All this sounded admirable in theory. But it was still theory, and there still had to be found some means of getting once again under way those international initiatives without which there could be no breaking of the deadlock. The key to finding these means lay in Egypt.
In 1981 and 1982, as had been expected, the newly appointed Egyptian President continued with the Camp David peace process in order to regain the whole of Sinai, yet he tried to reconcile this process, which required the co-operation of the United States and Israel, with a move back into the moderate Arab camp. At the same time, Israel itself had been tempted to slow down the hand-over of Sinai in order to gain time to judge further influences and policies. Such temptations, however, were removed by intense pressure from both the United States and Western Europe. Indeed the United States, which had already given some indication of future intentions by further military assistance to Saudi Arabia following the AWACS deal in 1981, made it clear that the balance of military aid could switch away from Israel to Arabia if the Sinai were not handed back on time. There was not yet any progress from Camp David to a proper re-assessment of how both the PLO and Israel could be persuaded to acknowledge each other’s rights in order to pave the way for negotiations on the lines of Prince Fahd’s plan. Once all the Sinai had been handed back to Egypt, however, and a peacekeeping force, which included Third World, American and European troops, had been established, a new set of circumstances emerged.
In 1982, with the Sinai back in Egyptian hands and the so-called normalization of Egyptian-Israeli relations still proceeding, the Saudi Arabian Sheikh Faisal Abdullah, who had long been working for a rapprochement between Egypt and his own country, succeeded in arranging a meeting between the Crown Prince and the President of Egypt. It took place in Geneva and was to set in train a series of events which, unlike all previous initiatives, began to break the Palestinian deadlock. In essence the policy they agreed upon was that Arab unity would as far as possible be restored. Disruptive movements, such as Moslem fundamentalism or adventurism in the Sahara, would be controlled by friendly, or if this failed, unfriendly persuasion. Given a degree of Arab unity, irresistible pressure should be brought to bear in two quarters: first on Israel, through the United States, to make the Israelis sit down and negotiate the future of an autonomous Palestine; secondly on the PLO, to oblige it to acknowledge Israel’s right to exist and thus also sit down at the negotiating table. The weapon to be used against the United States and thus its Western allies would, of course, be oil. In simple terms, the bargaining would be: no Palestine, no oil. This position had to be taken seriously and a settlement based on it did in the end come about. But the voices of those not present at the Geneva meeting still had to be heard. The principal voices, both demanding and entitled to be heard, were those of the United States, Israel, Libya, Jordan, Syria and the Soviet Union.
During the remaining months of 1982 and the early ones of the following year these voices made themselves heard in various bilateral and multilateral meetings, and in doing so helped to shape the final outcome. We must shortly consider the way in which the United States was persuaded to sponsor a formula for peace, broadly acceptable to the bulk of the Arab nations and to which Israel could be obliged to submit. We must also examine how the Soviet Union took a hand in the game which all but brought the superpowers to a direct clash in the very area they were seeking to pacify. But first, we must clear out of the way two other obstacles which were impeding solution to the central problem. The first was Libya, the second Iran.
Libya’s leader, whose preposterous behaviour had caused flutterings in so many dovecotes, overreached himself at last in the same year — 1983 — as negotiations for a Palestinian settlement were gaining ground. He actually committed his country, with the promised aid of Pakistan (whose paymaster he had capriciously been, stopped being, and was again) to the establishment of a nuclear armoury. At the same time, his further interference in the Sudan and Niger, covered more fully in the next chapter, so enraged the moderate Arab nations, headed by Saudi Arabia and Egypt, that, choosing a time when Libyan forces were also heavily engaged in suppressing another uprising in Chad, Egypt was authorized to deal with the Libyan leader once and for all.
Egypt’s armed forces struck, and struck hard. Libya’s air force was destroyed on its airfields. The relatively small number of serviceable tanks in the Libyan Army were knocked out by the anti-tank helicopters which Egypt had bought from Britain, while hundreds of non-running tanks were impounded in depots. What remained of Libya’s infantry, such as were not deployed in Saharan adventures, felt disinclined to argue the toss with the armoured and air forces that Egypt was able to put into the field. It was clear from the way in which the Egyptians conducted their campaign against Libya that they had modelled themselves on Wavell and O’Connor rather than on Alexander and Montgomery. Speed, surprise and audacity characterized the whole operation.
On D-day, the Egyptian Air Force destroyed all Libyan aircraft at Benghazi, while parachute and heliborne forces seized the Al Kufra oasis and its Soviet-made missile sites. Meanwhile, as armoured and mechanized divisions with strong air support drove for Benghazi, Tobruk was taken by commando groups. Within a week the Egyptians had consolidated these gains and destroyed or captured the main Libyan forces deployed in eastern Cyrenaica. In this consolidation they were assisted by the Senussi who had long chafed against rule from Tripoli. While mechanized troops continued to advance westwards on the coast road, mopping up half-hearted garrisons, Tripoli air base was put out of action by Egyptian bombers, and further seaborne and airborne operations captured El Agheila, Sirte and Horns. The main oil-producing areas between Gialo and Dahra were occupied by follow-up echelons, and communication centres like Al Fuqaha and Daraj were controlled by groups of parachute and light reconnaissance forces. Spearheads of the main armoured thrust drove into Tripoli after a final skirmish with garrison troops.
The whole affair had something in common with what Rommel had once described as a lightning tour of the enemy’s country. In this way Libya was subdued and all but annexed by Egypt. But the fight had been against the Libyan leader — who found refuge in Ethiopia — not against the Libyan people, whose new government was formed by a triumvirate, all of whom were recalled from exile, comprising the former commander of Tobruk garrison, Libya’s Prime Minister in the pre-military regime, and the man who was the eminence grise of Libya’s last king, the Senussi Idris.
Protests by the Soviet Union at this action by Egypt had no more effect than protests from the West when the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan. With the United States Sixth Fleet patrolling the central and eastern Mediterranean, the Soviet Mediterranean Squadron, the Fifth Eskadra, had been ordered to remain at anchorage and avoid confrontation. The Soviet High Command was much more concerned with free passage of the Dardanelles than with Libyan port facilities or the fate of the Libyan leader. The latter’s removal and his replacement by a regime sympathetic to moderate Arab policies were widely seen as almost wholly beneficial. Interference in Chad, Niger and Sudan stopped. The financing of international terrorism dwindled. Temptation to make a stir in the world simply for its own sake was put aside. Arab unity was further enhanced. Moslem fundamentalism suffered a setback. Encouragement for the less benevolent policies of South Yemen, Ethiopia and Syria ceased. What is more — and this in Western eyes was not wholly beneficial — the Arab oil weapon became more powerful with Libyan oil now under Egyptian control. Nor were the benefits confined to that part of the Middle East alone.