This tradition proceeds from the concept (here we are following Veche's interpretation) that, n and of themselves, 'the po"tical demands, or more accurately, the hopes, of the Russian people are extremely moderate, since . . . they do not see authority as an enemy but relate to it with complete trust.'17 In other words, the character of the Russian people renders a political opposition out of the question. If, nevertheless, such opposition does exist, then it could only have come from abroad: 'everything we have which could be called parties depends on the intrusion of foreign and al m [inorodcheskikh] influences.'18 The only conclusion that can be drawn from this is a recommendation to the government to close the country to foreign influence and eliminate those alien influences already there. When this is accomplished, it will immediately become evident that in Russian society 'no anti-state or anti-governmental interest whatever exists.'19 Under these conditions, some relaxation in the areas of 'open government' and civil rights not only would be safe for the state, since (according to Veche s interpretation of Danilevskii) it could never lead to political opposition, but would also be extremely useful to it, since 'lack of openness in government and of constitutional guarantees of human rights hinders the realization of national goals 2U In other words, the greater the degree of isolationism in foreign policy, the more liberalism can be permitted m Russia's internal policy; or, to put it another way, behind an Iron Curtain the Russian government could have absolute trust in its people. More importantly, 'the Russian periodical press, a power for good, is [under these circumstances] quite incapable of evil '21 These conclusions, we are told, are oased on the following properties of the Russian persorr hxs capacity for and habit of obedience, his respect for and trust in authority, his lack of a lust for power, and his distaste for interfering in matters where he does not consider himself competent.'22
As for inter-ethnic relations within the isolated empire, these too, according to Veche, could be liberal, because of the special and exceptional traits of the Russian people as an historical natior and the nucleus of the Russian empire. Quoting Vladimir Solov'ev, Vechc asserts, Russia is more than a people . . The supra-ethnic significance of Russia can only flow out of the essence of the Russians as a people',23 and, further, quoting Berdiaev, 'In the Russian nature there is, in fact, some kind of national unselfishness and will ngness to sacrifice unknown to Western peoples.'24 This explains why the Russian empire had nothing in common with despised Western colonialism:
Russian history has been characterized bv the voluntary union of peoples with Russia . If it can be said that the Russian empire was maintained by bayonets, this was true only in the sense that Russian bayonets defended the outlands from the claims of cruel neighbours. Russia knew how to instil love for herself and this was the secret of her power.25
In conclusion, 'whatever can be said about the role of non-Russians in the Russian Revolution', says Veche, 'or about the triumph of the non- Russian element in October . . . one thing can be firmly believed: the new Federation of Peoples [the USSR] was set up in Russian style.'26 Once again, we find the two negative models of multinational societies characteristic of all Veche's thinking — the American and the Chinese — and the one positive modeclass="underline" the Russian. What is the American model? asks Veche, making use of Faulkner:
A new nation? No, only 'a mass of people who no longer have anything in common save a frantic greed for money and a basic fear of a failure of national character which they hide behind a noisy lip-service to a flag'.27
What is the Chinese model? It is 'the destruction of every other [national] origin entirely',28 and the compulsory Simcization of the whole populal on of the country, by means of forced marriages.'
The Russian empire, however, is something altogether different. The dominance of the Russian historical nation is based on its moral supremacy over the 'ethnographic material' of the 'outlands'. If the outlands correctly understand their 'ethnographic' nature, they will feel themselves drawn toward the Russians as their historical centre and source of h gher values: 'If the outlands see in the centre a concentration of culture higher than theirs, of higher . . . morality, national tolerance, kindness, and genero^ ty, then they will be attracted to it voluntarily.'29 In other words, so long as the opposition of the outlands does not take on a poliucal coloration (and it will not be able to do so if 'foreign influences' at the centre are el ninated), Veche recommends the broadest possible cultural liberalism.30
As we see, Veche somehow succeeds — at least in theoretical terms — in reconciling the irreconc able, preaching a rigid isolationism in foreign pol cy, combined v th I bera sra in internal affairs.
The Siberian Gambit
The liberal impel al[3] ;t strategy of Veche rested on a profound faith in the potential supremacy of the Russian nation over the entire world.31 Therefore, in Veche s opinion, the Iron Curtain between Russia and the West is not an end in itself, but rather a means toward a social, moral and religious renaissance within Russia.
Veche s 'renaissance' plan, insofar as it can be assembled from isolated fragments, proceeded from the following postulates:
'Russia is to be saved by Orthodoxy. Russian Orthodoxy is indestructible. It is the work of God and a Russian can only be Orthodox.'34 In this respect too, the West is doomed, of course, but for Russia all is not yet lost it is still possible to render her society Russian Orthodox — if not juridically, then at least de facto.
The restoration of peasant and Orthodox Russia is what will finally eliminate 'cosmopolitanism' within the country and create an elfec.tive screen against the West, with its corrosive urbanization and faithlessness. But is this possible m authoritarian Soviet Russia — and if it is, then how? 'The Soviet regime, as history shows, is capable of making concessions when military or economic circumstances demand it, but is organically incapable of sacrificing itself for the sake of moral principles It makes concessions only to preserve the main thing — power 35 Is it then possible to combine 'moral pr: iciples' with nilitary circumstances'? These are the lines along winch Veche was thinking. What could compel the Soviet regime to make such very difficult and far-reaching concessions? Veche could see only one such opportunity: preparation for war with China.
When Stalin formulated his five essential conditions for military victory, he ranked strengthening the home front number one, the decisive condition. Why this and not improving the quality of weapons, for instance, or increasing the number of divisions? Because Stalin was dominated by a fear of his own people — and fear continues to dominate the present Soviet leadership, who are graduates of the Stalinist academy. This way, 'strengthening the rear' is turned into a magic formula which Veche sought to use as a stimulus for the realization of <ts programme. When the most difficult war in Russian history begins, the Soviet army must have at its back, not a Siberian desert, but a strong home front united by a single faith — a rearguard that can transform Siberia into a Russian fortress, capable of withstanding the onslaught of the Chinese 'human sea', as it tries to 'roll in a dense wave over the empty spaces of Siberia', one that will be reinforced by the traditional patnarchal solidity ot the Russian peasant soldier and his Orthodox rehgion. This is where the interests of all Russian patriots coiucde.36