Hardly any Western observer doubted the liberal nationalism of Osipov. See, for example, the article by D. Pospelovskv (Survey 1. 1973, p. 64). See also the statements by Osipov himself m Veche No. 1 (Arkhiv Samizdata [hereafter cited as AS], No. 1013) and No. 7 (Vol'noe slovo, No. 17—18) or his protest against the aecusation of anti-semitism in an interview with Dean Mills, Moscow correspondent of the Baltimore Sttn (Vestnik RKhD, No. 106, 1972).
Osipov started m on this task with the following graphically eloquent passage: 'The specific character of the Chinese threat eonsists not in its military potential, but in the enormous advantage of geographical position and human reserves. Our surplus military potential shackles our own feet. We cannot make a move in an Eastern war. When the Chinese say that they will drown the enemy in a human sea, they are by no means bragging. This sea is always increasing, and with each year the hour comes closer when it will overflow and come rolling [towards us] in a dense wave across the w Je open spaces of Siberia' (Vol'noe slovo, No. 17 — 18, p. 9). On 25 April 1972, in an interview with Associated Press correspondent Stevens Browning, Osipov spoke of the necessity of 'the appeal to a national ideology': 'In the face of the advancing threat from Communist China and the unceasing enmity of cosmopolitan capital, Russian society does not wish to show itself ideologically impotent' (AS, No. 1599. p. 14).
Vol'noe slovo, No. 9-10, p. 9.
Ibid., p. 31.
Ibid., p. 11.
The denial of universal morality flowed directly from the rejection of the concept of world civilization. Why should lizards sacrifice themselves for the sake of fish? Danilevskii's pupil Konstantin Leont'ev spoke of this even more openly: 'There are no humane states . . . They are ideas, embodied in a certain social structure. Ideas do not have humane hearts; they are merciless and cruel' (K. Leont'ev, Sobranie sochinenii, v. 5, p. 38). I do not contend that in their day-to-day activities states are gu ded by philanthropic principles, but they at least do not try to make a virtue out of necessity.
Vol'noe slovo, No. 9-10, p. 18.
Ibid., p. 22.
Ibid., p. 36.
Ibid., p. 37.
It is significant that it was not until the fourth edition of Russia and Europe, in 1889, that the book became really popular. This was after the 1878 Congress of Berlin (as well as Alexander Ill's nationalist counter- reform in 1881), when Europe had, so to speak, robbed Russia of the fruits of her victory over Turkey in the Russo—Turkish War (1877 — 8) — thus repeating by diplomatic means the outcome of the Crimean War (1853 — 6). TTtat would also explain the unusual popularity of Dai levskii in the 1880s — he had proved to be a prophet, essentially predicting the results of the Berlin Congress.
The importance Veche assigned to the essay on Danilevskii was clearly emphasized in its response to Pospelovsky's article in Survey (1973, No. 1): 'As to national messianism, we would like to note the following. Besides the early Slavophiles and Dostoevskii, who really preached this idea, there was also in Slavophilism N. Ya. Danilevskii, who repudiated any [form of] national messianism ... In issue No. 6 of Veche, there was an article on the views of Danilevskii which Pospelovsky, unfortunately, did not read' (Vol'noe slovo, No. 17—18, p. 169). There can hardly be any doubt that in this passage the 'isolationist-pragmatic' ideologists of Veche are defending their position, not so much from Pospelovsky as from the pressure of their own 'mcssianist' readers. Answering Pospelovsky could only be an excuse for them to respond to forces much
more dangerous to Veche than Survey In any ease, it is clear that Veche did not want to identify itself with the messianists
It is interesting to note that Vcchc's interpretation of Danilevskii was entirely original. In any event, it decisively diflers from the generally aeeepted Western aeademie interpretation expressed by Robert F,. MaeMaster in his Danilevskii: A Russian Totalitar.au Philosopher (Harvard University Press, 1967). MaelVlaster foeuses on the 'war element in Danilevskii's teachings and downplays the decisive 'isolationist eleinentL thereby depriving himself of the opportunity to reeoneile Danilevskii's 'liberalism' with his 'totalitarianism'. MaeMaster fails to see even the existence of'imperial liberalism'. It is true that Danilevskii predicted a feroeious struggle between Russia and Europe o\er Constantinople. For Veche, of eourse, the problem of Constantinople no longer existed. Therefore they shifted the 'war element to the Sino— Soviet border and thus depieted it as only a fragment in Danilevsk.'s overall isolationist strategy. There is a eertain irony l the faet that Veclte's interpretation, in spite of its openly polii.eal and elearly non-seholarh goals, is in a position to explain Danilevskii's liberalism mueh more logieally — and eonvineingly — than MaeMaster's pureh aeademie approaeh.
I, for one, who for many years worked in this press and wrote dozens of artieles in its Aesopian language, eannot find any other mean,ng in this essay. Furthermore, the same thing can be proved by purely deductive methods. In an important programmatic declaration, Osipo\ promised, on the one hand, loyalty to the existing system , and on the other 'support for the state in the faec of external threats" (Vol noe slovo, No. 20, p. 6). As we ean see, in the field of foreign policy he did not intend to eontine himself to passive loyalty In another programmatie declaration Osipov stated: 'Whether the existing system is viable or whether it is doomed to a transitory role . the position of Russian patriots remains unchanged, sinee we will not take upon ourselves the boldness or the impudenee to oppose our own social plan to that of the existing system . . . We remember that no matter how the politieal destiny of Russia may have developed, national interests are primarv, supra-soeial, and eternal (ibid., No. 17-18, p. 151. This means that, unlike VSKhSON, Veche did not intend to propose an alternative to the Soviet order (as a soeial system). Nevertheless, Osipov's declaration leaves open the field of strategic recommendations — i.e., the proposal of foreign poliey alternatives whieh might promote the realization of the 'primary national interests. From this standpoint, three possible alternative strategies emerge in the eoncept advaneed by the author of the artiele on Danilevskii fa) Russia may agree to stay just one among the great powers of the contemporary world (m the final analysis, this is what detente with the West leads to); (b) Russia may seek world domination (this is what the founders of Marxism suspeeted Russia of seeking: 'Panslavism', wrote Engels, 'is a fraudulent plan of struggle for world domination' |Mar\ and Engels, Sochmenia, v. I, p. 185], and it is why — sueh are the ironies of history ! — Marx and Engels were fanatieal proponents of a general European erusade against Russia; in the modern parlanee, they were eertainly hawks); (e) Russia may seek to establish an 'isolated' empire over most of the Eurasian mainland, as Danilevskii suggested (this empire — a federation, according to Danilevskii — 'must embrace all countries and peoples from the Adriatic to the Pacific Ocean and from the Arctic Occan to the Archipelago . . . under the leadership and hegemony of an integral and unified Russian state' (Vol'noe slovo. No. 15, p. 38)). With which of these alternative strategies does Veche's sympathy lie? It rejects (a), following Damlevskii's argument that, 'Russia is too great and mighty to be only one among the greal European powers' (ibid., p. 37). It considers (b) Cagain following Dar'levskii) to be unnatural — that is, not in accordance with the theory of 'cultural- historical types'. What is left then but the imperial—isolationist strategy (с)?