The same conclusion was suggested by the evidence presented to a meeting of the Central Committee on 16 October. The representatives of the Bolshevik Military Organisation, the Petrograd Soviet, the trade unions and factory committees who attended this meeting all warned of the risks involved in staging an uprising before the Soviet Congress. Krylenko stated the view of the Military Organisation that the soldiers' fighting spirit was weakening: 'they would have to be stung by something, such as the break-up of the garrison, to come out for an uprising'. Volodarsky from the Petrograd Soviet confirmed the 'general impression . that no one is ready to rush out on to the streets but that everyone will come out if the Soviet calls'. Massive unemployment and the fear of dismissal held the workers back, according to Shmidt of the trade unions. Shliapnikov added that even in the metalworkers' union, where the party's influence was dominant, 'a Bolshevik rising is not popular and rumours of this even produce panic'. Kamenev drew the logical conclusion: 'there is no evidence of any kind that we must begin the fight before the 20th [when the Soviet Congress was due to convene]'.10
But Lenin was insistent on the need for immediate preparations and saw no reason to hold back in the cautious reports on the mood of the Petrograd masses: in a military coup, which is how he conceived of the seizure of power, only a small force was needed, provided it was well armed and disciplined enough.[7] Such was Lenin's domination of the party that he got his way. A counter-resolution by Zinoviev prohibiting the actual staging of an uprising before the Bolshevik delegates to the Soviet Congress had been consulted was defeated by 15 votes to 6, though the closeness of the vote, compared with the 19 to 2 majority in favour of Lenin's vaguer call for an uprising in the immediate future, suggests that several Bolshevik leaders had serious apprehensions about the wisdom of an insurrection before the Soviet Congress, albeit not enough to make an open stand against Lenin. Only Kamenev and Zinoviev found the courage to do that.
At the end of the meeting Kamenev declared that he could not accept its resolution, which in his view would lead the party to ruin, and submitted his resignation to the Central Committee in order to make his campaign public. He also demanded the convocation of a Party Conference, which Lenin had managed to get postponed: there was little doubt that it would oppose the call for an uprising before the Congress. On 18 October Kamenev aired his views in Gorky's newspaper, Novaia zhizn. 'At the present,' he wrote, 'the instigation of an armed uprising before and independent of the Soviet Congress would be an impermissible and even fatal step for the proletariat and the revolution.' This of course was to let the cat out of the bag: rumours of a Bolshevik coup had been spreading for weeks, and now the conspiracy had finally been exposed. Trotsky was forced to deny the rumours in the Petrograd Soviet, but for once his performance was less than convincing. Lenin was furious and, in a sign of the sort of purges to come, denounced Kamenev and Zinoviev in the Bolshevik press. 'Strikebreaking', 'betrayal', 'blacklegs', 'slanderous lies' and 'crime' - such terms were littered throughout the angry letters he sent on 18 and 19
October. 'Mr Zinoviev and Mr Kamenev' (this was the ultimate insult - they were no longer even 'comrades') should be 'expelled from the party'.11
With the Bolshevik conspiracy public knowledge, the Soviet leaders resolved to delay the Soviet Congress until 25 October. They hoped that the extra five days would give them the chance to muster their supporters from the far-flung provinces. But it merely gave the Bolsheviks the extra time they needed to make the final preparations for an uprising. Moreover, it lent credibility to Lenin's claim that the Soviet leaders were planning to ditch the Soviet Congress altogether. He had always based his argument for a pre-emptive seizure of power (before the Soviet Congress) on the danger - which he either overestimated or (more likely) invented - that the Provisional Government might not allow the Congress to convene. All the local party reports had made it clear that, while the Petrograd workers and soldiers would not come out on the call of the party alone, many would do so if the Soviet were threatened. The postponement of the Congress was the provocation he needed.
3
Why was Lenin so insistent on the need for an armed uprising before the Soviet Congress? All the signs were that time was on the side of the Bolsheviks: the country was falling apart; the Soviets were moving to the left; and the forthcoming Congress would almost certainly endorse the Bolshevik call for a transfer of power to the Soviets. Why run the risk of civil war and possible defeat by staging an uprising that party activists in Petrograd believed was premature? Other senior Bolsheviks stressed the need for a transfer of power to coincide with the Soviet Congress. This was the view of Trotsky and many other Bolsheviks in the Petrograd Soviet executive, and since they were closely informed about the mood in the capital and would have to play a leading role in any uprising, their opinion was important. While these leaders doubted that the party had enough mass support to justify an insurrection in its name, they thought that it might be successfully carried out in the name of the Soviets. Since the Bolsheviks had conducted their campaign on the slogan of Soviet power, it was said that they needed the Congress to legitimise such an uprising and make it appear as the work of the Soviet as a whole rather than of one party. By taking this line, which would have delayed the uprising by no more than a few days, Lenin could have won widespread support in the party against those, such as Kamenev and Zinoviev, who were flatly opposed to an uprising. But Lenin was adamant - the seizure of power had to be carried out before the Congress.
Lenin justified his impatience by the notion that any delay in the seizure of power would enable Kerensky to organise repressive measures against it. Petrograd would be abandoned to the Germans. The seat of government would be moved to Moscow. The Soviet Congress would be banned. This of course was nonsense. Kerensky was quite incapable of such decisive action and, in any case, as Kamenev pointed out, the government was powerless to put any counter-revolutionary intentions into practice. Lenin was exaggerating the danger of a clampdown by Kerensky to strengthen his own arguments for a pre-emptive insurrection. There were rumours in the press that the government was planning to evacuate the capital. These no doubt reinforced his conviction that a civil war had begun, and that military victory would go to the side that dared to strike first. 'On s'engage et puis on voit.'
But there was another motive for wanting the insurrection before the Soviet Congress, quite apart from military tactics. If the transfer of power took place by a vote of the Congress itself, the result would almost certainly be a coalition government made up of all the Soviet parties. The Bolsheviks might gain the largest share of the ministerial places, if these were allocated on a proportional basis, but would still have to rule in partnership with at least the left wing - and possibly all - of the SR and Menshevik parties. This would be a resounding political victory for Kamenev, who would no doubt emerge as the central figure in such a coalition. Under his leadership, the centre of power would remain with the Soviet Congress, rather than the party; there might even be a renewed effort to reunite the Bolsheviks with the Menshe- viks. As for Lenin himself, he ran the risk of being kept out of office, either on the insistence of the Mensheviks and SRs or on account of his own unwillingness to compromise with them. He would thus be consigned to the left-wing margins of his own party.