“I don’t care,” Curt said. “As excited as I am, I’m not hungry.”
“I’m not hungry either,” Steve said. “But I sure wouldn’t mind washing my hands. I know Yuri said it was safe touching those plastic sausage things, but it still bothers me knowing what was inside.”
“Hey, where’s that envelope?” Curt asked.
“You mean Yuri’s?” Steve asked.
“Yeah, the one with the directions on making the bioweapon,” Curt said. “He told us he also wrote some pointers of what we should do after the laydown.”
“I got it with all the maps and shit to get us to the various safe houses,” Steve said. “You want me to get it out?”
Curt shrugged. “Why not. Let’s see what we should do for our protection.” Curt laughed again. “As if we need that little prick’s help at this point.”
Steve reached back behind his seat and pulled out a folder closed with an elastic cord. He opened it, shuffled through the contents, and pulled out Yuri’s envelope.
“Whoa! This thing is thick,” Steve said. “What’d he do? Write a book?” He extended it toward Curt so he could take a look.
“Open it, for crissake,” Curt said.
Steve got his index finger under the sealed flap and tore it open. From inside the envelope, he pulled out a thick card sealed with another flap.
“What the hell?” Steve said.
Curt took his eyes off the road long enough to take a gander. “What does it say on the front?”
“To Curt and Steve from Rosslya-matoshka,” Steve said. “Whatever the hell that means.”
“Open it up!” Curt said.
Steve tore through the tab and as soon as he had the card leaped in his hands and snapped open. At the same time a coiled spring mechanism propelled a sizable puff of powder into the air along with a handful of any glittering stars.
“Shit!” Steve yelled, startled by the small explosive device.
Curt had started as well, mainly because Steve had. He had to fight to keep control of the truck.
Both men sneezed violently and their eyes watered briefly.
Curt brought the truck to a stop by the side of the road. Both men were coughing, the powder tickled their throats. Curt grabbed the card away from Steve, who then got out of the pickup to whisk the glittering stars off his lap.
Curt examined the card. There was nothing written inside. He looked in the envelope. There was nothing there either. Then, all of a sudden, he had a terrible premonition.
Author’s note
Unfortunately, much of what the characters in Vector say about bioweapons and bioterrorism is true. This holds most notably for Detective Lou Soldano’s comment concerning the potential for a major bioterrorism attack in the United States or Europe: it is not a question of whether one will occur, but rather, when. Indeed, there have already been several minor bioterrorist events in the United States.
In 1984, there was an intentional contamination of restaurant salad bars in Oregon, causing an outbreak of salmonellosis in 751 people. In 1996, there was an intentional contamination of muffins and donuts in a hospital laboratory in Texas, causing an outbreak of Shigella dysenteriae in forty-five people.
The threat of bioterrorism has risen progressively in the world, particularly over the last decade. Consider the example of Aum Shinrikyo, the apocalyptic sect that released sarin gas in the Tokyo subway in March 1995. At the same time the cult unleashed its chemical attack, it was engaged in an active bioweapons program involving both anthrax and botulinum toxin, just like Yuri Davydov was in the novel. They’d even gone so far as to send a delegation to Zaire to explore the possibility of obtaining the Ebola virus for weaponization.
The Soviet Union had maintained an enormous covert bioweapons program prior to its dissolution in 1989, despite being a signatory to the 1972 Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BWC) strictly forbidding such activity. At its height, the program employed more than fifty thousand scientists and technicians in research and production facilities. It was administered under the aegis of Biopreparat, which was under the Ministry of Defense. The program purportedly has been dismantled by the Yeltsin government (although many experts fear not completely), resulting in a diaspora of tens of thousands of highly trained bioweapon personnel. Considering Russia’s current economic dislocations, the question invariably arises: where are these people now and what are they doing? Some, perhaps, are driving taxis in New York City like Yuri Davydov, the disaffected émigré in Vector, and meeting up with equally disaffected members of the violent far right.
Rogue nations like Iraq, Iran, Libya, and North Korea have added to the rising threat of bioweapons. In the aftermath of the Gulf War, the United States and its allies were shocked to learn the size of Iraq’s stockpile of bioweapons and production facilities, whose existence had entirely eluded intelligence operations. This revelation served as a sharp wake-up call to the various allied governments. Regrettably, at the same time, the discovery captured the attention of terrorist groups and individuals worldwide who suddenly became intensely interested in bioweapons. The attraction is simple: bioweapons are inexpensive to make; require materials, equipment, and expertise that are easy to procure (some of the information is even on the Internet); and, for the most part, involve biological agents that are readily available. As an added feature, bioweapons are the best weapons of mass destruction for covert use. The effects of their release take many hours or even days to materialize, giving the perpetrators time to escape.
Adding to this unfortunate circumstance of the rising threat of bioweapons is the current social, economic, and political reality of the world. With mounting religious fundamentalism in some countries, thwarted nationalistic goals in others, economic deprivation in many, and, in the industrialized west, the increased desperation of violent far-right groups whose agenda has stalled in an era of increased globalization, there has been a worldwide rise of terrorism in general. The combination of this increase with a heightened appreciation of the evil attractiveness of bioweapons is what makes the current situation so critical.
In Vector, medical examiners were the first to confront an occurrence of bioterrorism in the form of a single case of anthrax. Lamentably, since there was a simple but unverified explanation for the case in the story, the doctors’ index of suspicion of bioterrorism was not adequate for them to insist on proper follow-up. If they had, the event as it unfolded could possibly have been prevented. This is an important lesson. Leaving fiction for the real world, there is a high probability that the medical profession would be the first group of professionals to interface with a bioterrorism event, and that distinct possibility must be part of medical thinking these days. This is particularly true involving illnesses caused by agents known to have bioweapon potential.
Yet the medical profession’s responsibility with regard to bioterrorism goes beyond detecting an episode and treating its victims. The medical profession has an ethical duty to continue to institutionalize the opprobrium currently associated with the use of bioweapons. Members of the medical profession of all countries must insist on investigating any suspicious disease incidents within their borders and report such circumstances to the world forum. If that had happened in Sverdlovsk in 1979 following the anthrax leak from a Biopreparat bioweapon facility, the Soviet medical profession would have done the world a service. It would have exposed the illegal Soviet offensive bioweapon program. Instead, the world was treated to elaborate KGB disinformation, and Biopreparat continued its illegal and ethically repulsive secret work for another ten years.