In the absence of his admiral, Captain Drummond in Aboukir was left in charge. He was leading the other cruisers on a straight course at around 10 knots, not zigzagging as his standing orders required him to do. Weddigen manoeuvred U 9 into position for a submerged torpedo attack on Aboukir and at 0625 fired the first torpedo, which struck his victim on the port side. Rapidly flooding, Aboukir began to sink. Captain Drummond initially believed his ship had struck a mine, and he called the other two in to rescue his crew. Hogue’s Captain Nicholson stopped to lower boats, but as Aboukir rolled over and sank thirty minutes after being hit, Weddigen hit HMS Hogue with two torpedoes, sinking her in less than ten minutes. To compound the tragedy, Captain Johnson of Cressy had also stopped to lower boats, but began to take avoiding action when his crew spotted U 9’s periscope. It did not save his ship. The first torpedo launched by Weddigen missed, but the second struck home, and she sank in fifteen minutes.
In the Second World War, many cruisers of similar size survived torpedo hits, even from the powerful Japanese 24in Type 93 torpedo. What is clear is that these armoured cruisers shared the Achilles’ heel of all the major warships designed by Sir William White: the large boiler and engine room spaces divided by a longitudinal bulkhead. A torpedo hit opening up one of these large spaces was virtually certain to cause the ship to capsize, especially since there were no compensating voids on the opposite side to counter-flood.
From the three crews, 837 men were rescued, but a total of 1459 died, including many sea cadets aged fifteen, who should never have been aboard. The death toll exceeded that of all of Nelson’s ships engaged in the Battle of Trafalgar. Weddigen and his crew returned to Wilhelmshaven and a hero’s welcome.
Just three weeks later, Weddigen added to his laurels by sinking the old protected cruiser HMS Hawke, in the North Sea. Once again, a German torpedo exploded a magazine, and she sank in less than five minutes. The British press commented that the loss of so old a ship (Hawke had been launched in 1891) was of little consequence, but they lamented the loss of her captain, twenty-six officers and 497 men out of her crew of 594.
Otto Weddigen went on to command the diesel boat U 2 9, but on 18 March 1915 his luck ran out. In the Pentland Firth he had launched a torpedo at the battleship HMS Neptune but U 29 broached surface after firing. The battleship HMS Dreadnought spotted the U-boat and came in to ram at full speed, cutting her in half and causing the deaths of Weddigen and his entire crew — ironically, the only time when the battleship, which had given her name to an entire new breed of fighting ship, had actually come into action with the enemy.
THE MYSTERIOUS LOSS OF SMS KARLSRUHE
The Karlsruhe was a fast light cruiser of the Imperial German navy, commissioned on 15 January 1914. The outbreak of war found her in the Caribbean, and her commander, Fregattenkapitän Erich Kohler, commenced a short but successful campaign of commerce-raiding. En route to attack Barbados and Fort de France, on the night of 4 November 1914 the Karlsruhe suddenly suffered an internal explosion which blew the ship in two. The bow section quickly sank, together with Kohler and most of his crew. The stern remained afloat long enough for 140 survivors to transfer to one of Karlsruhe’s accompanying colliers.
The reason for her loss has never been explained. Several navies suffered losses from spontaneous combustion and explosion of their gun propellant. The French, British and Japanese suffered the most, but the Italians, Russians and even the Americans also lost ships. But not one single other German warship. German discipline in storage and handling of propellant was obviously superior to that of the other navies, or was her propellant much more stable, especially in hot climates, than that of the others?
The examination of the loss of HMS Khartoum in July 1940 in the Red Sea begs the question of whether it is possible that the loss of Karlsruhe was caused by the rupture of a torpedo air vessel, always a risk in the heat of the Caribbean. Her torpedo room and torpedo magazine were sited just forward of her bridge, as proved by the vertical torpedo loading shaft placed there. Just forward of the torpedo flat was the forward magazine for her 10.5cm guns.
A torpedo explosion, more plausible than an ammunition explosion, would have led to a fire and detonation of the stored torpedo warheads, in turn setting off the forward magazine. In any case, explosion of the torpedo warheads in the submerged flat would have sufficed to blow the ship in half, killing her commander and his officers on the bridge above.
NASMITH AND THE ‘BRENNAN’
Edwyn Gray, in his book A Damned Un-English Weapon, describes how Martin Nasmith, stalking the Bosporus in E 11, fired two torpedoes at a large Turkish transport, the Stamboul, moored beside the Arsenal. The port torpedo ran wild, breaking surface and then sinking. While Nasmith successfully fired his starboard torpedo, which made a direct hit, he was startled to see what he took to be a Brennan controlled torpedo head from the shore towards E 11. Nasmith avoided it by swinging to starboard and diving deep. Only later he reflected that the ‘Brennan’ must have been their own port torpedo coming back at them.
Given the density of traffic in the Bosporus it is probable that a wave from a passing ship had rolled the Whitehead. Some years later an agent named Slade reported the eventual activities of the rogue torpedo. He claimed he had seen it execute several manoeuvres, before hitting a merchant ship tied up at a wharf.
THE DARDANELLES: GRAVE OF THE PRE-DREADNOUGHTS
The first old pre-dreadnought to be sunk by torpedo was the ancient ironclad frigate Messudiyeh, 9250 tons, built by Thames Iron Works, and launched in 1874. Rebuilt to a ‘modern’ appearance in Genoa in 1903, her main 9.2in guns were never fitted, being replaced by wooden dummies. Anchored at Sari Sigla Bay as a guard ship, she was torpedoed and sunk on 1 December 1914 by the British submarine B 11.
The second torpedo victim was the Canopus-class HMS Goliath, 13,150 tons, four 12in, launched 1898. Anchored off Cape Helles, she provided close gunfire support for troops ashore. On the night of 12/13 May 1915 she was torpedoed by the Turkish torpedo boat Muavenet and sank with a loss of 500 lives.
Third down was HMS Triumph, 12,175 tons, a light battleship with four 10in and fourteen 7.5in guns, built for Chile but taken over by the Royal Navy, launched in 1903. Anchored off Gaba Tepe with her nets deployed, on 25 May 1915 she was torpedoed by Hersing in U 21. She quickly capsized with a loss of seventy men.
Just two days later on 27 May, Hersing returned to the same area to torpedo HMS Majestic, 14,580 tons, four 12in, launched in 1895. Once again the battleship had her nets out, and she was surrounded by smaller vessels as protection. Hit by two torpedoes, Majestic capsized and sank in seven minutes, with the loss of forty men, many being trapped in her nets.