Stegmaier had stabbed his superior in the back. It is true that Zanssen was not universally popular; he was excitable and could get very angry. Some leading Peenemünders were friendly with him, others less so, including, apparently, Stegmaier. Zanssen was also known to be a social drinker, but the charge that he was an alcoholic was false, as was the claim that he was a member of the “Catholic Action.” In the tradition of the German officer corps, Zanssen was not outspokenly religious; his wife and children were in fact Protestant. The real problem was his increasingly apparent alienation with the Third Reich. In 1933 Zanssen, like many junior officers, had been enthusiastic about the “national revolution.” When the Nazis came to power, he even made his children stand up at the dinner table and sing the Party anthem, the “Horst Wessel Song,” although he was never a member. But at some point he started to grow more and more disillusioned. His wife later attributed that to his service on the Eastern front in 1941–42. He did not go out of his way to pay obeisance to local Party officials and, under the influence of a drink or two, he would become careless about expressing his views. In Mazuw’s original telegram to Himmler, the SS commander had noted that he and the Gauleiter (regional Party leader) for Pomerania had known Zanssen for years and “had never placed great trust in him.”31
Himmler told Berger, who was in Berlin, to bring the matter up with Speer and also to inform Ernst Kaltenbrunner’s Reich Security Main Office, of which the Gestapo was a part. Apparently the ensuing investigations produced no evidence that Zanssen had anything to with the Catholic priests or any substantial proof of the Peenemünde Commander’s disloyalty. But before those investigations were even completed, the Reichsführer-SS decided to try to undermine Zanssen through another route, perhaps in the hope that Stegmaier would be made Commander. On April 24 Himmler wrote to General Rudolf Schmundt, Hitler’s OKW adjutant and head of the Army Personnel Office since October 1942, when it had been moved directly into Führer headquarters. He disingenuously reported Stegmaier’s accusations to Schmundt without claiming to have verified them. After a two-week delay, on May 6 Army Ordnance suddenly received a call from the Personnel Office that Zanssen was to be removed from his position immediately as a security risk.32
Dornberger and Zanssen were thunderstruck. The Commander of Peenemünde-East officially withdrew from the Catholic Church the same day and spent a sleepless night pacing the floor. Dornberger frantically attempted to find out what was behind the demeaning treatment of his close friend. Until that time, neither had been informed that Zanssen was under suspicion, although the Gestapo had indicated to the Commander that it had planted an agent in Peenemünde to investigate possible connections with the anti-Nazi group. As Zanssen told a police official a few days later, he suspected that his dismissal was due to the machinations of private industry (meaning Degenkolb’s cronies) to get rid of Dornberger and himself and take over Peenemünde.33
Pending a final resolution of Zanssen’s fate, Dornberger issued an order on May 11 appointing himself Commander and assigning his friend to Berlin to act as his representative at Wa Prüf 11. Backed by the Chief of Army Armaments, General Fromm, who was outraged by the way the order had come down from Führer headquarters, Dornberger then set out to clear Zanssen’s name. In short order Dornberger discovered who was behind the accusations: Stegmaier. He probably surmised this from the copy he had received of Himmler’s letter to Schmundt. Dornberger’s reaction to the information news is surprising: He merely gave Stegmaier a reprimand. As he explained in his letter to Ordnance Chief Leeb in early June, Stegmaier had been afflicted by a “real contradiction” between his loyalty to his superior officers and his loyalty to Nazism. Because of his friendship with Berger and his “lack of trust” in Dornberger, Stegmaier had therefore repeated his hostile views about Zanssen to Berger.34
Dornberger was angry, but he gave Stegmaier some leeway because his own loyalty to Hitler and the Third Reich was unquestioning, which could not be said of Zanssen. In his notebooks one can find a draft of the pep talk he gave to his senior subordinates on assuming the Commander’s post on May 12. He states: “My National Socialist beliefs should be widely known.” He goes on to say that his sole aim was “put in the hands of the Führer sufficient numbers of this weapon [the A-4], which—it is my conviction and unshakable belief—will decide the war.” In the pseudo-apolitical tradition of the officer corps, neither he nor Stegmaier was a member of the Nazi party or its principal organizations, but because he was also afflicted with conflicting loyalties to Nazism and the Army, he gave Stegmaier rather mild treatment, even though the Development Works chief had betrayed one of his closest friends.35
In the end, Zanssen’s name was cleared and Himmler had to back away from the affair. Fromm sent a letter to the Reichsführer-SS, based on a Dornberger draft, which strongly contested the charges. Because there was no solid evidence of Zanssen’s disloyalty, Himmler asked Berger what he should reply. The chief of the SS Main Office responded that Thom and Dornberger had visited him a number of times and he had offered this explanation: “In view of the special importance of secrecy, it was a purely comradely gesture” to make the Army aware of Zanssen’s questionable statements in letters and elsewhere! Himmler should take nothing back, Berger suggested, but rather should leave it to Berger to give the same explanation to Fromm. It was an incredibly cynical letter that revealed in its very first line Himmler’s attempt to exploit the affair: “The Col. Zansen case has not turned out quite the way we expected.”36
On the evening of June 28, Himmler arrived at Peenemünde for a second, more formal tour of the center, to be held the following day. He was accompanied by Mazuw and Leeb. According to Dornberger, he was finally able to confront the Reichsführer-SS about the Zanssen accusations the next afternoon, while on a boat to the Oie to witness the second, and this time successful, A-4 launch attempt from Peenemünde. The new Commander got nothing but a cold brushoff. Himmler indeed had every reason to be disgruntled about the way the whole thing had turned out. But there were other satisfactions to be found in the visit. The sight of Wernher von Braun in a black uniform must have inspired Himmler, because the Technical Director received an early promotion to Sturmbannführer (Major), backdated to June 28. The Reichsführer-SS must also have been excited about the progress of the missile, which the Führer’s whole entourage now believed could knock Britain out of the war. In the meantime, he would have to bide his time and await another opportunity to exert his influence over the program.37
THE DECISION TO USE SLAVE LABOR
While the Zanssen affair was still being cooked up behind the closed doors of the SS, Peenemünde became more deeply involved with Himmler’s organization by another route: through the decision to use concentration camp labor for A-4 production. After the war the Peenemünders made the SS a scapegoat for all the crimes associated with the rocket program, yet the initiative for this action came not from the SS but from the A-4 Special Committee and Arthur Rudolph, who were searching for a way around the prevailing labor shortage.