Their attitudes and views could be divided into three categories. The first included those who embraced an unmitigated communist ideology, with thought patterns oriented by their parents or relatives. Usually their families had taken part in the anti-French liberation movement before the Geneva Accords or had chosen to relocate to the north. They were youths like Thanh. The second category consisted of people burning with vengeful hatred after losing family members during the operations by the American forces or the ARVN. The third included those who had suffered agony and deserted the ARVN and joined the NLF or, like Pham Minh, those whose abstract passion for nationalism had been grievously disillusioned by the reality of South Vietnam. Those in the first two categories posed no special ideological problems, but conflicts in opinion were almost inevitable between the first category and those like Pham Minh. The divergences in views of the reality of their predicament grew more noticeable as the political training progressed.
They all got up at six in the morning and walked along the stream for an hour before having breakfast at seven. The meal was not bad. The Viet Cong brought less food with them on marches than the Americans or the ARVN. Arms and ammunition took priority over other supplies. But they had white rice on the table, along with fresh vegetables from farms on the Laotian side of the mountains. Every now and then they had pork or duck. Once every three days each barracks received a ration of tobacco and green tea from Hanoi. On Sundays when there was no training they even watched films.
Classes were conducted mainly in the morning, with group discussions of the pamphlets they had been issued. They were given lectures on such topics as the history of communism in Vietnam, modern Vietnamese history, the history of world revolution, the December Theses and the strategy of the National Liberation Front, and so on. After lunch there was a siesta hour and then presentations of examples of incitement propaganda, followed by group discussions. After that they had a briefing with current reports from the NLF on the conditions and deployments of security forces in the Second and Third Districts, as well as on the enemy’s firepower and organization.
Next, their prior training in handling weapons and explosives was extended by live ammunition drills and exercises, including war games in the jungle valley nearby. After dinner, each group assembled for further discussion to review the day’s activities. Sometimes they also made up short dramas depicting the present reality of Vietnam, which were presented to the others for evaluation. Lights out was ten o’clock.
Pham Minh did not stand out as a trainee. But one evening during an ideology discussion session he made a mistake, and it led to an auto-critique. That afternoon they had heard a lecture on the strategy and tactics of the NLF. The instructor, Dao Nguyen Lin, was an old veteran of the anti-imperialist movement, and formerly a middle-school teacher. He also had been a key cadre in charge of guerrilla commandos in Saigon at the time of the downfall of Ngo Dinh Diem. In his lecture, he had said:
“Urban guerrillas and rural guerrillas can be distinguished from each other by the scenarios and tactics of their struggles. In rural communities, the aim of military operations is to attempt to place the people under the command and control of the Liberation Front. Rural areas are important both as sources of supply and as strategic sanctuaries where our forces can hide out after hitting targets in the vicinity. Furthermore, with the same strength we can exercise power over a broader domain in a rural area, where security systems are less concentrated than in the cities.
“As stated in the thesis published in Hoc Tap in 1965, our special aim is to paralyze the administrative system of the enemy. Thus, the goal of urban guerrillas is to weaken the government through violence, establish an alternative order in the city, and spread the paralysis. Activate the dormant sentiments of nationalism in city dwellers. In the city, the enemy is very powerful and the mass is well under control. Therefore, the urban struggle must be unforeseeable and fast. Strike, run, and hide.
“Hence, the aim and targets can largely be divided in two, and then again subdivided into three. First are government agencies or figures against which the people have grievances. Second are government agencies or figures who are competent and admired by the people. Targeting the former is obvious enough, but at first glance it may be difficult to grasp why the latter would be targeted. If a certain feature of the enemy system we aim to destroy happens to cater to the wishes of the masses, then it is very dangerous. For what is sweet can mask poison. By attacking it, we kill two birds with one stone. The people will see that their competence, after all, was merely competence in maintaining a colonial reality; and the enemy will be warned that no move is safe.
“When the targets are again subdivided on the above principle, the first objective for attack would be the army of the imperialists and their facilities. The second is that part of the security system of the enemy which lies closest and most readily accessible. And the third would be all individuals and facilities whose sympathies are with the enemy. I’ll illustrate with a few examples. In June 1965 a bomb exploded at a restaurant in downtown Saigon. American soldiers were killed and their bodies carried into the street and heaped up. And even more corpses were buried under the destroyed tables and chairs. The total casualties were one hundred twenty. The Liberation Front proclaimed this victory far and wide. In October of the same year, when the South Vietnamese Air Force was holding a meeting in City Hall, a hand grenade exploded resulting in six deaths and forty-five wounded.
“The embassy attack in March of the following year exhibited a new dimension of our tactics. A car stopped outside a main gate. It appeared to have some sort of engine problem. One of the three policemen standing guard approached the car and ordered the driver to stop obstructing a busy street and immediately move the car out of the way. The driver groveled, saying the engine was dead. Irritated, the policeman told him to push the car out of the way if he had to. He pretended to push it, and just then a motorbike sped up and the rider took out a machine gun and shot the policeman. Then, as the other two policemen returned fire, men inside the car shot them. All the guerrillas then fled across the street and the car, heavily loaded with plastic explosives, went off in a huge blast. A large area was leveled. Then, in June, passenger luggage exploded while awaiting inspection in the lobby at Tan Son Nhat Airport.”
It was then that Pham Minh raised his hand. The instructor gave him a puzzled look, but Pham Minh wanted to wash away a feeling of oppression he had been carrying with him ever since his student days in Hue.
“I have a few questions, sir. During the last offensive I was in Hue. Of course, I think the occupation of Hue by the Liberation Front was a brilliant victory. I have no doubt whatsoever that it advanced the national struggle. A lot of our fellow countrymen were killed. But, a few days earlier, I saw a bomb go off in front of the inter-city bus terminal in Hue. The target seemed to be the waiting room of a nearby police checkpoint, but buses standing nearby were destroyed. I saw four children’s bloody corpses thrown on the concrete, and women drenched in blood were wailing. .”