Inasmuch as the VSKhSON considered Communism a phenomenon that was inherently anti-national and non-Russian, just as the "etrine governmental system' was for the Slavophiles, it assumed that the regime 'hangs in the air', without real roots in Russian society. ' le dogmatic grouping of the Communist class , it claimed, does not possess a broad social base among the people on which it could draw to organize serious resistance. Its utter defeat is predetermined.'6 Hence the VSKhSON conceived of the evolution as essentially amilitary coup: 'For total victory the people need their own underground army ol liberation which will overthrow the dictatorship and rout the oligarchy's security forces '7
Moreover, because Communism is presented as the ma.n threat to Christian civilization and the heart of Communism lies in Russia, obviously civilization can only be saved from wethin Russia. Since the fate of the world Communist movement will be decided in Russia',8 the future of the human race will be determined there as well.
After victory, the direct participation of society in the lite of the country must be realized by means of local self-government and the representation of peasant communes and national corporations — major unions of blue- and white-collar workers — n the highest legislative organ of the country9 . . . The state must be constituted as theocratic, social, representative, and popular 10
The theocratic character of the new state will be ensured by the creaiion of a special 'superv isory' organ — the Supreme Synod, which must consist of one-third members of the upper hierarchy of the church and two thirds of prominent representatives of the people, chosen for life.'11 The Supreme Synod will have 'the right of veto over any law or action which does not correspond to the basic principles of the Social-Christian order.'12 In addition, as the 'spiritual authority of the people', the Supreme Synod shall elect a Head of State — 'the representative of national unity'.
' he theocraac Social-Christian state so constituted must provide basic human rights and civil liberties', among which the following are prominent ■13
The lite and dignity of the person are inviolable.
All citizens are equal before the law.
Freedom of labour is provided for even-one by the right
of each citizen to land and to credit for the acquisition of
means of production.
No form of compulsory labour can be permitted in
Point 53: Point 56: Point 58:
Point 62,
Point 63: Point 64: Point 67: Pont 79:
regard to free citizens. Personal freedom is inviolable. All means for the dissemination of thought are free. There is freedom of assembly arid to hold demonstrations. The secret political police must be disbanded
It seems that everything Russian political thought had developed over the course of a century and a half, in its attempt to construct a specifically Russian and fundamentally non-Fluropean state, was brought together in this remarkable document. Here we find the
romantic conviction of Pavel Pestel' that 'freedom of labour' and, more importantly, freedom from unemployment can be provided by giving each citizen the right to land. Here too are to be found: the passionately held tenet of Ivan Aksakov that 'parliamentarism' is a means for professional politicians to usurp power; the postulate of Petr Tkachev that the Russian state has no roots in Russian society and that therefore the people can be liberated by a mihtary putsch; Vladimir Solov'ev's notion that the theocratic organization of society is the political embodiment of the Biblical commandments; Nikolai Berdiaev's declaration that both Western capitalism and Soviet Communism represent to the same degree fatal blind alleys in the history of humankind — paths to the triumph of the Antichrist; Fedor Dostoevskii's abiding faith that the world s salvation mill come from Russia. Yet just as revealing as what this encyclopedic collection of Russian liberal anti-Europeanism contains, is what it fails to address.
In particular, it does not mention the nationalities' question (which is especially surprising in a political programme for establishing the state structure of a multinational empire). Even worse, there's no mention of the need for a working mechanism capable of ensuring the actual realization of all the civil liberties cited earlier. After all, these basic freedoms are fully specified in the Soviet constitution too. However, without a working mechanism to realize them, in the form of an institutionalized political opposition, historically they have proved to be no more than fictions, empty promises. Where is the guarantee that the same thing will not happen with the promises of the 'new Russian revolutionaries'? In other words, what guarantees their liberalism? I stress that I do not doubt the liberal intentions of the authors of the VSKhSON programme — merely whether they were capable of carrying them out. Given that the VSKhSON already has a kind of official interpreter in the West — John Dunlop — it is worth examining his views more closely
What do the Russian people want?
Briefly, Dunlop believes that the VSKhSON represented the most promising wing of the Soviet dissident movement and carried within it the seed and prototype for a future anti-Communist revolution in the USSR. 'While the VSKhSON,' he writes, 'like the Decembr'sts, did not constitute a serious military threat to the exist ng order, the ideas it propagated — and continues to propagate — represent a formidable danger indeed.'14 For this reason Dunlop is certain that the further development of the dissident movement in the USSR will follow the model of the VSKhSON. He even goes so far as to predict this 15 As proof he cites 'the great s n.ilarity of the VSKhSON's views to those of Solzhenitsyn and h*s friends' 16 Furthermore, Dunlop feels enormous personal sympathy for the VSKhSON which serves him as a basis for yet another prediction. Although 'the VSKhSON's society would be more 'authoritarian than the Western democracies', t would nevertheless inevitably represent a marked improvement over the Soviet system , and that may very well be what the populace wants'.11 I haven t the slightest idea how Mr Dunlop ariived at this discovery. My personal observation has been that different people out there want different things What interests us here is what the authors of the VSKhSON programme wanted. They, judging by the articles of their projected constitution cited earlier wanted freedom, not authoritarianism. Just like the Bolsheviks, they were sure that a society built according to their plan would be much freer than Western democracy, which they, again as the Bolsheviks, considered 'an unconditional evi.' , and not in the least free. The question then becomes, whether the new Russian revolutionaries were not just as mistaken as the Bolsneviks, and whether iheir programme would not doom Russia to new authoritarian slavery instead of the freedom they promised Unfortunately, Mr Dunlop doesn't tell us anything on this crucial question.
The Russian Patn
The programme of the VSKhSON is divided into two parts, one critical, the other constructive. The critical part, which takes up the bulk of the document (30 out of 48 pages) is of no interest to our analysis. Mainly it ;ust rephrases Milovan Djilas's The New Class However, the constructive section raises a fundamental question: namely, for the sake of what is the 'Communist oligarchy' in the USSR to be overthrown? The programme makes it clear that this is necessary in order to save humanity from both Communism and capitalism, which it sees as the immediate source of Communism.