Even more important than any political event is the role of the church and of Russian Orthodoxy as an organizing and indoctrinating force in the triumphal progression of the 'Russian spirit'. Everything which for decades Marxist historiography had dismissed as the accursed tsarist past and opium of the people, and passionately attacked as 'reactionary' and 'backward', with Chalmaev now emerged into the foreground as the harmonious creative collaborat on of Russia's tsars and her church for the good of the nation and, ultimately, the Communist Party.
'The contemporary young person', wi tes Chalmaev, 'will probably be surprised at the fact that in the historical novels of recent years, such a large place has come to be taken by tsars and Grand Dukes, and along with them, but by no means inferior to them, patriarchs and other princes of the church, schismatics and anchorites.'25 He explains that the 'greatly poetic' Patriarch Nikon, the 'anchorite patriot' Sergii Radonezhskii, and the 'patriot Patriarch' Germogen, together with others, embodied the 'spiritual power' of the Russian nation, its 'fiery transports and dreams', from which it 'forges . . . the foundation for feats on behalf of the state.'26 'A great country', he adds, 'cannot live without deep pathos, without inner enthusiasm — otherw.se it is seized by flaccidity and torpor.'27 Moreover, inasmuch as the actual bearer of Russian history — the people — 'only once in a hundred years ... [is required to] rise to the occasion of a battle of Poltava or defence of Stalingrad',28 someone must in the meantime keep alive their 'deep pathos' and 'inner enthusiasm'. The intelligentsia, the 'educated shopkeepers', are, of course, unsuited to this role But who does that leave, except tsars and princes of the church
In the efforts of Peter I and Ivan the Terrible, and in the attempts of the church reformers to modify for the good of the motherland the Byzantine idea of denial of the earthly world as man s greatest achievement, there is something majestic, which is an inspiration to our thought too.:j
As we can see, there is really no great difference between Lenin and Ivan the Terrible, or between socialism and the reformers of the church — contrary to everything Marxist ideologists had been teaching Soviet youth for half a century'- Suddenly - in 1968 - the organ of the Central Committee of the Komsomol starts to exchange optimism for the sombre rhetoric of the church, trying to persuade Soviet youth that, all along, both of them have been working toward one and the same goal. But which goal? Where is the common denominator between Poltava and Stalingrad, between Lenin and Ivan the Terrible : Who would, even in jest, count Peter I among the buddcrs of Communism, or Lenin among the anchorites''
Here is where the grandiose vision of the 'Byzantine Idea'30 enters in. It is this, it turns out, that all the titans of Russian history — its patriot-anchorites and its patriot-Communists — have jointly been working towards. Now we can understand Chalmaev's programmatic declaration that, 'the measure of true intellectuality and progressive- ness in our day is the struggle against the ideological opponents oi our Motherland';31 and that, 'Awareness of this uncompromising ideological divide is the historical inevitability of our time.'32
According to Lobanov, 'the ideology of our country' is derived from the 'moral uniqueness' of the Russian nation. History helped Chalmaev to formulate this derivation more precisely. It proved to be 'Bvzantinism', through whose prism Russian history is transformed into a preparatory school for the next Stalingrad; and Byzantinism that helps to rekindle 'deep pathos' and 'inner enthusiasm , without which Brezhnev's Russia 'is seized by flabhiness and torpor
Chalmaevism
Lobanov's and Chalmaev's essays, accompanied in Molodaia gvardia by dozens of poems and short stories all devoted to the same resurrected 'land and soil' and 'national spirit' themes were an open challenge to the Brezhnev regime and its ideologists. The regime responded — not only with a hail of indignant articles, but also with a number of actions undertaken by the Propaganda Department of the Central Committee. There was even a special session of the Central Committee Secretariat devoted to 'Young Guaraism'. (Brezhnev himself, according to authoritative sources, compb.med at this meeting that whenever he turned on the television, he heard only the ring ng of church bells and saw nothing but on on domes. 'What's the matter , comrades?' he asked 'What time are we living in? Before the Revolution or after it?') Finally, the regime responded by ous ng the editor-in-chief of Molodaia gvardia, Anatoli N konov. A special term — Chalmaevism — was coined and began to be used in ideological propaganda attacks.
However, nothing changed. The mountain had laooured and brought forth a mouse. Almost contemptuously, № konov was appointed editor- in-chief of the 'cosmopolitan' magazine Vokrug sveia [Around the World] — in the same publishing house as Molodaia gvardia but one storey higher. His place was ultimately taken by his former deputy, Anatolii Ivanov, an even more faithful henchman of Chalmaev's. Brezhnev's patience continued to be tried by the church bells and onion domes on TV. 'Chalmaevism' in poetry and prose continued to dominate Molodaia gvardia, and a new magazine of the 'Chalmaevist tendency' — Nash sovremennik [Our Contemporary] — appeared. Its editor-in-chief, Sergei Vikulov, did not even try to disgt 'se his sympathies. More importantly Molodaia gvardia dared to hit back — and was supported by Moskva and Ogonek [Little Fire].
Something totally unprecedented was happening: the impeccably obedient journalistic machine, which had worked faultlessly for decades, this time balked. The Propaganda Department of the Central Committee proved powerless to enforce the Secretariat's decisions. Everything seemed to be taking place in a kind of Kafkaesque world. The Cultural Department of that same Central Committee impudently denied that any decision on 'Chalmaevism' had oeen taken at all No terrible vengeance was visited upon them. Instead, a half-hearted, though noisy quarrel dragged on for years between two departments at the very top of the ideological tree. What this led to, we will see later.
The Defeat of a Marxist
The chorus of Marxist voices which attacked Molodaia gvardia was ultimately joined by the liberal Novyi mir. For fifteen years this journal had fought bravely with the orthodox Stalinist Oktyabr ', but now found itself in the same camp. In truth, everything went topsyturvy when the black cloud of Russophilism appeared on the horizon In place of their good old enmity, familiar as the daily paper, seemingly irreconcilable opponents suddenly finished up on the same side of the barricades. What's more, they began to speak almost the same language — the language ot dogmatic Marxism Aleksandi Dement'ev, tn a lengthy essay, accused Molodaia gvardia of what it should have been accused of long before. He wrote:
Chalmaev speaks of Russia and the West in the language of Slavophile messianism rather than that of our contemporaries . Our scholarship . . . treats [this problem] above all as a struggle between the world of socialism and the world of capitalism . . . Underlying today's struggle between Russia' and the West' are not national, but social and class distinctions . . . [From Chalmaev's essay] it is but one step . . to the idea of national exclusiveness and the superiority of the Russian nation over all others, to an ideology incompatible with proletarian internationalism . . . The meaning and goal of life [for Chalmaev] are not in the material, but in the spiritual . . . [which] is an obstacle to the material and spiritual advancement of the Soviet peasantry.33