39 “could complete only”: Memo, Maj. Gen. S. E. Anderson to Stuart Symington, Apr. 11, 1950, Air Force OPD Papers, NA/MMB.
39 re-examine target plan: In Feb. 1950, the JCS Weapons Systems Evaluation Group noted that in view of the infeasibility of Offtackle, “a re-examination of the entire target system is desirable.” See WSEG Report #1, loc. cit.
40 Vandenberg asked Brodie: Letter, Brodie to Rosenberg, loc. cit.; Memo of Record, Dec. 11, 1950, Curtis LeMay Papers, Box B-66, Memos & R-R’s, 1950 folder, LoC;* letter, Hoyt Vandenberg to Griswold, Nov. 30, 1950, A. Whitney Griswold Papers, Box 86, folder 75, Yale Univ. Brodie, Vandenberg and Norstad first met over lunch Aug. 21 and again Sept. 15. See Hoyt Vandenberg Papers, Box 4, 1950 Appointments Book, LoC.
40 tiring of Yale: Letter, Brodie to Harvey DeWeerd, Oct. 20, 1952, Bernard Brodie Papers, Box 1, D folder.
41 “killing a nation”: Cited in Robert Frank Futrell, Ideas, Concepts, Doctrine: A History of Basic Thinking in the United States Air Force, 1907–64 (Maxwell AFB, Ala: Air Univ., 1971), p. 122.
41 took pages from Survey: Poole, op. cit., p. 165.
41 liquid fuel and electric power: Ibid.
41 “electric power situation”: The U.S. Strategic Bombing Survey, Summary Report (European War), p. 14.
41 atomic-energy plants: JCS-2056/7, Aug. 12, 1950, Records of JCS, CCS 373.11 (12-14-45), Sec. 2, NA/MMB.
41 “Delta-Bravo-Romeo”: Ibid.
42 Tokyo attack: Len Giovannitti and Fred Freed, The Decision to Drop the Bomb (New York: Coward-McCann, 1965), pp. 34–36.
43 A-bomb made point stronger: Most Air Force officers felt that the bomb would vindicate theories of air power. See Lee Bowen, A History of the Air Force Atomic Energy Program, 1943–54, Vol. IV (USAF Historical Division, 1955), p. 108.
44 LeMay on liquid fueclass="underline" JCS-2056/16, June 18, 1951, Encl. B, p. 120, JCS File List 1951–53, CCS 373.11 (12-14-48), Sec. 4, NA/MMB.
44 LeMay on atomic-energy and electric-power plants: Poole, op. cit., pp. 165–66; Gen. LeMay’s Diary, Jan. 22, 1951, Curtis LeMay Papers, Box B-64, Diary 1951 folder.*
44 “deliver the entire”: Quoted in David Alan Rosenberg, “American Atomic Strategy and the Hydrogen Bomb Decision,” The Journal of American History, June 1979, p. 70.
44 move aim point south of Kremlin: Letter, Brodie to Rosenberg, loc. cit.
44 JCS say not feasible: The plan was JCS-2056/9. See JCS-1953/12, End. A, Apr. 24, 1950, JCS File List 1951–53, CCS 373 (10-23-58), Sec. 7, NA/MMB; cf. Diary, Jan. 23,1950, Curtis LeMay Papers, Box B-64, Diary Jan.-June 1950 folder.*
44 “condition precludes”: JCS-2056/13, March 28, 1951, JCS File List, 1951–53, CCS 373.11 (12-14-48), Sec. 4, NA/MMB.
45 “collapse”: Letter, Brodie to Rosenberg, loc. cit.
45 no ground forces: Brodie, “Changing Capabilities and War Objectives,” p. 13, lecture, Air War College, Apr. 17, 1952, Max. AFB.
45–6 “Sunday punch” and “collapse”: Letter, Brodie to Rosenberg, loc. cit.; for more on Sunday punch, see Diary, July 22, 1950, Curtis LeMay Papers, Box B-64, Diary July–Dec. 1950 folder.*
46 asked LeMay why the hurry: Letter, Brodie to Rosenberg, ibid.
