From captured CTs who had been at this location during the early stages of its construction, we learned that the many camps making up the entire ZANLA complex lay between two easily identified hills. Photo-reconnaissance confirmed the existence of the new base area but from photos alone it was impossible to determine key points. To find this out, the SAS was tasked to go in to gain a clearer picture. This was necessary at the time because the Fireforces were reaping such important rewards in securing the internal Vital Ground that there could be no question of withdrawing them for another joint-force operation in Mozambique. If the SAS could pinpoint worthwhile and clearly definable targets within the Vanduzi Circle, jets would have to take them on to help keep ZANLA off balance.
After an aborted first recce attempt, the SAS broke from their four-man team to test the viability of using just two lightly loaded men to move into the intensely active enemy base area. Whereas a total of six men were deployed in early March 1979, four established a secure base from which Richard Stannard and his companion, ‘Jungle’ Jordan, worked forward.
These two men succeeded in scaling the difficult feature Monte Bassa, one of the two features between which the Vanduzi Circle lay. From a lofty position they watched a great deal of ZANLA activity just below their OP. For two days they monitored all movements until they were sure they had the place they had been sent to find. Hunters, Canberras and K-Cars moved in. The jet strikes were over when the helicopters arrived and drew fire from many heavy AA positions the SAS had not seen because of the density of the bush. This proved that the base was much larger than they had thought.
When everything was quiet FRELIMO turned up, as had been expected, and for which the Hunters were busy rearming back at Thornhill. Richard and ‘Jungle’ Jordan, still unnoticed in their lofty hide, watched ZANLA’s dead and wounded being loaded onto a large truck whilst an armoured personnel carrier with FRELIMO troops prowled around.
When the Hunters returned, Richard was able to direct them onto the personnel carrier, which was taken out along with most of the FRELIMO troops surrounding it. As this happened a Strela missile was launched unsuccessfully, again at Vic Wightman who whipped around and blasted the launch point.
Having suffered losses due to the return of Hunters, FRELIMO realised there must be Rhodesians close by. Their radio messages were picked up in Rhodesia, passed to COMOPS, and relayed through SAS HQ to Richard who commenced his move-out after dark.
Unfortunately the two-man team was spotted next morning and a hot pursuit by angry ZANLA resulted in Jordan being wounded and having to call for hot extraction. Not long after this Richard Stannard was back on Monte Bassa from where he again directed jet-strikes and, again, he called Hunters back to strike ZANLA and FRELIMO whilst they were gathering casualties from the first strike.
Thanks to Richard’s successes, ZANLA was forced by FRELIMO to move away from them. The Vanduzi Circle of bases ceased to exist and it would be four months before we would find ZANLA’s new location close to our border.
Cost comparisons
PRIOR TO HIS DEPARTURE FROM COMOPS, Wing Commander Dag Jones, acting for General Barnard, instructed MID (Military Intelligence Department) to conduct a survey on the cost-effectiveness of internal versus external operations. By the time this lengthy study was completed much had changed. Nevertheless, it served as a rough guide for planning.
The MID assessment used the months January and February 1979 from which to draw figures and make comparisons. The task was difficult because they were trying to compare apples with oranges, except where costs were concerned. These are condensed details of Fireforce (FF) versus external operations, for what they are worth:
INTERNAL:
Considering that January and February had been very quiet months between major external offensives, MID’s choice was hardly an ideal time frame for comparisons. Besides, there had been considerable internal movements of forces into the Vital Ground, adversely effecting Fireforce activities in which 60% of calls proved to be ‘lemons’ because bush cover was at its thickest.
In these two months only 262 CTs had been killed in Fireforce actions, according to physical body counts that is. The cost per terrorist killed translated into high expenditure in Rhodesian terms. (I do not remember the actual cost comparison but can recall that it was in the order of one tenth of the American figure for Vietnam.)
EXTERNAL:
On the other hand, according to FRELIMO radio intercepts, 103 ZANLA CTs were killed in Mozambique by jet-strikes and landmines previously laid by Special Forces. In Angola 174 ZIPRA were killed with 533 seriously wounded. Since we did not have these figures at the time, they were not included in the cost-comparison study.
Ignoring those dead and wounded CTs in Mozambique, about which we knew nothing, the cost per terrorist killed externally (according to the study) was in the order of onethird of the internal cost. Within the next ten months this would reduce to less than a quarter in spite of greatly improved internal successes.
Externally things were going to hot up and prove just how seriously political restraints had increased costs and greatly expanded CT numbers.
ZIPRA plans revealed
DURING MARCH 1979, ACTING ON intelligence from their agent in Botswana, the Selous Scouts mounted an ambush on the main Grove Road linking Botswana with Zambia. This road ran close to Rhodesia’s western border where the Scouts established their ambush position. Their targets were two wellknown, high-ranking ZIPRA officers.
One was Dumiso Dabengwa (the ‘Black Russian’), second only to Nkomo and head of ZIPRA Intelligence. The other was Elliott Sibanda (the ‘Black Swine’), ZIPRA’s senior intelligence officer for the ‘Southern Front’ whose office was in Francistown, Botswana. These two men were transferring brand-new ZIPRA vehicles, purchased in South Africa, to Zambia.
When the Selous Scouts sprung its ambush, Dumiso Dabengwa escaped unharmed but Elliott Sibanda was seriously wounded and captured. Following stomach surgery that saved his life, Elliott Sibanda willingly gave the most important information we had received to date concerning ZIPRA’s future plans and dispositions.
We knew that ZIPRA indulged in a mix of conventional and irregular training and that the larger proportion of men had been preparing for conventional war. However, until Elliott opened Pandora’s box, we thought ZIPRA’s low level of activity was largely due to our external ops. Sibanda disabused us of such comforting thoughts.
Nkomo’s Russian advisors had persuaded ZIPRA to retain a limited force of active irregulars to keep Rhodesian eyes off the main intention, which was to invade Rhodesia. When the moment was right, the irregulars were to commit defined acts of sabotage in conjunction with a full-scale invasion by regular forces, supported by armour and air, in two drives via Victoria Falls in the west and Chirundu in the north.
Beira fuel refinery
WHILST SIBANDA’S INFORMATION WAS STILL being digested, the Selous Scouts were actively attempting to assassinate the elusive Joshua Nkomo in Lusaka and the SAS embarked on a daring operation to boost the MNR’s growing image by destroying the enormous fuel storage facility in Beira.