Inasmuch as Veche had declared itself an organ of a loyal opposition, it was compelled to observe certain time-honoured rules of the game practised in all the legal 'fat' journals, and to use the traditional style of analysis. This style, of course, was the technique of historical analogy- developed over the course of centuries by the Russian loyal opposition press to a point of supreme craftsmanship and filigree delicacy. Thus the main contribution of Veche to the development of an alternative strategy was made in the form of historical-phdosophical essays, among which the most notable was the unsigned article N. Ya. Danilevskii's Role in World Historical Philosophy'.
As the reader may recall from Chapter 3, Dar devskii was classical Slavophilism's first revisionist. His fundamental work, Russia and Europe, first published in 1871 during a period of crisis for the pre- revolutionary liberal nationalism, laid the basis for the strategic reorientation of the Russian Right in the nineteenth century. Danjlevskii was a liberal nationalist, like Osipov himself Obviously, for all these reasons, an interpretation of Danilevsk must have seemed to the ideologists of Veche to be the most suitable vehicle for starling up a dialogue with Soviet leaders.
Danilevskii's main thesis, you may remember, was that there is no such thing as world civilization. There are only individual 'cultural- historical' types which have no more in common with one another than do different biological genera, such as fish and lizards, for example. At the core of each of these types are 'historical nations', which differ from non-historical ones in that, 'they have their own tasks . . . their own ideas.' For this reason, the 'political formulas wor ed out by one people are suited only to that people.'4
If Danilevski. had been consistent, he would have had to concede tne right of every nation to self-determination. 'Unfortunately,' Veche condescendingly notes, 'Danilevskii was far from sympathetic to every kind of uniqueness. Peoples who found themselves within Russia's state borders could not count on his tolerance.'5 Danilevskii explains this position in theoretical terms by claiming that, besides historical nations there are also, so to speak, ne'er-do-well peoples who for various reasons lack their national ideas and as a result wind up as merely 'ethnograpf с material'. In addition, there are nations who have already fulfilled their historical task and have died 'a natural death, by seri'le weakness (China)'6 and have thereby also become ethnographic material.
One of the main points in Danilevskii's revision of Slavophilism was his der lal of the principle of universal morality (which Veche mildly calls pragmaUsm'). Specif -;ally, he considered it inappropriate to apply rules of morality to nternational relations: 'An eye for an eye and a tooth for a tooth . . . that is the law of foreign poficy, the law of relations of one state toward another. The law of love and self- sacrifice have no place here '7 Thus, 'ndifferent cocxistence between nat'ons — or, in the case of conflicting interests, open enmity ('cold war , as we would say these days) — was raised by Danilevskii to the level of natural law. Under these circumstances it was, of course, permissiole to treat 'ethnographic material' like . . . well, material. By denying the existence of such a concept as 'the interests of all mankmd 8 and, Instead, asserting that the real and profound danger is prec;ely the enthronement ... of the idea of world civilization',9 Dan levakii advanced 'a complete program for a kind of isolationism'.10 Thus the conclusion that Veche led its readers to was that the Slavophiles were wrong (as was the VSKhSON) in considering Russia a tool for saving humankind from 'satanocracy'. Humankind is a phantom and there s nothing to save in it. What must be savea is Rusoja as an 'historical nation' which is destined to implement her 'idea'. What is this dea? Darilevskii had prov led the answer:'Russia cannot occupy a place in history worthy of herself and of the Slavs except by becoming the head of a special autonomous polit cal system of states . . . [and] serving as a counterweight to Europe.'11
How did the political universe during the era of Danilevsk'i (and particularly of his epigones Nikolai Strakhov and Konstantin Bestyzhev-
Riumin) appear from the perspective of their 'pragmatic isolationist' doctrine? Basically, it was made up of three elements Russia, which must fulfil her historical mission; Turkey, 'the living corpse' which had long since become ethnographic material but refused to accept the fact, and was threatening to interfere with Russia s fulfilment of her historical role (unless she defeated Turkey, Russia could not become head of an autonomous system of states' or serve as 'a counterweight to Europe'); and the rotting cosmopolitan West, which, though doomed to become ethnographic material eventually, was nevertheless for the time being hindering Russia from crushing Turkey.12
Proceeding from this picture of the world, Danilevskii's political doctrine implied a very simple strategy: Russia must become strong enough that the West cannot prevent it from rout.ng Turkey; on the ruins of Turkey, Russia must build an 'isolated empire extending from the Adriatic to the Pacific Ocean; after sealing off the borders of this gigantic empire, Russia can wait patiently until ihe West, its boundaries greatly shrunken finally rots away under the pressure of its own internal decay.
It we compare how the contemporary political universe appeared to Veche. we find that it consisted of three elements: Russia, China, and the West. Moreover, the functions of these elements are the same as the earlier three. Specifically, the 'living corpse' China threatens to disrupt not only the execution of Russia s historical mission but also her Orthodox renaissance, while the decaying West \s preventing Russia from ridding herself of this threat. What is the strategy that logically follows from such a view of the world? Is t not exactly the same as the one that emerged from Danilevskii's doctrine? Veche proposed, it seems, not the pursuit of detente, but the acquisition of strength sufficient to prevent the West from interfering with the destruction of China and allow Russia an isolated and 'self-contained existence apart from the rest of the world, (Certainly, this appears to be the strategy proposed, based on the most significant historical- philosophical essay published 111 Veche.)13
According to Danilevskii, Russia could not become Russia — that is, realize her 'idea' — without first disposing of the Ottoman empire. According to Veche, Russia cannot become Russia wilhout disposing of the 'living corpse' of China. Thus it proved possible to combine traditional Slavophile hostility toward the West wnh an ant<-Chinesc orientation.14 To transform Russia into a gigantic, 'closed', 'isolated' empire where no outsider would dare to meddle, an empire that would live by its own 'political formulas as Л patiently waited for the West to turn into ethnographic material suitable for acquisition — such was the alternative to 'Europeanization' envisaged by the Old Russian Right in the 1870s This could also be the Russian New Right alternative to detente in the 1970s, at least, that seems to be the meaning behind its essay on Danilevskii once it is decoded according to the traditional rules of the loyal opposition press in Russia.15
Imperial Liberalism
■ he Western reader may be shockcd to learn that such a rigidly isolationist- mperialist plan for foreign pulicy could be put forward (even in coded form), not by the hawks of Russian nationalism but by its doves — people whom I si Lcerely consider the liberals of the patriotic' camp, and, more importantly, people who consider themselves liberals.16 To understand this paradox, one must first understand the paradoxical nature of the liberal nationalist consciousness. It does not include the same parallels between foreign and internal po cy which charactei ze the European way of thinking. We have already seen how Veche sharply d itinguished these policies from one another; we shall further see how it also counterposed them to each other. This s not a distinction that has been introduced by the twentieth-century Russian Right: it is a tradition in which Veche once again follows Danilevskii's lead.