It was replaced by a challenge from the right that Kerensky considered to be far more dangerous. As he would write after the events, 'It was only from that quarter [the right] that we faced any real danger at that time.'1 Indeed, then and afterwards, he was absolutely convinced that the military were involved in a 'conspiracy' to remove him from power and install a dictator.2 This judgement, based on no evidence, was to prove a fatal miscalculation. It led to a needless conflict with General Kornilov that opened to the Bolsheviks the door to power.
Kornilov, who was forty-seven years old at the time, was born into a family of Siberian Cossacks. In 1915, while commanding a division, he was wounded and taken prisoner by the Austrians. He managed to escape and make his way back to Russia. A man oflegendary courage, he watched with dismay the disintegration ofRussia's armed forces and the helplessness of the Provisional Government in dealing with it. In late summer 1917 he concluded that this government had become a captive of socialist internationalists and enemy agents planted in the Soviet.
Although he was not a political man, this judgement made him receptive to suggestions that he assume dictatorial authority.
After the abortive Bolshevik putsch, Kerensky turned to Kornilov to restore discipline in the armed forces. On 19 July he offered him the post of commander-in-chief. Kornilov, however, wanted major reforms before he would accept the appointment: restoration of army discipline, reintroduction of the death penalty for desertion or mutiny, the imposition of discipline in defence industries. These conditions placed Kerensky in a quandary for he was dependent on the Soviet, which was unlikely to consent to these stipulations. Kornilov informed Ker- ensky on what conditions he would be prepared to accept command over Russia's armed forces: (1) he would owe responsibility only to his conscience and the nation; (2) no one would interfere with his operational orders or command appointments; (3) the disciplinary measures which he had mentioned would apply also to the troops in the rear; and (4) the government would accept his previous requests.3
Kerensky was so incensed by these demands that he considered withdrawing his command offer to Kornilov but then thought better of it, attributing them to the general's 'political naivete'. In fact, Kornilov's demands were directed at the Soviet and its Order N0. 1, which gave it the authority to countermand military instructions. The negotiations between the two parties dragged on and Kornilov assumed command only on 24 July, after receiving assurances that his conditions would be met.
Unfortunately, Kerensky could not keep his promises to Kornilov. For one, he was entirely dependent on the Executive Committee of the Soviet, which regarded all attempts to restore military discipline, especially in the rear, as 'counter-revolutionary'. To carry out his promises to Kornilov would have forced him to break with the socialists, his principal supporters. Furthermore, he came to view the general as a rival who wanted to replace him. So, instead of cooperating with Kornilov by honouring his pledges, he steadily retracted them: on 7 August he stated that he would not, under any circumstances, agree to introducing the death penalty for soldiers serving in the rear of the front. And eleven days later the Soviet passed by a virtually unanimous vote a resolution proposed by the Bolsheviks to abolish the death penalty for front-line troops.
In the person of the prime minister and the general, two Russias confronted each other: the Russia of international socialism and the Russia of patriotism. There could be no conciliation between them.
On 3 August, Kornilov came to Petrograd to brief a closed cabinet meeting on the military situation. While he was describing the balance of forces, Kerensky leaned over and in a whisper warned him to be careful. Kornilov assumed that the warning concerned the minister of agriculture, V. M. Chernov.
This incident had a shattering effect on him for he interpreted it to mean that at least one minister was suspected of leaking military secrets. He came to regard the Provisional Government as disloyal and incompetent.
On 6 or 7 August, Kornilov ordered three badly undermanned divisions to move up to a position roughly equidistant between Moscow and Petrograd. When asked to explain this order he said that he wanted these troops to be in a position to suppress a potential Bolshevik coup in either city, with or without the government's consent. Russia, he felt, desperately needed 'firm authority'. 'I am not a counter-revolutionary,' he explained,
I despise the old regime, which badly mistreated my family. There is no return to the past and there cannot be any. But we need an authority that could truly save Russia, which would make it possible to end the war honorably and lead her to a Constituent Assembly ... Our current government has solid individuals but also those who ruin things, who ruin Russia. The main thing is that presently Russia lacks authority and that such an authority must be created. Perhaps I shall have to exert some pressure on the government. It is possible that if disorders break out in Petrograd, after they had been suppressed I will have to join the government and participate in the establishment of a new, strong authority.4
On 8 August, the Ministry of War presented Kerensky with two lists, one of left-oriented persons, the other of right-oriented ones, all of whom should be arrested. Kerensky agreed to the arrest of all conservative politicians but hesitated to sign the list of radical ones.5
On 14 August, Kornilov made an appearance at the State Conference, which Kerensky had convened in Moscow to rally public support. When Kornilov turned up at the Bolshoi Theatre he was cheered and carried aloft by the crowd; the right-wing delegates gave him a riotous welcome. Kerensky felt thoroughly threatened by this reception of his rival. As he testified subsequently 'after the Moscow conference it was clear to me that the next attempt at a blow would come from the right and not from the left'.[5]6
In mid August, Boris Savinkov, the man in charge of the Ministry of War, received from French intelligence information that the Bolsheviks were planning at the beginning of September an all-out effort to seize power. Kerensky disbelieved this information but he realised that it could be useful in neutralising Kornilov. So he asked Savinkov to proceed to Mogilev, the locale of the military headquarters, in order to liquidate the suspected officer conspiracy and to despatch the Third Cavalry Corps to Petrograd for the purpose of imposing martial law and defending the Provisional Government from any and all assaults, and, in particular, the assault of the Bolsheviks, who had rebelled on 3-5 July and who, according to information from foreign intelligence, were once again preparing to rise.7
Later, Kerensky would accuse Kornilov of sending the same cavalry corps, commanded by General Alexander Krymov, to the capital in order to unseat him.
Savinkov arrived in Mogilev on 22 August and stayed there for two days. He told Kornilov that the government had information of an impending Bolshevik putsch and that in order to deal with it Kerensky wanted to withdraw Petrograd and its suburbs from the Petrograd Military district and place it under his personal command. Kornilov was not pleased with this proposal but consented. Then Savinkov added that the prime minister wanted the Third Cavalry Corps to be moved to the capital where it would also come under government control. If necessary, he added, the government would carry out a 'merciless' operation against the Bolsheviks and, should it side with them, also the Petrograd Soviet. All this was prevarication for, as mentioned, Kerensky did not believe the Bolsheviks would act. Kornilov responded as follows:
I must tell you that I no longer believe in Kerensky and the Provisional Government. In the Provisional Government serve such people as Chernov and such ministers as Avksentiev. The only salutary measure for the country is firm authority. This the Provisional Government is unable to provide ...As concerns Kerensky, he is not only weak and indecisive but also insincere.8