need to violate that autonomy; if he does nevertheless violate it, remaining all knowing, this means that he is not in the least correcting his handiwork (a correction can only mean, after all, an initial nonomiscience), but instead is providing—with the miracle—a sign of his existence. Now this is faulty logic because the providing of any such sign must produce the impression that the creation is nevertheless improved in its local stumblings. For a logical analysis of the new model yields the following: the creation undergoes corrections that do not proceed from it, but come from without (from the transcendental, from God), and therefore miracles ought really to be made the norm; or, in other words, the creation ought to be corrected and so perfected that miracles are at last no longer needed. For miracles, as ad hoc interventions, cannot be merely signs of God’s existence; they always, after all, besides revealing their Author, indicate an addressee (being directed to someone here in a helpful way). So, then, with respect to logic it must be thus; either the creation is perfect, in which case miracles are unnecessary, or the miracles are necessary, in which case the creation is not perfect. (With miracle or without, one may correct only that which is somehow flawed, for a miracle that meddles with perfection will simply disturb it, more, worsen it.) Therefore, the signaling by miracle of one’s own presence amounts to using the worst possible means, logically of its manifestation.