61. For these accounts, see Daria Dimke, Aleksey Gilev, “‘No Time for Quality’: Mechanisms of Local Governance in Russia,” Europe-Asia Studies 73, no. 6 (2021): 1060–1079; Margarita Zavadskaya, Lev Shilov, “Providing Goods and Votes? Federal Elections and the Quality of Local Governance in Russia” Europe-Asia Studies 73, no. 6 (2021): 1037–1059.
62. On “participatory authoritarianism” in China and Russia, see Catherine Owen, “Participatory Authoritarianism: From Bureaucratic Transformation to Civic Participation in China and Russia,” Review of International Studies 246, no. 4 (2020): 415–434.
63. For a detailed account of the effects of participatory budgeting projects in Russia, see Ivan Shulga, Lev Shilov, Anna Sukhova, Peter Pojarski, “Can Local Participatory Programs Enhance Public Confidence: Insights from the Local Initiatives Support Program in Russia,” World Bank Discussion Papers, no. 1931 (2019), https://elibrary.worldbank.org/doi/abs/10.1596/31810, accessed September 7, 2021.
64. For an empirical evidence, see Leonid Polishchuk, Alexander Rubin, Igor Shagalov, “Managing Collective Action: Government-Sponsored Community Initiatives in Russia,” Europe-Asia Studies 73, no. 6 (2021): 1176–1209.
65. On the “triple transition,” see Claus Offe, “Capitalism by Democratic Design? Democratic Theory Facing the Triple Transition in East Central Europe,” Social Research 58, no. 4 (1991): 865–892.
66. On state capture in post-Communist countries, see Joel S. Hellman, “Winners Take Alclass="underline" The Politics of Partial Reform in Postcommunist Transitions,” World Politics 50, no. 2 (1998): 203–234.
67. See M. Steven Fish, “The Determinants of Economic Reforms in the Postcommunist World,” East European Politics and Societies 12, no. 1 (1998): 31–78; Michael McFaul, “The Fourth Wave of Democracy and Dictatorship: Non-Cooperative Transitions in the Postcommunist World,” World Politics 54, no. 2 (2002): 212–244; Timothy M. Frye, Building States and Markets after Communism: The Perils of Polarized Democracy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010). See also Kirill Rogov, “Krizis perekhoda: Oktyabr’ 1993 i uroki makroistorii,” Inliberty.ru, October 6, 2018, https://www.inliberty.ru/magazine/issue8/, accessed September 7, 2021.
68. For some evidence, see Eric Hanley, Natasha Yershova, Richard Anderson, “Russia—Old Wine in a New Bottle? The Circulation and Reproduction of Russian Elites, 1983–1993,” Theory and Society 24, no. 5 (1995): 639–668; Olga Kryshtanovskaya, Stephen White, “From Soviet Nomenklatura to Russian Elite,” Europe-Asia Studies 48, no. 5 (1996): 711–733.
69. For firsthand accounts, see Petr Aven, Alfred Kokh, Gaidar’s Revolution: The Inside Account of the Economic Transformation in Russia (London: I. B. Tauris, 2015).
70. For various assessments, see Andrei Shleifer, Daniel Treisman, Without a Map: Political Tactics and Economic Reform in Russia (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2000); Chrystia Freeland, Sale of the Century: Russia’s Wild Ride from Communism to Capitalism (New York: Crown Business, 2000).
71. See Neil Abrams, M. Steven Fish, “Policies First, Institutions Second: Lessons from Estonia’s Economic Reforms,” Post-Soviet Affairs 31, no. 6 (2015): 491–513.
72. See Anton Steen, Between Past and Future: Elites, Democracy, and the State in Post-Communist Countries. A Comparison of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania (Aldershot: Ashgate, 1997).
73. For some survey data, see Joakim Ekman, Kjetil Duvold, “Ethnic Divides in the Baltic States: Political Orientations after the Russian-Ukrainian Crisis,” in Crises in the Post-Soviet Space: From the Dissolution of the Soviet Union to the Conflict in Ukraine, eds. Fexit Jaitner, Tina Olteanu, Tobias Spöri (Abingdon: Routledge, 2018), 121–135.
74. For these accounts, see Juan J. Linz, Alfred Stepan, Problems of Democratic Transitions and Consolidation: Southern Europe, South America, and Post-Communist Europe (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996), chapter 20; David D. Laitin, Identity in Formation: The Russian-Speaking Populations in the Near Abroad (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1998). For a critical assessment, see James Hughes, “‘Exit’ in Deeply Divided Societies: Regimes of Discrimination in Estonia and Latvia,” Journal of Common Market Studies 43, no. 4 (2005): 739–762.
75. On the advantages of relative backwardness, see Alexander Gerschenkron, Economic Backwardness in Historical Perspective (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1962).
76. See Alina Mungiu-Pippidi, “The Quest for Good Governance: Learning from Virtuous Circles,” Journal of Democracy 27, no. 1 (2016): 95–109; Fredrika Björklund, “E-Government and Moral Citizenship: The Case of Estonia,” Citizenship Studies 20, no. 6–7 (2016): 914–931; Valts Kalnins, “The World’s Smallest Virtuous Circle: Estonia,” in Transitions to Good Governance: Creating Virtuous Circles of Anti-Corruption, eds. Alina Mingui-Pippidi, Michael Johnston (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 2017), 102–127.
77. For similar observations, see Lucan Ahmad Way, Adam Casey, “The Structural Sources of Postcommunist Regime Trajectories,” Post-Soviet Affairs 34, no. 5 (2018): 317–332.
78. For some accounts, see Stephen Jones, Georgia: A Political History since Independence (London: I. B. Tauris, 2013); Jonathan Wheatley, Georgia from the National Awakening to the Rose Revolution: Delayed Transition in the Former Soviet Union (Abingdon: Routledge, 2017).
79. For a detailed account, see Larisa Burakova, Pochemu u Gruzii poluchilos’ (Moscow: United Press, 2011). See also Alexander Kupatadze, “The Quest for Good Governance: Georgia’s Break with the Past,” Journal of Democracy 27, no.1 (2016): 110–123.