The ship had lost propulsion from its port propellers, reducing speed to just 15 knots. The serious flooding caused a list to port, which was increased to 11.5 degrees when the handling crews in the port aft 5.25in shell and cartridge rooms, believing from the noise of the break-up of the shafting that the ship had received a second torpedo hit in their vicinity, flooded the magazines.
The torpedo hit had also caused widespread damage in other areas, the shock damage knocking out the electrical system. This cut out the power supply to the aft 5.25in turrets and the clumsy eight-barrelled pom-poms, to the pumps, the ventilation and the lighting system. The steering gear also failed, and despite the helm remaining set at 20 degrees to starboard Prince of Wales began a slow turn to port under the impulse of her remaining starboard propellers. The list to port meant that the heavy 5.25in turrets could not be trained, so Captain Leach ordered the counter-flooding of the external and internal voids of the TDS on the starboard side forward. The list to port was reduced to 9 degrees, but the move risked compromising the effectiveness of the triple-layer TDS on the starboard side.
While the flooding was progressing throughout the stern of Prince of Wales, at 1219 another twenty-six torpedo planes arrived and commenced a mass attack on the two ships. Seven planes headed for the starboard side of Prince of Wales, but three veered off to attack Repulse. From the remaining four aircraft, three torpedoes struck the starboard side of the sluggish Prince of Wales, which was unable to manoeuvre to avoid them. To make matters worse, the forward starboard 5.25in turrets could not depress adequately to engage the torpedo planes, due to the ship’s list to port.
The first torpedo tore a hole 7m (23ft) in diameter straight through the bow from starboard to port. The second struck abreast ‘B’ turret, on the compromised TFD, and caused major damage. Shock wrecked equipment in the 14in cordite and shell-handling rooms of ‘B’ turret, and in the transmitting station. Surprisingly, diver surveys carried out in 2007 and 2008 found no damage to the internal TDS, and it is surmised that the force of the explosion may have vented upwards. Certainly, a degaussing generator was flung bodily through an upper deck, creating a large hole.
The third and last torpedo hit far aft, above the starboard outer propeller, and the effects were devastating. The starboard outer propeller shaft was bent downwards, leaving the propeller wedged in the hull. This caused the starboard outer turbine to come to an abrupt stop. With only the starboard inner shaft turning speed dropped to just 8 knots. A hole 11m long × 4m high (36ft × 13ft) was torn in the hull. The starboard hits had the effect of righting the ship, until her list reduced to only 3 degrees to port. But the additional flooding aft doomed the Prince of Wales.
The final attack was carried out at 1244 by eight high-level bombers with 500kg (1100lbs) bombs, and with the target barely moving, they managed to score one hit and six near-misses, which caved in the hull sides. All power was lost, and the Prince of Wales came to a halt, slowly sinking. The destroyer Express came alongside to evacuate survivors, but at 1324, the flagship lurched to port and capsized, sinking a few minutes later. HMS Express was almost caught and rolled over by Prince of Wales’ bilge keel and only just managed to avoid being capsized in her turn. Of her complement of over 1500, almost 1200 were rescued, but 327 officers and men died, including the admiral and Captain Leach.
When the flagship had hoisted the signal that she was not under control, Captain Tennant of the Repulse had closed Prince of Wales to offer assistance. At that point torpedo planes had put in an attack on the Repulse, coming in from port and starboard at the same time. Captain Tennant managed to avoid nineteen torpedoes in all, but Repulse was struck by one torpedo on the starboard side and by at least three, and possibly four, on the port side. Captain Tennant knew his old ship could not survive such punishment, and he gave the order to abandon ship. Repulse capsized and sank at 1233, taking 508 men down with her. Captain Tennant and nearly seven hundred of his officers and men survived.
Just three Japanese aircraft were shot down, all by the pom-pom gunners on Repulse. Standard procedure was to fire on a torpedo plane only up to the point where it released its torpedo, then to switch fire to the next attacker. However, Repulse’s gunners saw to their dismay that the Japanese were dropping their torpedoes outside the maximum range at which their 2pdr shells were self-destroying. Therefore they ignored standing orders and continued to fire on those torpedo bombers overflying their ship after dropping their torpedo.
As the destroyers were rescuing survivors struggling in the water, RAF Flight Lieutenant Vigors, who was responding to the only call for air cover, sent by Captain Tennant, flew over the scene in his Brewster Buffalo. The Buffalo fighter was to be later criticised for its lack of performance compared with contemporary Japanese aircraft. However, the actual combat performances of RAF, New Zealand and Dutch pilots flying the Brewster give the lie to this condemnation. It is now thought that the Buffalo was damned in order to explain away the shortcomings of the Allies’ preparations for a war with Japan. If the air cover had been requested before the Japanese attackers had arrived over the ships, it is obvious that things might have turned out very differently. The .50cal heavy machine guns of the Buffalo would have caused serious damage to the lightly armed and unarmoured Japanese bombers, which had no self-sealing fuel tanks, the G4M ‘Betty’ in particular being nicknamed the ‘flying cigar’ for its propensity to catch fire under attack.
In the Fleet Air Arm attack on Taranto, and the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, the targets had been lying immobile in harbour. The destruction of Force Z proved that even capital ships, fully prepared for action and free to manoeuvre in the open sea, were liable to destruction by aircraft when not provided with effective fighter cover. The day of the battleship as the predominant capital ship was over, and its place would be taken by the new capital ship, the aircraft carrier.
BATTLE OF THE JAVA SEA
The Netherlands East Indies traced their origins to the first Dutch ships which arrived at the end of the sixteenth century searching for spices. To protect their commercial interests the Dutch incorporated the Dutch East Indies Company (VOC), which was nationalised by the State in 1800. Colonial expansion by military conquest continued into the twentieth century. They provided many valuable products such as quinine, but the most desirable were rubber and oil, both considered vital to the Japanese war effort.
To defend their rich colonial possessions the Dutch had established a local army, the KNIL and airforce, and major units of the Dutch navy were stationed in the East Indies. In early 1942, the Dutch naval forces available for the defence of the Netherlands East Indies comprised three light cruisers (De Ruyter, Java and Tromp), seven modern destroyers, and sixteen submarines. When the Japanese invaded, these forces were bolstered by a number of British, American and Australian ships, to form a unified command, ABDA, under Dutch Admiral Helfrich. From the outset, Allied efforts were hamstrung by the severe losses inflicted on them everywhere throughout the Pacific theatre, at Pearl, in the Philippines, and off Malaya.