Chris’s radio system was linked to a tape recorder in the cockpit for possible post-strike public relations purposes. On playback of the tape, we all heard the deep breathing of the crew building up during run to target and their comments about the precision of Hunter strikes. This was followed by excited shouting between Chris and Mike when they saw hundreds of CTs running in the treed and open areas through which the Canberra formation’s bomb loads would run. On completion of their strike, Chris and Mike continued to communicate excitedly as, in the background, the calm voices of the Hunter pilots could be heard as they called, “turning in live” for their restrikes.
When the Hunters cleared, the voice of Pink Formation leader, Squadron Leader Graham Cronshaw, showed that the K-Cars had arrived over FC camp. They were lucky that none of the anti-aircraft guns were manned as they set about attacking scattered survivors.
Chris Dixon had been instructed to contact Lusaka Tower before his strike, but something had gone amiss with frequency selection. He only made this call to a remarkably calm African controller whilst the K-Cars were active over FC camp. This was Chris’s prepared message:
Lusaka Tower this is Green Leader. This is a message for the Station Commander at Mumbwa from the Rhodesian Air Force. We are attacking the terrorist base at Westlands Farm at this time. This attack is against Rhodesian dissidents and not against Zambia. Rhodesia has no quarrel—repeat no quarrel—with Zambia or her Security Forces. We therefore ask you not to intervene or oppose our attack. However, we are orbiting your airfield at this time and are under orders to shoot down any Zambian aircraft that does not comply with this request and attempts to take off. Did you copy that?
In response to a query from Lusaka Tower, Chris suggested that the departure of an aircraft be withheld for a short while. The controller was happy to oblige and even asked a Kenyan airliner, incoming from Nairobi, to hold off.
Chris had flown out of range when Dolphin 3, Norman Walsh in the Command Dakota, established contact with Lusaka Tower. Immediately after this the irritated Kenyan Airways pilot asked Lusaka “Who has priority here anyway?” to which the Zambian controller calmly replied, “The Rhodesians, I guess!” The Kenyan did not have long to wait. Norman Walsh returned Zambia’s air space to the thankful controller once the K-Cars were well clear of the target.
Shortly after the air action, Lusaka’s hospital became inundated with the inflow of wounded and dying ZIPRA personnel. All forms of transport kept bringing in more and more casualties way into the night. Zambian patients were incensed for being kicked out of their sick beds when all floor and bed space was taken up by the ZIPRA flood. Unbeknown to the Zambian medical staff, a Selous Scouts officer was sitting calmly in the waiting room, claiming to be there for an anti-cholera injection. He watched the never-ending stream of serious casualties in satisfied amazement having, himself, been responsible for locating FC camp. According to a ZAPU delegation report to a Pan African Congress held at Arusha, Tanzania in May 1979, 226 CTs were killed and 629 were wounded, most seriously.
The K-Cars returned to Mana Pools and the jets to their bases. The gunners, preparing their helicopters for the attack on Mkushi Camp, were full of enthusiasm having just returned from FC Camp. For the technicians at New Sarum and Fylde there was no time to find out how the Zambian raid had gone; and anyway the aircrew were too tied up to share their war stories. In spite of this the armourers, engine fitters, airframe fitters, electricians, radio men and refuellers went about their business with no less enthusiasm than their colleagues way up on the Zambezi River.
In most respects, the attack on Mkushi was conducted in the manner of the first attack on Chimoio with jet-strikes leading the action at 11:40. In this case six Dakotas dropped 120 SAS paratroopers in a semi-circle around the western and northern flanks of Mkushi base with K-Cars patrolling the Mkushi River, which formed the eastern and southern boundaries of the target. Forty-four SAS were landed by eleven G-Cars behind the cover of a small feature in the camp’s southeastern corner. Eight kilometres southeast of target lay the Admin Base into which an RLI protection force was para-dropped with fuel and ammunition.
It was only when the ground fighting was underway, that the SAS realised Mkushi camp was occupied by women CTs with only a few male instructors. Our intelligence people had not known this. The women looked just like men in their camouflage uniforms and they bore their weapons with efficiency. Although some attempted to hide and take advantage of grass fires initiated by the air strikes and heavy firing, most fought back. The SAS could not help but be impressed by female aggression and fighting ability that kept the soldiers busy till late afternoon.
With the RLI protection force at the Admin Base was one unusual character. He was Sergeant-Major Standish who, as a grey-haired Territorial Army soldier on call-up with SAS, had managed to wangle his way onto Op Gatling. Stan Standish, who had been a paratrooper at Arnheim, claimed that only the Dakotas that had brought the force to Mkushi had seen longer service than he had. He thoroughly enjoyed his parachute descent into the Admin Base and gained the admiration of the aircrews who saw him set a great example to the RLI youngsters in matters of collecting parachutes and rolling fuel drums.
There had been some concern for the safety of helicopters parked on the Admin Base dambo (Zambian word for a small open grass area) because they presented a perfect target for any Zambian MiG 17 or MiG 19 pilot who might choose to attack them. As it happened, one MiG 19 did appear over the Admin Base but either the pilot did not see the exposed choppers or turned a blind eye and disappeared into the blue.
Mkushi was by far the best-organised base the troops had seen with many more facilities than in any ZANLA base. A red hammer and sickle emblazoned in red on one of the buildings emphasised ZIPRA’s Russian orientation. When the fighting was over, the troops left everything just as it was for members of the press to view the next day.
The SAS referred to reporters as ‘vultures’ because they only turned up when the killing was over. There were certainly plenty of dead bodies, piles of captured matériel, stacks of ZIPRA documents and many Soviet manuals for the vultures to photograph and inspect. The SAS also had five ZIPRA prisoners for them to interview. Once the press had done their work and were on their way back to Rhodesia late on Day 2, all equipment and buildings were destroyed.
On Day 3 the SAS were in the process of recovering to Rhodesia when a lookout warned of the approach of a large armed force sweeping towards the main group. Hurriedly the SAS got into position and waited for the force to come to close range. They then opened fire on Zambian Army, Zambian Police and ZIPRA in a short sharp action that left forty-seven dead. Fortunately they captured a Zambian Army man and, incredibly, ZIPRA’s senior Logistics Officer. His name was Mountain Gutu and his importance will become apparent. These two prisoners, together with the other five captives, were all flown back to Salisbury.
Well to the south of Mkushi, air attacks on CGT 2 were launched by four Vampires firing 60-pound squash-head rockets and 20mm cannons and four Lynx dropped Mini-golf bombs and fired 37mm boosted Sneb rockets. The RLI followed up in double Fireforce strength. I cannot recall any details of the ground action other than it occurred in difficult bush conditions resulting in the death of about sixty CTs. But this target turned out to be the toughest nut of the ZIPRA targets because it contained many very effective large-calibre anti-aircraft guns and missiles. Cocky Benecke took hits immediately, which forced him to withdraw with a holed fuel tank.