46 Brodie on LeMay plan: In a speech to the Naval War College, Mar. 17, 1952, called “Characteristics of a Sound Strategy,” Brodie said (p. 18), “I have seen studies which thought they were attempts at war plans, but which ended simply with putting bombs on targets.” (Bernard Brodie Papers, Box 12.)
46 “How many bombs”: Brodie, “The Atom Bomb as Policy Maker,” loc. cit., p. 31.
46 “may, on the one hand”: Brodie, “New Techniques of War and National Policies,” loc. cit., p. 165; the essay is taken from a speech delivered at a conference held May 7–9, 1948.
47 reports for Vandenberg: Letter, Brodie to Rosenberg, loc cit. In this letter, Brodie says the second memo was written in late March or early April. Actually, since Vandenberg’s Appointments Book for 1951 shows four meetings with Brodie from March 6 to 23, and since on the 23rd, Vandenberg assigned Brodie the task of directing a special advisory committee on strategic bombing objectives—which he probably would not have done if Brodie had not yet turned in his memo—one can surmise that the second report was done in March, probably mid-March. (See Hoyt Vandenberg Papers, Box 4, 1951 Appointments Book; Memo, Vandenberg to Brodie, “Formation of a Special Advisory Panel… ,” Mar. 23, 1951, Box 83, Miscellaneous folder.*)
47 idea of avoiding city destruction: Letter, Brodie to Rosenberg, loc. cit.; Brodie, “Schlesinger’s Old-New Ideas,” loc. cit.; Brodie, “A New Kind of War,” UCLA Alumni Magazine, Winter 1968–69.
47 “more strategic leverage”: Brodie, “Schlesinger’s Old-New Ideas,” loc. cit.
47 Japanese surrender: Brodie, “Changing Capabilities and War Objectives,” loc. cit., p. 28.
47 city destruction and bargaining lever: Ibid. That he was thinking along these lines while in the Pentagon as well, see Brodie, “A New Kind of War,” loc. cit.; and letter to Rosenberg, loc. cit.
47 SAC must survive attack: Brodie, “Changing Capabilities and War Objectives,” loc. cit., p. 29. That this was a part of the Vandenberg memo has been confirmed by a former analyst in the RAND Corporation with whom Brodie discussed his Vandenberg work shortly after the fact.
47 “sacrificing the prospect”: Ibid., p. 29.
47 “We have thus far given”: Brodie, comment attached to Memo, Col. Parrish to Gen. McKee, Dec. 9,1950, quoted in Noel F. Parrish, “Behind the Sheltering Bomb: Almagordo to Korea,” Ph.D. dissertation, Rice Univ., 1968, p. 375.
48 “an enormous area for wisdom”: Brodie, “Characteristics of a Sound Strategy,” loc. cit., pp. 23–24.
48 “the most important”: Letter, Brodie to Rosenberg, loc. cit. Unfortunately, the memoranda themselves appear to have been irretrievably lost, perhaps destroyed; several people, including Alfred Goldberg, historian of the Office of the Secretary of Defense, have valiantly hunted for them, but with no luck; the RAND Corporation threw out its copies years ago. I have inferred the contents of the documents from interviews and from letters, documents and speeches written soon after Brodie’s experience, which—interviews confirm—reflect the contents of the memoranda.
48–9 Special Advisory Paneclass="underline" Memo, Hoyt Vandenberg to Brodie, “Formation of a Special Advisory Panel on Strategic Bombing Objectives,” loc. cit.*
49 Norstad transferred: Brodie offers this as the main reason for his own departure in letter to Rosenberg, loc. cit.
49 footnote on Brodie and Earle: Earle on Brodie’s criticisms: letters, Earle to Brodie, Aug. 10, 1944, and Brodie to Earle, Aug. 15, 1950, Edward Mead Earle Papers, Box 5, Brodie folder, and Box 10, B folder, respectively. Earle on Brodie’s Chicago talk: marginalia on Brodie, “Strategic Consequences of the Atomic Bomb,” Earle Papers, Box 5, Chicago University Conference folder. “have a word”: letter, Earle to Finletter, Apr. 30, 1951, Earle Papers, Box 11, F folder. Talk with Vandenberg: Hoyt Vandenberg Papers, Box 4, 1951 Appointments Book. Brodie-Earle correspondence: see letters in B or Brodie folders, Earle Papers.