Military historians have observed that in war demoralization and panic usually begin, not at the front, but in the rear, among civilians who are prone to exaggerate both defeats and victories.60 So it was in Russia. Measures were taken to evacuate Riga and Kiev, and the government discussed the possible evacuation of Petrograd itself.61 In May 1915, a Moscow mob carried out a vicious anti-German pogrom, demolishing stores and business firms bearing German names. Anyone overheard speaking German risked lynching.
The public clamored for heads. The prime target of popular wrath and the obvious scapegoat was Sukhomlinov, who was blamed for the shortages of weapons and ammunition with which the military explained their reverses. Recent historical studies indicate that he was not to blame for these shortages62 and that the lack of artillery shells had been blown out of proportion to cover up more deep-seated shortcomings of Russia’s military establishment.63 The Imperial couple were very fond of the War Minister, but demands for his dismissal became irresistible and on June 11 he was let go with a warm letter of thanks.64 He was imprisoned a year later on charges of treason and peculation. Freed in October 1916, he was rearrested by the Provisional Government and sentenced to lifelong hard labor. He managed to escape to Paris, where he died in 1926.65
The man who replaced him, General Alexis Polivanov, was cut from different cloth, a leading member of the Young Turks, who before the war had urged a more modern approach to warfare, with greater emphasis on military technology and the mobilization of domestic resources.66 Sukhomlinov, whose deputy he had been, had kept him at arm’s length, suspecting him of conspiring with Grand Duke Nikolai Nikolaevich and Guchkov against the Court and himself. Polivanov’s appointment suggested that the government had at last come to embrace the concept of a “nation in arms” and that Russia, like the other belligerent powers, was ready to proceed in earnest with the mobilization of the home front. But this prospect, of course, automatically incurred the enmity of the Empress, who could not bear Imperial officials “politicking” and viewed efforts to rally the nation as directed against the Crown. Rasputin also did not approve of him and busied himself looking for his successor.67 On June 24, after she had met the new minister, Alexandra wrote:
saw Polivanov yesterday—don’t honestly ever care for the man—something aggravating about the man, cant explain what—preferred Sukhomlinov tho’ this one is cleverer, but doubt whether as devoted.68
26. General A. Polivanov.
To further appease public opinion, Nicholas let go of other unpopular ministers. In June, he dismissed Nicholas Maklakov, the Minister of the Interior, then Vladimir Sabler, the Procurator of the Holy Synod, and Ivan Shcheglovitov, the Minister of Justice, all of whom public opinion regarded as incorrigible reactionaries. Their replacements were, for the most part, more acceptable. In this manner, the Court, without yielding to demands that it turn over ministerial appointments to the Duma, appointed officials likely to find favor with it. To further placate the opposition, Rasputin was persuaded to retire to his village in Siberia, until relations with the Duma, scheduled to reconvene in July, had been “settled.”69
These measures failed to appease public opinion. Many Russians now concluded that their defeats were due not so much to personalities as to fundamental flaws in the “system.” This system, then, had to be thoroughly restructured if Russia were to survive.
Once World War I exceeded its expected duration and no quick decision seemed in sight, all the major belligerents took steps to mobilize the rear. Germany led the way, followed by Britain. A kind of symbiotic relationship developed between the public and private sectors to supply the military with all its needs. Something of the sort occurred in Russia as well, beginning in the summer of 1915, but here the relationship between the two sectors was hampered as nowhere else by mutual suspicion. As a consequence, the mobilization of the rear in Russia was only partially and imperfectly realized. This conceded, it must be emphasized that it is generally unappreciated to what extent the Imperial Government during the war allowed society a voice in the affairs of state and how much its concessions altered Russia’s political system.
By the early summer, the liberals and liberal-conservatives concluded that the bureaucracy was incompetent to manage the war effort. They wanted fundamentally to improve Russia’s military performance but, like the government, they never lost sight of the postwar consequences of wartime actions. The debacle of 1915 offered an opportunity to complete the 1905 Revolution, that is, to transform Russia into a genuine parliamentary democracy. The Duma opposition wanted the concessions wrung from the monarchy for the sake of victory to become so embedded in the country’s institutions that they would remain in place after victory had been won and peace restored. Its principal objective was to secure for the Duma the authority to appoint ministers, which would have the effect of subordinating to it the entire Russian bureaucracy.
The result was a tug-of-war. The government wanted society’s assistance, but it did not want to surrender to it the prerogatives it had managed to salvage from the 1905 Revolution, while the leaders of society wanted to take advantage of the war to realize the unfulfilled promise of that revolution. In the conflict that ensued, it was the government that showed the greater willingness to make concessions. It met with no response, however, each concession being interpreted as weakness and encouraging still greater demands.
The Duma sat in session until January 9, 1915, when it was prorogued, partly to forestall “inflammatory” criticism of the conduct of the war, partly to enable the government to legislate by means of Article 87. At the time, the Duma was told it would be promptly reconvened if the military situation required it. Such a situation had now arisen. Opposition leaders demanded a recall. The Empress opposed them and urged her husband to stand fast. “Deary,” she wrote him on June 25,
I heard that that horrid Rodzianko & others went to Goremykin to beg the Duma to be at once called together—oh please dont, its not their business, they want to discuss things not concerning them & bring more discontent—they must be kept away—I assure you only harm will arise—they speak too much.
Russia, thank God, is not a constitutional country [!], tho’ those creatures try to play a part & meddle in affairs they dare not. Do not allow them to press upon you—its fright if one gives in & their heads will go up.70
But the pressures became too strong to resist, and Nicholas authorized Michael Rodzianko, chairman of the Duma, to reconvene the legislature for a six-week session.71 It was to open on July 19, the first anniversary of the outbreak of the war according to the Russian calendar.
The month and a half that lay ahead gave Duma deputies an opportunity to caucus. The initiative for these informal meetings came from the small Progressive Party, representing the wealthy and liberal industrial bourgeoisie. Its leaders hoped to repeat the achievement of the Union of Liberation and forge a broad patriotic front of all the parties save those of the extreme right and left. The military reverses had now driven into the opposition conservative elements that in peacetime would never have joined a cabal against the Crown. Participating, in addition to the Progressives, were the Kadets, Left Octobrists, and Left Nationalists. Such was the origin of the Progressive Bloc, which would soon gain a majority in the Duma and in 1916 decisively influence the events leading up to the Revolution.*