Who were these villains then, who were responsible for the defeats of August 1914 and hence for the February Revolution — the only one, as we now know from Solzhenitsyn, that changed the course of Russian history? For Solzhenitsyn the propagandist, the answer is unambiguous: they were liberals, terrorists, Bolsheviks and lews — in a word, 'demons' inspired by the decadent, disintegrating West. According to the imperative of the Russian Idea, there can be no other answer. Otherwise, the decadence of the Orthodox monarchy and ts lamentable incapacity to cope with the empire's historical decline would have to be blamed, as the earlier anti-tsarist Solzhenitsyn of the 1930s believed. To acknowledge this, would mean that the guilty party is precisely the ideal to which today's Russian New Right is calling its country 'homeward' — Russia's pre-Communist political tradition — and not any Russ;an or foreign-born 'demons'. To Solzhenitsyn as propagandist, such a recognition would be tantamount to political su'c ie. He knows his party obligations and does all he can to carry them out in his book, where, he believes, history is the judge.
From the very beginning of the book the West appears in the role of the accused. The French ambassador Paleologus writes to the tsar, 'I beg Your Majesty to order your forces to begin the attack immediately. Otherwise the French army runs the risk of being crushed.'16 A few chapters later, we read a letter from the French Minister of Foreign AffE rs to his ambassador,17 followed by the author's ironical commentary that, 'Instead of allowing for 29 days of preparation after mot lization, the attack was launched after only 15 days of preparation, while the rear was still unprepared — such was the nervous rush to save Paris that gr pped everyone.'18 After a few more chapters the theme of 'sa\ ng France'19 appears again as one of the reasons for the dit culties expei enced by the Russian army in Prussia. Thus, the West, as New Right party canon dictates, assumes its r ,rhtful place in the dock.
Of course, after a few more chapters, the Bolsheviks join them there, l the person of Lenin, who 'acted as if some powerful force [d'rtated his actions]'20 (we already know what kind of satanic force this was), and who — significantly — was driven by this at the very moment when the traitorous slogan of transforming the imperialist war nto a civ'.i one was conce /ed.21 Even ;f the monologue attributed to h n by Solzhenitsyn is of doubtful literary merit, it !s nevertheless revea ng:
A-a, got you now you rapacious carrion-crow from the coat of arms! You won't pull yourself out of the clutches that grasp you this time! You chose this war yourself! Let them chew you up — all the way to Kiev! to Kharkov! to Riga! Let them beat your great power spirit so you drop dead! You're only fit to squeeze others, nothing more! Amputate Russia all around. Poland, Finland — cut them off! The Baltic region — cut if off! The Ukraine — cut it off! The Caucasus — cut it off! Drop dead!22
In this remarkable Urade there's only one small thing that s unclear, why, in point of fact, does the separation of Poland or Finland, or the
Baltic region, or even the Ukraine and the Caucasus qualify here as an amputation of Russia rather than of her empire? If, as is obvious from che text it's the empire that's being amputated, then why should Solzhenitsyn object? What is it he is actually fight ng for today, Russia or her empire? 'Why can t we live together with Poland as two free and equal nations? Why must we force everyone into serfdom to us? What makes us better than them?'23 It was not Lenin who said this, but rather Herzen Is he also guilty in Solzheritsyn's opinion, of having intended to amputate Russia? Sometimes Solzhenitsyn rather gives himself away.
Anyway, the Bolsheviks also assume their rightful place ш dock among those accused of guilt for the August debacle — even if there is nothing, apart from a tasteless monologue, to hold them responsible for. The nihilist intelligentsia — the smatterers — are represented n the army by ensign Sasha Lenartovich, who, ;n fact, makes no contribution to the August disaster other than t-hinking about the senselessness of the war and attempting to surrender himself to the Germans after the Russian army has been defeated Both his smatterer' aunts are given much wider coverage. Yet their contribution to the defeat consists merely in trying to convince their student rnece that the tsarist monarchy is a disgrace to Russia. This, of course, could provoke indignation among party 'patriots , but it doesr t have any direct relevance to military operations.24
As for terrorists, they are represented in the court of history by an impressive parade of'Anarchists Social Revolutionaries and Maximalists'.25 However, they too appear only in the recollections of Lenartovich's aunts and not on the field of battle in East Prussia. The story of Stolypin's murderer, Mordecha Bogrov which occupies over two hundred pages, is also presented as evidence against terrorists To Solzhenitsyn it was important that Bogrov's 'great-grandfather on his father's side and his grandfather on his mother's side were wine concessionaires',26 while Stolvpin was the son of an adjutant general and the great-grandson of a senator'.27 However, this story deserves special discussion and we'll return to it in the next chapter The point that needs to be made here, however, is that since these things happened three years prior to August 1914, they couldn t have had a direct effect on the events in question,
Finally, of course, the theme of the West s guilt arises, in the concluding scene of the novel where Colonel Vorotyntsev, the author's alter ego, delivers an impassioned speech before the Russian High Command with the same directness as a dying man saying his last words'.28 Just as Solzhenitsyn, "i his Gulag Archipelago, spoke with the leaders of the Soviet empire on behalf of those who perished innocently, so Vorotyntsev makes a Similar appeal to the leaders of the Russian empire. Even in this state of mind Vorotyntsev clearly realized that it wasn : the desire to save France that caused the destruction of the Russian army, but rather the mind-boggling incompetence of its very own leaders, their complete, total and hopeless inability to lead an army, conduct a war or guide Russia. 'We don't know how to lead any unit larger than a regiment — there's a conclusion for you.'29
That is how Solzhenitsyn the novelist, in the heat of indignation having momentarily forgotten his obligations as a New Right party propagandist, characterizes the people who the Orthodox monarchy entrusted wrtfel the fate of the army, the front, the war and Russia itself. Postovsku is described as 'a wan, indecisive, but assiduous major general who had never in his life been to war';30 'this paperweight never understood anything nor could he ever.'31 Kondratovicb s a 'notorious coward'.32 Blagoveshchenskii — a 'Sack of shit. Dripping-wet shit, too.'33 Kliuev - 'a dough trough, not a general!'34, who 'has never been to a war in his whole life.'35 \rtamonov is nothing but a braggart and a liar'; 'an errand-boy disguised as a general , . . But how did he get to be a General-of-the- Infantry? How did 64,000 Russian troops end up under his negligent supervision?'36
If the generals are all 'fools or cowards',37 then higher up, it gets worse. Zhii nsk: , a front commander, is a 'living corpse' and 'a graved gger'.38 Yanushkevich, head of the general staff, is a 'velvet milksop'.39 'It is obvious from each of his effeminate movements,' says Solzhenitsyn, 'that this is a mock-general, yet how could he possibly occupy the post of head of the High Command? And nothing can be done to prevent him from destroying even the whole of Russia's entire army '40 Dani.ov, the main strategist of the Russian army, is 'a rum nant';41 'his head was empty! . . . and bis ideas feeble!'42 Finally, the Supreme Commander himself is described as 'his Most August Fairy ... of course he had the heignt, the look, the voice . . . but in his head — not a thing.'43