On the other hand, if a Bolshevik seizure ofpower took place before the Congress, then Lenin would emerge as the political master. The Congress majority would probably endorse the Bolshevik action, thereby giving the party the right to form a government of its own. If the Mensheviks and SRs could bring themselves to accept this forcible seizure of power, as a fait accompli, then a few minor places for them would no doubt be found in Lenin's cabinet. Otherwise, if they could not accept an armed seizure ofpower, they would have no choice but to go into opposition, leaving the Bolsheviks in government on their own. Kamenev's coalition efforts would thus be undermined; Lenin would have his Dictatorship of the Proletariat; and although the result would inevitably be to plunge the country into civil war, this was something Lenin himself accepted - and perhaps even welcomed - as a part of the revolutionary process. Civil war, in Lenin's view, was a necessary and vital phase in any social revolution, the deepening of the 'class struggle' in a military form. Since July he had been arguing that the Civil War had been started by the forces of the right, and that the seizure of power should be seen as the joining of the fight by the proletarian side. The 'class struggle' could not be resolved by political means. Russia was split into warring camps - the 'military dictatorship' and the 'Dictatorship of the Proletariat' - and it was a question of which side would prevail. 'Kto kogo,' as Lenin liked to say.
In this Leninist scenario the armed insurrection was a provocation to the Mensheviks and the SRs. It was as much against the other Soviet-based parties - and those in his party who would compromise with them in a Soviet government - as it was against the Provisional Government.
ч
Lenin's arrival at the Smolny had a decisive effect. In Room 36 the mood changed dramatically, according to the Bolsheviks who were present. From defence they shifted to the offensive, issuing the order for the insurrection to begin, and getting out the maps to plan the main lines of attack. By lunchtime they had seized control of the railway stations, the post and telegraph, the state bank, the telephone exchange, police stations, and the central zone around the Winter Palace and St Isaac's Square. But the assault on the Winter Palace, where the remnants of Kerensky's cabinet were bunkered without hope of salvation in the Malachite Hall, was delayed by technical problems and postponed until 3 p.m., then 6 p.m., whereafter the MRC ceased to bother with any set deadlines at all. For Lenin these delays were infuriating: it was vital for him to have the seizure of power completed before the opening of the Soviet Congress. At around 3 p.m. he told a packed session of the Petrograd Soviet that the Provisional Government had already been overthrown. It was of course a lie but that was not the point: the fact of the seizure of power was to be so important to his political strategy over the next few hours that he was prepared to invent it. As afternoon turned into evening, he screamed at the MRC commanders to seize the Winter Palace without delay. Podvoisky recalls him pacing around in a small room in the Smolny 'like a lion in a cage. He needed the Winter Palace at any cost ... he was ready to shoot us.'12
The assault began with a signal blast from the guns of the Baltic cruiser Aurora anchored in the Neva River near the Winter Palace. Just as the bombardment was getting under way, at 10.40 p.m., the Soviet Congress finally opened in the Great Hall of the Smolny. The majority of the delegates were workers and soldiers in their tunics and greatcoats; their unwashed and dirty look contrasted sharply with the clean suits of the old executive members, the Mensheviks and SRs, seated on the platform for the final time. Sukhanov remarked that the 'grey features of the Bolshevik provinces' had a clear preponderance among the Congress delegates.13 The Bolsheviks did not have an absolute majority, although with the support of the Left SRs they could push through any motion they liked. The Credentials Committee reported that 300 of the 670 delegates were Bolsheviks, 193 SRs (of whom more than half were Left SRs), while 82 were Mensheviks (of whom 14 were Internationalists). The mandates of the delegates showed an overwhelming majority in favour of a Soviet government. It was up to the Congress to decide how this should be formed. Martov proposed the formation of a united democratic government based upon all the parties in the Soviet: this, he said, was the only way to stop civil war. The proposal was met with torrents of applause. Even Lunacharsky was forced to admit that the Bolsheviks had nothing against it - they could not abandon the slogan of Soviet power - and the proposal was immediately passed by a unanimous vote.
But just as it looked as if a socialist coalition was about to be formed, news arrived of the violent storming of the Winter Palace and the arrest of Kerensky's ministers. Denouncing this 'criminal venture', which they said was bound to throw the country into civil war, a large number of the Menshevik and SR delegates walked out of the hall in protest, while the Bolshevik delegates stamped their feet, whistled and hurled abuse at them. Lenin's planned provocation - the pre-emptive seizure of power - had worked. By walking out of the Congress, the Mensheviks and SRs undermined all hopes of reaching a compromise with the Bolshevik moderates and of forming a coalition government of all the Soviet parties. The path was now clear for the Bolshevik dictatorship, based on the Soviet, which Lenin had no doubt intended all along. In the charged political atmosphere of the time, it is easy to see why the Mensheviks and SRs acted as they did. But it is equally difficult not to draw the conclusion that, by their actions, they merely played into Lenin's hands. Writing in 1921, Sukhanov admitted as much:
We completely untied the Bolsheviks' hands, making them masters of the whole situation and yielding to them the whole arena of the Revolution. A struggle at the Congress for a united democratic front might have had some success ... But by leaving the Congress, we ourselves gave the Bolsheviks a monopoly of the Soviet, of the masses, and of the Revolution. By our own irrational decision, we ensured the victory of Lenin's whole line.14
The effect of their walkout was to split the opposition forces, leaving Martov and the other left-wing advocates of a Soviet coalition isolated against Lenin's drive towards dictatorship. Martov made one more desperate appeal for an all-democratic government. But the mood in the hall was changing. As the mass of the delegates saw it, the Mensheviks and SRs had proved themselves to be 'counter-revolutionaries' by walking out of the Congress. They were now ready to follow the lead of the Bolsheviks in opposing the whole idea ofa compromise with them. Trotsky seized the initiative and, in one ofthe most often-quoted speeches ofthe twentieth century, denounced Martov's resolution for a coalition:
The masses of the people followed our banner and our insurrection was victorious. And now we are told: Renounce your victory, make concessions, compromise. With whom? I ask. With those wretched groups who have left us or who are making this proposal ... No one in Russia is with them any longer. A compromise is supposed to be made between two equal sides . But here no compromise is possible. To those who have left and to those who tell us to do this we say: You are miserable bankrupts, your role is played out; go where you ought to go - into the dustbin of history.15