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The final torpedo loss was Haireddin Barbarossa, the ex-German Kurfürst Friedrich Wilhelm, 10,727 tons, six 11in, launched 1891 and purchased 1910. Torpedoed by Nasmith in E 11 off Bulair on 8 August 1915, she capsized and sank in seven minutes with the loss of twenty-one officers and 237 men.

All of the pre-dreadnought battleships designed by Sir William White, director of naval construction from 1886 to 1903, were ill-equipped to resist even one torpedo hit amidships. In order to give priority to gunnery, White had deliberately provided his designs with low metacentric heights (for example only 3.4ft in the Majestic class). This made them steady gun platforms, but reduced their reserve of stability. Another feature of White’s ships, shared, it must be said, by many foreign contemporaries, was the longitudinal watertight bulkhead in the large spaces amidships, the boiler and engine rooms. It was feared that dividing these spaces laterally would leave too large a space across the ship from one side to the other. An ingress of water could quickly form a free surface situation and lead to rapid capsize.

Unfortunately, the longitudinal bulkheads posed the same risk. Since there were no voids at the sides of the ships which could be rapidly counter-flooded to offset damage to the opposite side, the large spaces such as the boiler room, once penetrated by a torpedo or mine explosion, coupled with the low metacentric height, would almost certainly end in capsize. It was a question of size, the pre-dreadnoughts, and even the earliest dreadnoughts, being too narrow in beam to allow for a meaningful TDS in depth. Accordingly, when Goliath, Triumph and Majestic were torpedoed, they all capsized, the first with heavy loss of life.

(Line drawings from Battleships of World War I by Anthony Preston)

Kapitänlieutenant Hersing of U 21 was the submariner who had torpedoed HMS Pathfinder in 1914. For his exploits in the Mediterranean he was known by his fellow officers as ‘Zerstörer der Schlachtschiffe’ — ‘destroyer of battleships’.

JUTLAND

Although the outcome of the Battle of Jutland, which took place on 31 May and 1 June 1916, would appear to have hinged on the effects of heavy shells against armour plate, the torpedo was the weapon which simultaneously robbed the Grand Fleet of the conclusive victory which was within its grasp, and allowed the German High Seas Fleet to escape and claim a tactical victory.

Royal Navy destroyers put in three mass torpedo attacks on German ships; German destroyers put in four mass torpedo attacks on British ships. The fourth German torpedo attack, which started at 1917, was the decisive moment in the battle. Jellicoe ordered his ships to turn away from the threat, and Scheer escaped the trap the Grand Fleet had laid for him. In between these mass attacks there were several individual encounters when torpedoes were launched, with mixed results.

The first major clash between opposing destroyer flotillas occurred after 1630, during the ‘run to the south’, when Beatty’s battlecruisers pursued their German opposite numbers, not suspecting that they were being led onto the main body of the High Seas Fleet. The destroyers and light cruisers attached to the opposing battlecruiser squadrons clashed between the firing lines, each side attempting to break through and torpedo the enemy battlecruisers. Success went to the British: at 1657 the destroyer HMS Petard hit the German battlecruiser Seydlitz with a torpedo, and shortly after torpedoed and sank the German destroyer V 29. All other torpedoes launched by both sides were avoided.

At 1756 the German light cruiser Wiesbaden was disabled by shell hits from HMS Invincible of Admiral Hood’s 3rd Battlecruiser Squadron and was left between the opposing lines, seemingly dead in the water. Despite attracting the attention and fire of several passing capital ships, Wiesbaden’s crew continued to load and launch torpedoes at passing targets of opportunity for almost an hour. At the same time German destroyers put in a mass attack on Hood’s 3rd BCS, but his battlecruisers avoided all the torpedoes. Simultaneously, British destroyers launched their second assault on the German battlecruisers, again without result. At 1810 the destroyer HMS Moresby launched a torpedo at the battleship Markgraf, but missed.

When at 1830 the leading German ships came within sight of the Grand Fleet’s dreadnoughts crossing their ‘T’, Admiral Scheer realised he was sailing into certain death, and ordered all ships to execute a battle about-turn to starboard, turning through 180 degrees, and managed to disengage temporarily. Wary of running onto torpedoes, Jellicoe continued to head south. During their battle turn the German ships had, in fact, launched torpedoes, and by 1840 battleships at the rear of the British line reported having to take avoiding action. Fourteen minutes later, the battleship HMS Marlborough was hit in the diesel room by a single torpedo. Her crew had not seen from where it had been launched, and they suspected a U-boat. In fact, it is likely that the torpedo had come from the stationary Wiesbaden, which continued to take torpedo shots of opportunity.

When Scheer once more found himself heading into the teeth of the firing line of the Grand Fleet at 1917, he ordered a second battle turn-away, calling on his four remaining battlecruisers and all his destroyers to cover his retreat — the famous ‘death ride’ of the battlecruisers. In all, thirty-one German torpedoes were launched at the British battleships, some coming very close, but all missed, and the British anti-torpedo boat gunners sank the destroyer S 35.

The two battle fleets lost contact, and during the hours of darkness several confused actions took place at the rear of the British line. Although Jellicoe and his officers did not realise it, these were the High Seas Fleet fighting its way to safety through the rear of the British formation. Both sides incurred losses, the light cruiser Southampton torpedoing and sinking the light cruiser Frauenlob at 2223, the German ship going down with all hands. Between 2330 and 0215 British destroyer flotillas put in torpedo attacks on units of the German fleet, sinking the cruiser Rostock. At 0210 the pre-dreadnought Pommern was torpedoed and also lost with all hands. The final German loss was the destroyer V 4, which had her bows blown off. It was believed she had struck a mine, but it is more likely a British torpedo had found her. The final torpedo attack was made at 0237, when the destroyer HMS Moresby attacked the battlecruiser Von de Tann with a single torpedo, which missed.

In the kind of manoeuvre they carried out at Jutland, black-painted torpedo boat destroyers (with V 183 nearest the camera) break through a line of Nassau-class dreadnoughts at high speed. (Photo from The Ships of the German Fleets 1845–1945 by Hans Jürgen Hansen)
A painting by Claus Bergen of Pommern and her sisters under fire at Jutland. They were known as the ‘five-minute ships’ — the length of time they were expected to survive in a duel with dreadnoughts.