Haguro was one of the large Japanese heavy cruisers responsible for the sinking of De Ruyter, Java and Exeter in the Battle of the Java Sea and its aftermath. She survived the debacle of Leyte Gulf, and returned to Malayan waters. On 16 May 1945 she was on a supply run to the Japanese garrison at Port Blair in the Andaman Islands in the company of the destroyer Kamikaze when she was intercepted just after midnight by British destroyers southwest of Penang.
Reports that two destroyer formations had been sighted in the area caused Vice Admiral Hashimoto to order the two ships to return to Singapore, but they were not to escape. In an action codenamed Operation Dukedom, the five destroyers, Saumarez, Verulam, Venus, Vigilant and Virago, of the 26th Destroyer Flotilla under the command of Captain Manley Laurence Power, tracked down the Haguro on radar and prepared for a flotilla torpedo attack, at a closing speed of some 60 knots. Power’s torpedo officer on the bridge of Saumarez, Lieutenant Douglas Scobie, was drenched as one of Haguro’s 8in shells exploded alongside, but he wiped his eyes dry and launched all eight of Saumarez’s torpedoes. An 8in shell from Haguro passed straight through the forecastle without exploding, a second took off the top of the funnel, and a third killed two men and injured three more in her boiler room. Splinters cut away her radio aerials.
The ferocious gunnery duel between the 13,300-ton cruiser and the destroyers abruptly ended at 0115 when Haguro was hit by three torpedoes from Saumarez and Verulam. A British officer was heard to remark that the three gold-coloured towers of water resembled the Prince of Wales’ feathers — a very appropriate comment as the wreck of HMS Prince of Wales lay not far off. Venus hit Haguro with one torpedo ten minutes later, and at 0127 she took two more torpedo hits from Virago, and went dead in the water. The destroyers were not finished, however, for Vigilant hit her with one torpedo and Venus a final two. Haguro sank at 0209, taking down with her over nine hundred officers and men, including Vice Admiral Hashimoto and Rear Admiral Sugiura.
Apart from Saumarez, none of the other British destroyers received any damage. For her part, Kamikaze was slightly damaged but escaped, returning the next day to pick up 320 survivors from Haguro. When Haguro sank, the French battleship Richelieu was steaming at full speed to join in the destroyer attack, but arrived just too late. The sinking of Haguro proved to be the last major action between surface ships in the Second World War, and likely the last ever destroyer flotilla torpedo attack.
USS Indianapolis was one of the third class of US ‘Treaty’ heavy cruisers, displacing 12,775 tons full load, and capable of a top speed of 32.5 knots. After the repair of damage to her propeller shafts caused by a kamikaze off Okinawa, Indianapolis sailed for Tinian carrying components for the first atomic bombs. She then sailed for Leyte via Guam. Her commander, Captain Charles B McVay had asked for a destroyer as escort, since his ship had neither sonar nor hydrophones, but his request was denied. Meanwhile, the Japanese submarine I 58 commanded by Lt Cdr Hashimoto had departed Hirao on her seventh Kaiten-launching mission. Fleet Radio Unit Pacific intercepted and decoded a Japanese Sixth Fleet radio transmission detailing the composition and patrol areas of the Tamon group of Kaiten carriers, and alerted CINCPAC. Because the intercept was classified as falling under the ULTRA programme, it was not passed on to American units in the area.
By 27 July 1945 Hashimoto had reached his patrol area on the shipping route between Guam and Leyte. On 29 July, Indianapolis was 250 miles north of Palau, zigzagging at 17 knots in decreasing visibility. At 2305 I 58 surfaced and sighted Indianapolis, which Lt Cdr Hashimoto identified as an Idaho-class battleship. She was proceeding at 12 knots, and was no longer zigzagging. It took him twenty minutes to reach a suitable firing position for a conventional submerged torpedo attack, but in case he missed he put two of his four remaining Kaiten pilots on alert.
There was no need, for after firing six Type 95 torpedoes at a range of 1650yds (1500m), at 2335 he observed three hits on the cruiser’s starboard side, closely grouped abreast the two forward turrets. Indianapolis came to a stop and began to list to starboard. Hashimoto dived to reload two forward tubes, but when he resurfaced thirty minutes later, Indianapolis had already capsized and sunk. He departed at high speed on the surface, later reporting that he had sunk an Idaho-class battleship. His radio report was also intercepted by the Americans and decoded, but because no US battleships were due in the area, his report was ignored.
Indianapolis’s crew were unable to send out a Mayday because she had lost power. Of her crew of 1196, many were killed by the torpedo explosions or went down with the ship, but some nine hundred men were left in the water. Because Lt Cdr Hashimoto’s report had been disregarded, it was 84 hours before Indianapolis was reported overdue, and a search was begun to find survivors. By the time help arrived, there were only 316 men, including her captain, still left alive. Many of those who died had succumbed to shark attack.
CHAPTER 24
Post-Second World War
HMS KEMPENFELT
The Sydney Morning Herald of 30 November 1945 reported an incident which had occurred the day previously. A torpedo air flask exploded on the destroyer HMS Kempenfelt, the ‘W’-class leader, while she was moored alongside depot ship HMS Tyne at Kirribilli Point, Sydney. The torpedo body was driven into the radar room and penetrated the funnel. The warhead exited overboard, carrying away an aerial on HMS Wager and debris fell on HMS Whirlwind. A fire sprang up and spread to the awnings, but it was quickly extinguished. Only slight damage was caused to the Kempenfelt but one rating, named in the newspaper report as Able Seaman D J Pullin, was seriously injured, and several others suffered from shock and slight burns.