We find other evidence in the recollections of A. Petrov-Agatov, a highly controversial personage who has spent the greater portion of his lile in Soviet camps. There he met members of the VSKhSON whom he — like Karavatskii — considered 'the salt of the Russian nation' and 'the flower of Russian youth , and there he encountered virulent anti-semitism.
The Jewish question was sharply posed . . Having become acquainted with the Zionist Solomon Borisovich Dol nik . I suggested to Andrei Donatovich (Siniavskv) that we go visit him. 'Fine with me: Solomon Borisovich is a nice person. But I ask you to bear .n m.nd that the attitude toward Jews here is especially intolerant ' A rumour was even going around camp that Andrei Donatovich was a Jew. Incidentally, it wasn't just Siniavsky who was considered a Jew. Having seen my friendly relations with Dol nik, people also began to say' 'Kike! What kind of Petrov is he? Some kind of Freierman or Zilberstein. The scum have all taken Russian surnames.' Hatred of Communism was also identified with Jews. 'Lenin, Khrushchev, Brezhnev, and Kosygin — all kikes', could be heard everywhere.32
This is a very strange situation ndeed, where even hatred of the Soviet regime is based on a profound, instinctive, almost bestial ethnic hatred. Whereas the members of the VSKhSON saw the roots of Communism ui materialistic capitalism , the mass of prisoners invariably saw them in 'Jewish oppression', in 'the kiKes
In such a poisoned atmosphere, what would be the logical position of the leaders of a patriotic organization' clainrng to represent 'all the nationalities of Great Russia'? Obviously, the least they could do would be to distance themselves from street anti-semitism; after all, they did want to become the leaders of 'Great Russia'. Here, in the Gulag they encountered a kind of microcosm of the society they intended to lead along 'the Russian path'. If, even here, hatred of Communism was so closely intertwined with chauvinism and the pogrom-mentality of the Black Hundreds, think of the potential for an an+i-semi_ic explosion if they tried to install a theocratic Russian Orthodox state. For just this reason their reactions here are especially snjnif:cant Judging from the evidence at our disposal, they not only fa led to come to the defence of the insulted and injured', which would be their Christian duty, and to distance themselves from the persecutors, but even the 'director' of their 'ideological department', Evgenii Vagin, persuaded Petrov-Agatov that 'all Russia's misfortunes come from the Jews.'33
An analogous, even more ominous, story was recounted to me by Andrei Simavsky, who also served his prison term together with members of the VSKhSON and those 'close to them in spirit'. Once he put the follow ng quest'nn to one of them: 'What would you do with the Jews il you won?' The answer was easy: 'We would send them to Israel.' 'But what about the ones who didn't want to go?' Again the answer was simple: 'We would exterminate them.' 'What? AJong with their children?' gasped Siniavsky. 'Well, after all, Andrei Donatovich, who, when he is exterminating rats, thinks about their babies?'
A Marked Improvement over the Soviet System?
The VSKhSON programme includes among its liberal provisions that: 'The information med i . . . must not be a monopoly of the state. Censorship must be abolished.'34 Further: 'All known religions must enjoy the right to preach and worship unhindered.'35 Thus, the programme promises cultural and relig dus freedom of thought. But what aDout political freedom of thought? What would a VSKhSON government do with people such as S'mavsky or myself or, generally, with the traditionally 'heterodox' and — alas, equally traditionally — 'Westernizing' Russian intelligentsia? It's clear that this problem is no less poignant for the planners of 'Great Russia' than the problem of nationality. Essentially, it is the problem of the intellectual elite's position in the social order, of how new ideas are to be generated and the state's errors corrected. In short, it is the problem of the need for a political opposition, without which, as history has shown, the rational development of society is impossible. The authors of the VSKhSON programme did not yet call this intellectual elite 'educated shopkeepers', 'smatterers' or 'civilized savages', as their successors will. They promised merely 'not to take a hostile attitude toward those close in spirit [to the VSKhSON] but possessing a variety ot different programmes. The final choice ought to be made after the overthrow of the Communist dictatorship.'30
Since it is more than likely that Siniavsky and I, along with thousands upon thousands, if not millions, of others, would not be judged close in spirit to the VSKhSON, what would the new military government propose to do about it? Would П apologize for causing a disturbance and go home in peace? Would it not, more naturally, place some of those who were 'more distant in spiru m camps or exile them abroad as other military governments have done in similar circumstances?37 A discussion broadcast over Radio Liberty, in which Evgenii Vagin explained his credo more precisely, sheds some light on this question, albeit mdrectly.
Asked about a certain quotation from Dostoevskii, Vagin replied, 'As to the quotation you have cited, wheiher a Russian can be an atheist and to what extent the Russian nature is compatible with this, yes, in this sense I share Dostoevski's belief that to be Russian is to be Orthodox, and that religion is, of course, the profound essence ot the Russian person.'3S But Dostoevskii, unlike Vagin, was not involved m devising plans for Russia's future political order nor did he Intend to become one of its leaders, as Vagin did For this reason we must be interested in the political meaning attached to his definition of 'the profound essence of the Russian person . For myself — unlike Dunlop — this issue is not merely an academic one, but bears directly upon my fate. What would Vagin's government do with me and those close to me in spirit — not Russian Orthodox (and consequently not Russians'), and politically heterodox to boot? Would t not be natural for this government — in the best of circumstances — to send me nto permanent exile abroad? But that's where I am already!
I was just paraphrasing a story told to me by Siniavsky. When he replied to his camp inmate ('who was close in spirit' to the VSKhSON) that he would protest against the genocide of those Jews unwilliig to leave the VSKhSON's 'Great Russia', his fellow prisoner told him, And we would stick you in prison, Andrei Donatovich So how woud Dunlop's promise of a 'marked improvement over the Soviet system' benefit Siniavsky either?
The Utopia ot L-Nationalism
I hope 1 have now provided enough evidence to convince the reader that the born-again Russian Idea was at its very inception permeated with anti-Europeanism, med -eval dreams of theocracy, and the fascist principles of a corporate state. But if so, how are we to explain all the liberal provisions in the VSKhSON programme: its declarations concerning the abolition of censorship and freedom of religion; how judges must be irremovable and answerable only to the law';39 how 'the cultural policy of Social-Christianity proceeds from the recognition that living culture . . . can blossom only under conditions of freedom'?40 In short, how can we explain all the things which compelled Dunlop to believe n 'the new Ruse an revolutionaries'?41 Is all this simply hypocrisy and political demagoguery? If not, how else are we to interpret this combination, in one and the same ideological conccpt, of 'freedom' and 'theocracy', of liberalism and anti-Europeanism, and of modern terminology and medieval ideas?