Western politicians continually called on the Kremlin to show greater co-operativeness. They pleaded for NATO’s good intentions to be accepted. Putin barked it out at a dinner for Prime Minister Blair: ‘This is ridiculous. I am a Russian. I cannot agree with the Americans on everything. My public won’t let me for a start. I would not survive for two years if I did that. We often have different interests.’12 As proof of his determination, in July 2007, Putin suspended Russia’s adherence to the Conventional Forces in Europe treaty signed by the Soviet leadership in 1990. His attitude went down well with Russians regardless of political orientation. Disputes among parties were shunted to marginal matters of foreign policy as opinion rallied to Putin.
The broad ruling group, however, never felt completely secure in power, and it was ruthless in enforcing its grip on public debate. Investigative journalists who highlighted official corruption or challenged the government’s account of the war in Chechnya exposed themselves to personal danger. In October 2006 Anna Politkovskaya was murdered outside her Moscow apartment. She was the most prominent of the critical reporters targeted in this manner, but there were several others. Her newspaper, Novaya gazeta, was subjected to repeated acts of persecution. Vladimir Slivyak exposed the widespread negligence in the civil nuclear industry in the Russian far north; he was treated as a traitor and subjected to continual harassment. In the United Kingdom, where Boris Berezovski stepped up his barrage of accusations against the Russian authorities, Alexander Litvinenko — one of his associates — was poisoned with a lethal dose of polonium-210. Outspoken rival politicians were intimidated. A gang of unidentified thugs had crushed the fingers of Yabloko leader Grigori Yavlinski’s pianist son in Yeltsin’s time. The dangers of opposition persisted under Putin. Garry Kasparov was temporarily thrown into gaol merely for campaigning for justice and civil rights. The FSB was given licence to act outside the law in defence of the whole state order. Putin himself professed ignorance of the specific cases. What is more, he showed little sympathy for the victims and did next to nothing to rectify the general situation. Russia sank deeper and deeper into a pit of authoritarian rule backed by criminality.
Putin in his second term moved ever further down the road towards a centralization of power. From December 2004 the leaders of the Russian Federation’s republics, instead of being elected, were to be selected by the president and their names were to be submitted to the legislative bodies of their localities for approval or rejection. Several of the smaller of the non-Russian republics in the Federation, moreover, were abolished. The authority of ‘the centre’ was ceaselessly confirmed.
In April 2005 Putin also took a grip of the country’s thousands of civil associations from charities to recreational groups, making it compulsory for them to acquire official registration and subjecting them to central supervision through a Public Chamber he himself appointed. Foreign agencies were treated with some suspicion and difficulties were placed in the way of the British Council, the BBC Russian Service and other bodies. Religious denominations too were put under pressure. Although the Russian Orthodox Church was granted privileges, in return it was required to show eager loyalty to the secular authorities. Putin, himself a professed Christian, interfered in personnel appointments in other faiths. Berel Lazar, a Hasid, was his first choice as Chief Rabbi in 2000. Universities were vigorously patrolled. Textbooks were vetted; approved authors had to moderate any criticism of Stalin. A youth movement, Nashi (‘Our Ones’), was founded to divert adolescents towards patriotic ideals. Its organizations were employed to harass the British ambassador after a worsening of Russo–UK relations in 2006. Lip-service was paid to enhancing social freedom. The reality was that the Kremlin distrusted collective endeavours by citizens unless there could be confidence that respect for the government, its leaders and its policies would be maintained.
Putin and his fellow rulers over several years combined electoral abuse, legislative licence, violent repression and media control to sustain an authoritarian regime. His projects on terrorism, on political extremism and public demonstrations were smoothly passed by the Federal Assembly. The loose wording of the laws was designed to make it easier for government and security agencies to curtail open dissent. Putin also succeeded, after years of trying, to scrap the remnants of the communist system of social security and replace it with monetary payments that gave a lesser guarantee of assistance in times of personal emergency.13 Yet he could not permanently ignore the popular grievances recorded in sample surveys. In 2005 he announced four ‘national programmes’ for urgent reform in housing, social welfare, agriculture and health care. The central and local elites had neglected such sectors since the fall of communism since they themselves could easily pay privately for what they needed. Most families, though, experienced dreadful under-provision. They lived in cramped accommodation. They could ill afford the weekly grocery bill. If they fell sick, they had to pay bribes to state-employed doctors for treatment.
His public image was assiduously manicured by his spokesmen, and it elicited a positive response from most Russians. The female pop duo Singing Together had a hit with ‘I Want A Man Like Putin’; his sober lifestyle commended itself especially to young women. When he appeared on radio for a question-and-answer programme, middle-aged listeners rang him up to express their heartfelt thanks. Male adults appreciated his relish for macho sports like judo. He also posed for a photo holding a tiger cub which an unknown friend had given him on his birthday. TV stations, all owned by his supporters, joined in the praise. The photographers accompanied him on a tour of eastern Siberia in August 2007 when he took Prince Albert II of Monaco out fishing — and pictures appeared of him stripped to the waist in the bright sunlight. Requests came through from the public for the Constitution to be amended so that he could stand again for a presidential third term. For a while he seemed to toy with the idea. The loyal sections of the media gave the impression that Russia, having found its saviour, should not allow him to stand down from the paramount office.
Outside of politics, Russians also began to do better on the international stage. Official sport recovered. Yeltsin had always supported tennis and the proliferation of private clubs produced a grand slam champion, Marat Safin. Female players thrust themselves forward in 2006–2007. Russian football became a serious force in European competitions. At the Beijing Olympics in August 2008 the country came third in the medals table. In December of the same year Xenia Sikhinova won the Miss World contest in South Africa.
The Duma elections in December 2007 produced 315 seats for United Russia. This was a remarkable endorsement of Putin’s period of rule. But he resisted the temptation to alter the Constitution and pondered whom to recommend as his successor. It was thought that his choice might fall on Viktor Zubkov, whom he appointed Prime Minister in September 2007. Like Putin, Zubkov hailed from St Petersburg, and the two of them had worked together for a long time. In the end Putin plumped for Dmitri Medvedev. At the time Medvedev was serving as First Deputy Prime Minister; he was also in charge of the ‘national programmes’ announced by Putin to improve health care, housing, agriculture and education. He was not a complete unknown but as yet lacked a clear profile in the eyes of most Russians. Continuity would be preserved by a secret deal whereby Putin would be asked to serve as the new Prime Minister. The usual dirty tricks were played. Liberal-minded politicians were ruled out of the contest on spurious technical grounds. These included ex-premier Mikhail Kasyanov. Even the former chess world champion Garry Kasparov was banned. Tired veterans Zyuganov and Zhirinovski were allowed to stand but they received little airtime on television. In stark contrast, Medvedev’s every public appearance was filmed and the Kremlin’s mastership of ‘political technology’ secured the desired result in March 2008.