[At this point the CID investigator warned Carter that he was making grave accusations against his commanding officer, but Carter insisted upon continuing.]
What I have said about Medina is the truth. I swear that my statement is the truth.
Concluding Comments
The investigation did not clearly resolve the question whether the company commander gave orders to the platoon leaders to kill at random. It was confirmed, however, that Capt. Medina was present at the scene of the incident. Included in this file are photographs taken by two reporters, Roberts and Haeberle. They eventually will be disclosed to the public. There are dozens of photos of dead animals, dead human beings, and village dwellings ablaze. One photo of a soldier shooting children aged six and seven. One photo of a dead boy on top of his younger brother’s corpse. Capt. Medina’s report at the time stated that fifty Viet Cong were killed and twenty suspects captured. This case will be a propaganda windfall for the Liberation Front and they are sure to exploit it politically. Four hundred fifty civilians were shot. The case should not be concealed, rather it must be examined in full view and those concerned treated strictly under military law.
The concept of “search-and-destroy” missions is thought to be in need of qualification. It is imperative to collect information in detail on as many cases as possible of massacres committed by the Liberation Front in order to publicize those fratricidal atrocities.
16
“Air! Air!” the guide shouted.
With inured skill the bicycles and bundles instantly were covered with camouflage nets and all the fighters in the file hit the ground, taking cover in the leaves. The noise of whirring helicopter propellers came closer. They turned out to be observation aircraft rather than an attack formation. It was a reconnaissance mission of three choppers. Escorted by two small gunships, a camera-equipped helicopter was methodically covering that whole region of the jungle. When it came upon a clearing, the helicopter hovered in a circle for a while as if to peer down narrow paths and point its cameras under the canopy of trees on the fringes. Meantime, the gunships fired occasional bursts with their machine guns — neutralization fire.
Pham Minh was sprawled among the bushes with the other fighters. In the course of basic training at the Temporary Atwat Military School, he learned methods of concealment and survival on long marches down the Ho Chi Minh Trail. A comrade lying near him shrugged his shoulders then stuffed a red handkerchief into his own mouth. Muffled coughing followed. Taking out his canteen Pham Minh unscrewed the top and held it out to him. The man nodded in thanks and hastily gulped down a few mouthfuls.
They were marching along a mountain ridge near the Laotian border. For security reasons, the Atwat Military School was divided into two units; the basic training phase was conducted apart from more advanced training courses. The two locations were about twenty-five miles apart, making it a day-and-a-half march from one to the other. Their group was forty-eight in all, including the guide and a political officer.
The Seventieth Transport Division of the regular forces of the North Vietnamese Army was in charge of movements along the trail. At the beginning and end of each day’s march there were rest areas with food and beds and medical treatment. The group was split into three sections for the march, and each unit was spread out in a long double file, with at least fifteen feet between individuals. Before departure they scouted the immediate area and received briefings on any operations or changes of situation between there and the next stopping place. Anything unusual would delay departure until the situation could be assessed.
Not only personnel, but also ammunition, explosives, and other war materiel were constantly being moved along the Ho Chi Minh Trail. In better times, the trail had been hectic with motor vehicles coming and going, but now each segment was set up as part of a secret relay network and supplies were moved by bicycles and small carts. Vehicles were still in use only on a few stretches where the road was still intact under the cover of thick jungle.
In the first phase of basic training, the urban guerrillas of the Second and Third Special Districts mainly concentrated on military tactics and use of weapons. They were taught a range of hit-and-run tactics and various methods of urban warfare. As for firearms, the instructors showed them how to shoot, disassemble, and take care of small arms such as pistols, carbines, and automatic weapons. They also became familiarized with enemy weapons and ammunitions and learned what was known as “guerrilla cookery,” namely, how to improvise homemade weapons, bombs, booby traps, and so forth. There were demonstrations on the fuse mechanisms of time bombs and they were taught how to make detonators for plastic explosives.
They picked up a few tricks especially useful for urban fighters. For instance, if you stick a live cartridge inside the tip of a fountain pen or a ballpoint pen and rig a firing pin to the coiled spring, it makes a wonderful weapon for killing someone facing you at close range. Another item, specifically designed for attacks on buildings or vehicles, was a “guinea pig cocktail.” A mixture of two parts gasoline to three parts motor oil in a throwable container with a cotton cloth wick. The density of the oil made the inflammatory gasoline stick to the target.
They were taught how to make bombs from the empty ration tins discarded by American soldiers. You stuffed it with nails and gunpowder, sealed it with tape and stuck a detonating pin through the top. For another common booby trap, tape a grenade to a gate where the target will emerge, then connect a tripwire to the grenade pin and string it just above the ground where feet will stumble over it. They were also shown how to disarm and reuse landmines and other bombs.
The training also included doctrines and rules for planning and executing operations. For example, they learned that urban guerrillas should always plan their own safe escape before embarking on an attack. The assault should be rehearsed and the target and scene carefully observed and confirmed two or three times before proceeding. Be inconspicuous. On the street, keep away from the curb. Avoid telephone contacts if possible. Never discuss politics. Have a job. Spend breaks reading quietly instead of drinking or playing games. Be wary of fellow workers. Arrange all meetings with a fallback procedure. Select the targets that are easiest, most accessible, and most concrete. The rules were so many and so detailed that it was impossible to remember them all.
The second phase of training was political education and propaganda tactics. Until the early sixties, all guerrillas received four to six months of special indoctrination in Suanmai near Hanoi or in Thanh Hóa in the south before being shipped to Binh to finish the course at Dong Hoi Military Camp. But as the American forces increased in strength and the NLF forces suffered greater losses, the length of training had been drastically shortened.
In the period from the start of training until the first infiltration mission, at least a quarter of their military strength was lost, mainly from air bombardment and diseases in the jungle. Small-scale camps for training guerrillas for the central Vietnam theater were now scattered throughout the highland jungle in the region of the Atwat Mountains. The trail guides were mostly local natives of the highland country. They led the troop contingents for about half a day and then turned them over to the next guide and returned to their base. In this way, communications passed quickly and each base point had an idea what was happening elsewhere through the comings and goings of the guides. Radio equipment was rare, so for signaling they made do with whistles and woodblocks.