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Perhaps the country that most exemplifies this inequality is Zimbabwe, where the Chinese enjoy a powerful presence in the economy, controlling key strategic areas like the railways, electricity supply, Air Zimbabwe and the Zimbabwe Broadcasting Corporation. [1083] The fact that China has a carefully worked-out and comprehensive strategic approach to its relationship with Africa, while the African response, in contrast, is fragmented between the many different nations, poorly informed about China, and based on an essentially pragmatic rather than strategic view, serves only to exacerbate this inequality. [1084] The danger is that African nations enter into agreements with China over the exploitation of their natural resources which are too favourable to China, or use the revenues gained in a short-term fashion, perhaps corruptly, to benefit various interest groups, or possibly both.

Although China ’s presence has been hugely welcomed across the continent, and has generated considerable enthusiasm, [1085] there is also unease and concern. This has been most manifest in Zambia, where in the last presidential election in 2006 the opposition candidate propounded a strongly anti-Chinese line, declaring that ‘Zambia is becoming a province — no, a district — of China’, and gained 29 per cent of the vote, prompting the Chinese ambassador to imply that China might withdraw its investments in the event of his winning. [1086] One of the strongest and most persistent criticisms is that Chinese companies prefer to employ Chinese rather than local workers, with the proportion of Chinese workers sometimes reaching as high as 70 per cent. [1087] There are also frequent complaints that Chinese managers display negative attitudes towards local people. [1088] Both of these, of course, touch directly upon the problem of Chinese attitudes towards those of darker skin, and especially Africans, which I discussed in Chapter 8. The evidence is still too sparse to draw any proper conclusions as yet, though the problem is unsurprising. There is a widely held view, especially in the West, that China ’s refusal to require any conditionality in terms of governance means that it is prone to turn a blind eye to human rights abuses, such as those in Darfur. [1089] That has certainly been the case, but the Chinese have recently shown growing sensitivity towards Western criticism, as well as that from within the continent, and as a result have helped to pressure the Sudanese government into accepting the presence of a joint United Nations/ African Union peacekeeping force in Darfur. [1090] There is little evidence, however, that China ’s record in Africa is any worse — and in fact is almost certainly far better — than the West’s own miserable catalogue of support for corrupt and dictatorial regimes on the continent, not to mention its colonial legacy. [1091] Finally, in a rather different vein, the Chinese have become the target of terrorist groups, for example in the Niger Delta and Ethiopia, a phenomenon which is surely set to grow as the Chinese presence and influence expands and they assume the role, visibility and responsibilities of a global power not only in Africa but elsewhere too. [1092]

The significance of China ’s African mission is enormous. Its rapidly growing influence suggests that in due course it will probably become the dominant player on the continent, and serves as a bold statement of China ’s wider global intentions. The speed of China ’s involvement in Africa, and its success in wooing the African elites, has put the West on the defensive in a continent where it has a poor historical record. [1093] Unlike the ‘scramble for Africa’ in the late nineteenth century, which generated bitter intra-European rivalry, China’s involvement has not as yet produced significant tensions with the US, Britain or France, though that could change. The recent establishment of the United States Africa Command to coordinate its military relations and activities on the continent suggests that it is concerned about China ’s growing influence; as of late 2008, however, the US had failed to find an African location for its headquarters, stating that it would be based in Stutt gart for the foreseeable future. Apart from the rather more attractive terms that China offers African countries, one of the reasons for its remarkable progress on the continent is that it does not carry the same kind of historical baggage as the West, a fact which it regularly stresses. In this context China has emphasized that Zheng He’s voyages to East Africa in the early fifteenth century sought no territory and took no slaves, in contrast to the Europeans. More importantly, during the Maoist period China was, in contrast to the West, a staunch supporter of the African independence movements. Thus China, with its own experience of colonization, its anti-colonial record and its status as a developing country, has more legitimacy and enjoys a greater affinity with the African nations than does the West. [1094] This is reflected in the fact that in the 2007 Pew Global Attitudes Survey, for example, respondents in ten African countries expressed far more favourable attitudes towards China than they did towards the United States.

THE MIDDLE EAST AND IRAN

Nearly two-thirds of the world’s proven oil reserves are concentrated in the Arabian Gulf, with Saudi Arabia controlling over a quarter, and Iraq and Kuwait sharing a little under a quarter. These three countries control about half of the world’s known oil reserves. Another potentially large producer in the region, Iran, accounts for a little under a tenth of world oil reserves. The Gulf States are responsible for nearly 40 per cent of world crude oil exports, with Saudi Arabia ’s share around 12 per cent and Iran ’s 7 per cent. China became a net importer of oil products in 1993 and of crude oil in 1996. [1095] It is estimated that by 202 °China will have to import in the range of 57–73 per cent of its oil requirements. [1096] China first became seriously concerned about its future oil supplies during the 1990s and as a result began to take steps to ensure their reliability. Until 2006 its biggest single supplier was Saudi Arabia, but Iran is also very important. It would therefore be natural for China to seek a much closer relationship with the Middle East. Unlike Africa, however, the region is regarded by the Americans as its sphere of influence. The US has become increasingly embroiled in the Middle East over the last thirty years, building extremely close relations with Israel and Saudi Arabia in particular, and becoming involved in two Gulf Wars with Iraq, the second largest oil producer, with the invasion in 2003 culminating in the country’s occupation. The Chinese, as a consequence, have trodden very warily in the region for fear of antagonizing the United States, whose relationship, ever since the reform period began, it has prioritized over all others. In contrast to Africa, which has clearly now assumed a central importance in its foreign policy, China regards the Middle East, as a result, as of only second-tier significance. [1097] Over the last few years it has employed various strategies to try to secure its oil supplies from the region. It has sought to negotiate long-term energy supply arrangements, most notably a ‘strategic oil partnership’ with the Saudis in 1999; [1098] Chinese oil companies have tried to gain rights to invest and develop oilfields in the region; and, finally, China has encouraged companies in the Gulf to invest in Chinese refineries in order to try to promote closer links. [1099]